asymetric warfare

In message , phil hunt
writes
On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 05:26:01 GMT, Kevin Brooks wrote:
That is way beyond even our capabilities. You are talking autonomous combat
systems.

Yes. The progrsamming for this isn't particularly hard, once you've
written software that can identify a vehicle (or other target) in a
picture.

Falling off a cliff isn't a problem once you've learned how to fly like
Superman.

Trouble is, that prerequisite is harder than you might expect.

Getting a machine to tell a T-72 from a M1A1 from a Leclerc is hard
enough in good conditions: doing so in the presence of camouflage,
obscurants and when the crew have run out of internal stowage (so have
hung lots of external gear) and maybe stored some spare track plates on
the glacis front ('cause they need the spare plates and they might as
well be extra armour) gets _really_ tricky. Do you err on the side of
"tank-like vehicle, kill!" or "if you're not sure don't attack"?

Would it not be embarrasing to have a successful armoured raid broken up
by your own missiles?

It's just a matter of aiming the missile towards the
target.

Which presupposes you know where the target is, even roughly, in a
sufficiently timely manner.

Weapons like this were in existance 20 years ago, for example the
Exocet anti-ship missile.

Which never once hit its intended target from an air launch (five
launches, all aimed at 'carriers'; two hits, one on a picket ship and
one on a STUFT that was seduced off another picket)

Bad example. (Besides, Exocet in 1982 was a frontline Western
capability, launched from aircraft with radar that could cover the
missile's range window... and they _still_ missed their intended
targets. You're talking about Hail Mary shots of extended-ranged Exocets
from the Argentine mainland... really not likely to work)

I'm not bsure what problems you envisage
with doing this; perhaps you could elaborate?

Key problem is that going up against the US loses you your comms and
observation (in oldspeak) or your C4ISTAR (in newspeak). Can't get recce
flights out to see where they are, can't get communication with your
forward observers, can't orbit surveillance assets. Observe how
thoroughly Iraq was deceived in 1991, for instance, or how Argentina
spent most of the Falklands conflict trying to figure out where the
British forces were and what they were doing. (Even when they had a
perfect target, they hit escorts rather than HVUs)

because you can't just fire them "in that direction, more or less", and hit
anything--you have to have a pretty narrow determination of where the target
is right at the time the weapon arrives.

What you could do is have the missile, if it doesn't find a target
to hang around in the area looking for one. (The British ALARM
missile does this literally :-)).

Which area are you firing it at? Seeker windows are small and
battlefields are large. The larger the area it's expected to scan, the
harder it is to build and the less reliable it will be.

(b) Are you going to send it in low, where it
MIGHT have a chance at surviving, but its field of view is extremely
limited, so it is that much more likely to not find any target to hit, but
which also requires oodles of (very accurate, and likely unavailable to most
potential foes) digital topographic data to be uploaded and a complex
navigation system)

The topographic data would probably be available if the missile is
flying over the territory of its own country.

Otherwise, there are other methods of nagivation: dead reckoning,
celestial, a LORAN-like system could be set up.

DR is patchy at best unless you've got good inertial guidance systems
(non-trivial). Celestial only works on clear nights - so you're limited
to fighting wars after dark on cloudless nights with no flares in the
sky. LORAN is a radio broadcast and therefore not survivable against a
US-style opponent.

or up high where the view is better,

It's possible that a mission might require some of the flight to be
at high level and some at low level. I imagine the missiles could
be programmed for a mission by sticking a computer with an Ethernet
cable into a slot on the missile.

This has only been done for twenty years or so in the West, so hardly a
great advance.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

ess (phil hunt) wrote:
Yes. The progrsamming for this isn't particularly hard, once you've
written software that can identify a vehicle (or other target) in a
picture. It's just a matter of aiming the missile towards the
target.

ROTFL. Yes, once you master the extraordinarily difficult task of
writing software to identify a target, then pretty much else is
simple. But you appear to be underestimating the effort needed to
write that software. (Clue: All of your high tech nations have been
wrestling with the problem for years, with little real sucess.)

Weapons like this were in existance 20 years ago, for example the
Exocet anti-ship missile. I'm not bsure what problems you envisage
with doing this; perhaps you could elaborate?

The Excocet relies on active detection of the target, not on analysis
of passive images of the target.

What you could do is have the missile, if it doesn't find a target
to hang around in the area looking for one. (The British ALARM
missile does this literally :-)).

ALARM, like *ALL* ARM's, depends on *active emissions* by the target,
not on analysis of passive images of the target.

You can't prevent fratricide all the time, and most countries would
have a higher tolerance from losses caused by friendly fire than
most western countries do. The missile would know (at least
approximately - within a few km) were it is, and therefore whether
it is over land occupied by its own side.

Assuming the firing unit has a valid picture of what land is and is
not currently in friendly hands. A problem that 'high tech' nations
are finding difficult to solve.

Otherwise, there are other methods of nagivation: dead reckoning,
celestial, a LORAN-like system could be set up.

One suspects you vastly underestimate the difficulties involved in
accurate navigation.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

"Kevin Brooks" wrote:
Otherwise, there are other methods of nagivation: dead reckoning,
celestial, a LORAN-like system could be set up.

Your LORAN system bites the dust when the curtain goes up.

Depending on LORAN plays to one of the great strengths of the US...
Electronic warfare. (Not to mention various more violent ways of
taking the system off the air.)

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

Bernardz wrote:
Say I built heaps of multiple-rocket launchers built an improved WW2, V1
jet to hit a city say at 200 miles and then targeted them at an US ally
cities.

Aiming would be pretty trivial, most modern cities are pretty big anyway
and so what if a a lot miss? Its not like they cost me much anyway each
missile.

Aiming them is trivial. Producing them, storing them until needed,
deploying them when needed, and launching them in a coordinated
fashion *isn't*. (And all the steps in the process are vulnerable to
disruption.)

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

In message , phil hunt
writes
Indeed. Developing and caching weapons that allow people to be
guerrillas with reduced risk to themselves (such as time-delayed
mortars) would seem an obvious thing to do.

Done thirty years ago with assorted single launchers (basically just a
rail and a stand) to point a 107mm or 122mm rocket targetwards, and a
countdown timer to fire it minutes or hours after the guerilla has
departed.

If you're lucky then you can plant it on the hospital roof, across the
street from the orphanage and next door to the elementary school, and
tip off the news crews so that any enemy counterbattery fire is widely
reported.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

ess (phil hunt) wrote:

On Thu, 18 Dec 2003 17:52:28 GMT, Derek Lyons wrote:

(phil hunt) wrote:

Guidance systems depend on *much* more than simply their computers.
You also need the inertial components, or their analogs, and *those*
are going to be hard to obtain in large quantities, especially at any
useful accuracy level.

digital cameras can do much of the job, and they are available
cheaply.

ROTFLMAO. A commercial digital camera isn't within an order of
magnitude of defense imaging systems and *isn't* a replacement for
inertial components. (I.E. a camera can image a target, it cannot
keep your missile level, or on a proper course.)

snipped various fanciful uses
Many of these depend on the West not deploying something it's
exceedingly capable at; Electronic warfare and countermeasures.

What electronic countermeasures could be used?

Any number of the the systems that the US has developed, especially
for naval and aviation uses.

Faster weapon system design mewans it could
"get inside the decision curve" of Western arms industries, because
by the time they've produced a weapon to counter the low-cost
weapon, the next generation of low-cost weapon is there.

Problem is, the Western powers can get inside this curve faster than
the medium nation can. The factories, power grid, etc of the medium
nation can be taken out within a few weeks to months via manned
bombers, or our own cruise missiles. Vital components produced
overseas can be stopped via blockade.

That's after the war breaks out. The USA isn't likely to start
bombing every country with an arms industry, is it?

No. But bombing after war breaks out is about 99% as efficient as
doing so before the war breaks out. Your LCCM's have to be stored
somewhere, and then deployed to their firing points.

D.
--
The STS-107 Columbia Loss FAQ can be found
at the following URLs:

Text-Only Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq.html

Enhanced HTML Version:
http://www.io.com/~o_m/columbia_loss_faq_x.html

Corrections, comments, and additions should be
e-mailed to , as well as posted to
sci.space.history and sci.space.shuttle for
discussion.

An interesting if, but the Soviets, though at an apparent disadvantage,
weren't faced with such overwhelming military power, and had a history of
successfully repelling invaders. It would have been tough to motivate the
Iraqis to such determination given that they knew their opponents were
vastly superior based on the clear demostrated in the Kuwait war. And I get
the impression the average Iraqi was even less loyal to the Iraqi government
than the Russians were to theirs. Finally, I would imagine the Soviets were
even more ruthless in there methods for enforcing behavior.

Jarg

"Simon Morden" wrote in message
...
Michael Ash wrote:

I do recall thinking, during the
fall of Iraq and the immediate aftermath, that a trained monkey could
probably do a better job of defending that country. Take all of those
army units that got surrounded/wiped out/whatever and simply distribute
them throughout the cities. Give each one a rifle, give RPGs to as many
as you can. Tell them to wait in a building by the window. When they see
Americans, shoot (at) them. As it was, I suppose the high ranks were too
busy trying to get out of harm's way with as much cash as possible to
put any effort into making life hard on the US Army.

I concur. If the Iraqis had been as determined as say, the Soviets in
defense of
Leningrad and Stalingrad, the choices would have been between bomb Baghdad
flat or
suffer massive casualties.

Thank God they weren't.

Indeed, the general level of competence of most terrorist/armed resistance
movements is worryingly low. Where do these guys get their training? (I
know the
answer is the CIA, but I'll just ask nursie for more thorazine rather than
go down
that road...)

Simon Morden
--
__________________________________________________ ______
Visit the Book of Morden at http://www.bookofmorden.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk
*Thy Kingdom Come - a brief history of Armageddon* out now from Lone Wolf

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
. ..
I think that Phil is probably talking about weapons like the IAI Harpy.
It
is a relatively inexpensive "CM" used in SEAD operations. The only
significant technology employed by this vehicle is in the sensor (and
even
there, a "middle-ranking country" should not have a problem developing
or
procuring).

The question really is if it is possible to integrate different sensors
(TV,
IR) on such vehicles, if you can accurately identify targets (based on
some
signature characteristics or library), and how effective it could be (at
not
killing your own or being easily defeated by the enemy).

And those questions are the kind that even the US, with its multi-billion
dollar R&D structure, is tangling with--do you really see some
second/third
world potential foe solving that dilemma over the posited period of the
next
ten years? I don't.

The US has a number of programs all employing various degrees of
technological innovation. While money has been allocated into the research
of new UAV/UCAV's, obviously that is a relatively small investment (when
compared to the total budget). Even with those programs, human involvement
seems to be essential in the operation of the system and targeting of the
enemy. Obviously the program selection, funding, and priority given differs
from country to country. I'm just stating that another country could take a
position on this matter that might differ from that of the US.

That depends on the programming of the weapon. The same thought process
that
goes into autonomously targeted systems (ALARM, Harpy, SMArt, etc.) -
systems that can be launched against enemy positions and where the
weapon
autonomously selects on locks on to its target - would be used.

Those home on active emitters, keeping their last transmitting location in
their memory in case they drop off the air. That is a big difference from
going after targets that are purely passive and are not radiating (or not
radiating anything you can actually read with a system that could be
placed
in such a small weapon--detecting the frequency agile signals from vehicle
FM radios is not going to work).

There is a reason I included the SMArt artillery round. It's advanced sensor
will detect and target armored vehicles (MBT's, AIFV's, APC's, etc.) while
"loitering" over enemy positions. Depending on the target, different sensors
can be used that can target different target characteristics. The SMArt
155mm artillery shell is already in service, so the technology for fusing
such sensors to UAV's (like the Harpy) is surely not a decade away.

Good questions for the side employing them. If you are indeed talking
about
a "massive" use of such weapons, I think that the Patriots (and other
anti-aircraft systems) would be quickly (and quite expensively)
overwhelmed.
Overwhelming, confusing, and otherwise countering the sensor might be a
better approach.

I disagree. On the one hand you are going to have to use a pretty complex
CM
of sorts, as we have already seen from the discussion to this point, if
you
are going to engage previously unlocated targets, so the idea that these
things will be cheaply turned out in some converted auto garage is not
going
to cut it.

A UAV is not an expensive proposition when you take away every aspect of
human control after launch. It can also be deployed in such a fashion that
few soldiers are needed in their transporation, targeting, and launch.

For example, Turkey recently purchased roughly 100 Harpy's. While the cost
has not been disclosed (at least to any sources I have access to), it is not
considered to be "prohibitive" or even "substantial". A single
truck-transporter can carry 18 such weapons in canisters, and a battery of 3
can launch 54 of them simultaneously.

They will also be expensive--the R&D effort is still required,
since what has been postulated is essentially an autonomous attack system
that does not currently exist even in the US.

But it does exist in the form of an artillery shell that can be fired 40 km
away from its target (in the case of weapons against armored vehicles). Why
not extend that range to perhaps 100+ km by fusing it onto the body of a UAV
(like the one used against radar transmissions)?

Third, the number of Patiots
that can be made available is not a trivial number--count the number of
missiles available in the uploaded canisters of a single battery, not to
mention the reminder of its ABL that is accompanying them.

How many Patriots are used against incoming artillery shells? Imagine that
instead of artillery shells you have hundreds of self-guided UAV's. Even
against a Harpy battery (54 incoming vehicles that will loiter until they
detonate), what exactly can a Patriot battery do? Now imagine a few hundred
more, some targeting AD and others armored vehicles or ships.

Finally, we have
a rather substantial stock of Stingers, including ones mounted on Avengers
and BFV-Stinger, along with the regular MANPADS.

Perhaps I'm not informed on the subject, but how many UAV's or CM's have
been shot down by heat-seeking MANPADS (ever)? Some UAV's have been lost in
the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan due to ground fire (AAA), but I've never
heard of a confirmed loss due to a MANPAD.

Sorry, this just does not
look realistic to me. Other posters have taken the more proper tack--don't
try to confront the US on conventional terms and instead go the
unconventional warfare route--much more likely to at least stand a chance
at
success of sorts.

I'm not trying to get into the mind of every despot in the world. However,
many of them invest time and money on conventional programs (like ballistic
missiles). Compared to a ballistic missile system, wouldn't a sensor-fused
CM be a better investment?

If you are talking about a "massive" deployment of such inexpensive
weapons,
you might not need to concern yourself with those that "miss". Depending
on
the cost of the vehicles, the total number acquired, and the budget
allocated, the user might be satisfied with a success rate well below
100%.

I'd be surprised if this approach yielded a system that acheived a success
rate that reaches even double digits--for the commitment of significant
resources that would have been better used training irregulars and
creating
caches of weapons and explosives.

Irregulars are not going to stop the advance of any regular army (their
mission is quite different). What the army of a country needs to do is to
target the enemy formations. As was proved once again in Iraq, it is
suicidal to stand up against a better equipped and trained military in order
to fight a "conventional" war. The speed, accuracy and lethality ( the
"punch") cannot be countered with 1960's defensive technology. You can
however try to expose any weakness that might exist in the defenses of your
superior opponent (much like the Iraqi irregulars tried doing).

The Harpy has been around for a while. And in the mean time, technology
has
progressed and costs of acquisition declined (for commercially available
components).

Again, there is one heck of a difference between going after an active
emitter like an AD radar and passive targets, especially if you are the
disadvantaged party in terms if ISR and C-4, which we can bet the
opposition
would be in such a scenario.

How difficult was it for the Iraqi's to know the general geographic position
of the US troops? Turning on CNN being one easy way. Imagine if they could
send self-targeting systems into the general location from 40 km away (using
SMArt), what the US position would be. Obviously the Air Force would have
something to target (those nice artillery pieces), so that could not last
for long. But what if some regular-looking trucks a few hundred km's away
were achieving the same result? In that scenario, all I can do is remember
the "Scud hunt" from GW1.

Brooks

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
. ..
I think that Phil is probably talking about weapons like the IAI Harpy.
It
is a relatively inexpensive "CM" used in SEAD operations. The only
significant technology employed by this vehicle is in the sensor (and
even
there, a "middle-ranking country" should not have a problem developing
or
procuring).

The question really is if it is possible to integrate different sensors
(TV,
IR) on such vehicles, if you can accurately identify targets (based on
some
signature characteristics or library), and how effective it could be (at
not
killing your own or being easily defeated by the enemy).

And those questions are the kind that even the US, with its multi-billion
dollar R&D structure, is tangling with--do you really see some
second/third
world potential foe solving that dilemma over the posited period of the
next
ten years? I don't.

The US has a number of programs all employing various degrees of
technological innovation. While money has been allocated into the research
of new UAV/UCAV's, obviously that is a relatively small investment (when
compared to the total budget). Even with those programs, human involvement
seems to be essential in the operation of the system and targeting of the
enemy. Obviously the program selection, funding, and priority given differs
from country to country. I'm just stating that another country could take a
position on this matter that might differ from that of the US.

That depends on the programming of the weapon. The same thought process
that
goes into autonomously targeted systems (ALARM, Harpy, SMArt, etc.) -
systems that can be launched against enemy positions and where the
weapon
autonomously selects on locks on to its target - would be used.

Those home on active emitters, keeping their last transmitting location in
their memory in case they drop off the air. That is a big difference from
going after targets that are purely passive and are not radiating (or not
radiating anything you can actually read with a system that could be
placed
in such a small weapon--detecting the frequency agile signals from vehicle
FM radios is not going to work).

There is a reason I included the SMArt artillery round. It's advanced sensor
will detect and target armored vehicles (MBT's, AIFV's, APC's, etc.) while
"loitering" over enemy positions. Depending on the target, different sensors
can be used that can target different target characteristics. The SMArt
155mm artillery shell is already in service, so the technology for fusing
such sensors to UAV's (like the Harpy) is surely not a decade away.

Good questions for the side employing them. If you are indeed talking
about
a "massive" use of such weapons, I think that the Patriots (and other
anti-aircraft systems) would be quickly (and quite expensively)
overwhelmed.
Overwhelming, confusing, and otherwise countering the sensor might be a
better approach.

I disagree. On the one hand you are going to have to use a pretty complex
CM
of sorts, as we have already seen from the discussion to this point, if
you
are going to engage previously unlocated targets, so the idea that these
things will be cheaply turned out in some converted auto garage is not
going
to cut it.

A UAV is not an expensive proposition when you take away every aspect of
human control after launch. It can also be deployed in such a fashion that
few soldiers are needed in their transporation, targeting, and launch.

For example, Turkey recently purchased roughly 100 Harpy's. While the cost
has not been disclosed (at least to any sources I have access to), it is not
considered to be "prohibitive" or even "substantial". A single
truck-transporter can carry 18 such weapons in canisters, and a battery of 3
can launch 54 of them simultaneously.

They will also be expensive--the R&D effort is still required,
since what has been postulated is essentially an autonomous attack system
that does not currently exist even in the US.

But it does exist in the form of an artillery shell that can be fired 40 km
away from its target (in the case of weapons against armored vehicles). Why
not extend that range to perhaps 100+ km by fusing it onto the body of a UAV
(like the one used against radar transmissions)?

Third, the number of Patiots
that can be made available is not a trivial number--count the number of
missiles available in the uploaded canisters of a single battery, not to
mention the reminder of its ABL that is accompanying them.

How many Patriots are used against incoming artillery shells? Imagine that
instead of artillery shells you have hundreds of self-guided UAV's. Even
against a Harpy battery (54 incoming vehicles that will loiter until they
detonate), what exactly can a Patriot battery do? Now imagine a few hundred
more, some targeting AD and others armored vehicles or ships.

Finally, we have
a rather substantial stock of Stingers, including ones mounted on Avengers
and BFV-Stinger, along with the regular MANPADS.

Perhaps I'm not informed on the subject, but how many UAV's or CM's have
been shot down by heat-seeking MANPADS (ever)? Some UAV's have been lost in
the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan due to ground fire (AAA), but I've never
heard of a confirmed loss due to a MANPAD.

Sorry, this just does not
look realistic to me. Other posters have taken the more proper tack--don't
try to confront the US on conventional terms and instead go the
unconventional warfare route--much more likely to at least stand a chance
at
success of sorts.

I'm not trying to get into the mind of every despot in the world. However,
many of them invest time and money on conventional programs (like ballistic
missiles). Compared to a ballistic missile system, wouldn't a sensor-fused
CM be a better investment?

If you are talking about a "massive" deployment of such inexpensive
weapons,
you might not need to concern yourself with those that "miss". Depending
on
the cost of the vehicles, the total number acquired, and the budget
allocated, the user might be satisfied with a success rate well below
100%.

I'd be surprised if this approach yielded a system that acheived a success
rate that reaches even double digits--for the commitment of significant
resources that would have been better used training irregulars and
creating
caches of weapons and explosives.

Irregulars are not going to stop the advance of any regular army (their
mission is quite different). What the army of a country needs to do is to
target the enemy formations. As was proved once again in Iraq, it is
suicidal to stand up against a better equipped and trained military in order
to fight a "conventional" war. The speed, accuracy and lethality ( the
"punch") cannot be countered with 1960's defensive technology. You can
however try to expose any weakness that might exist in the defenses of your
superior opponent (much like the Iraqi irregulars tried doing).

The Harpy has been around for a while. And in the mean time, technology
has
progressed and costs of acquisition declined (for commercially available
components).

Again, there is one heck of a difference between going after an active
emitter like an AD radar and passive targets, especially if you are the
disadvantaged party in terms if ISR and C-4, which we can bet the
opposition
would be in such a scenario.

How difficult was it for the Iraqi's to know the general geographic position
of the US troops? Turning on CNN being one easy way. Imagine if they could
send self-targeting systems into the general location from 40 km away (using
SMArt), what the US position would be. Obviously the Air Force would have
something to target (those nice artillery pieces), so that could not last
for long. But what if some regular-looking trucks a few hundred km's away
were achieving the same result? In that scenario, all I can do is remember
the "Scud hunt" from GW1.

Brooks

(Derek Lyons) wrote:

Procuring the missiles is only the first step. Then you have to
train the crews, and store the missiles until needed, and distribute
them when needed. All three are non-trivial problems in and of
themselves. (And all four steps are vulnerable to disruption.)

That's something a lot of nations can't seem to understand about running
a modern military. Strategy is one thing, equipment design is another,
but logistics is what wins wars.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.