"F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success"

On Sat, 23 Dec 2006 16:01:33 -0600, Jack wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:


We've got no disagreement about putting a gun in every fighter that
has any possibility of being engaged air-to-air.

Careful wording, that. What matter the medium in which your target
operates, to a true fighter pilot? We wouldn't want to give the
impression of air-to-air arrogance. Would we?

I'm hardly from the age of air-to-air arrogance. I was more in the
Jack-of-too-many-trades era. As a true Neanderthal I vociferously
protested against the idea of specialization--one in which the
aircraft has more capabilities than the operator. Yet, that's the way
we've gone and I'll freely admit that it has turned out to be a better
AF.

My contention has always been that air-to-air is something a fighter
pilot does on the way to and from the target.


"CAS is continuing to morph into a stand-off delivery game.
The troops-in-contact provide accurate coordinates or laser-
designation and the stand-off platform dumps iron on the
cross-hairs. It isn't as glamorous as snake-n-nape at 50 feet,
but it is much more accurate and effective." -- E. Rasimus

Oh sure, very glamorous indeed, but not much use when bad guys are not
only in the wire, but on your side of the wire. And that brings up the
question of whether 30mm might not be a little too heavy for this
particular scenario?

Agreed, in principle, but rare in practice. We don't see fixed
position fighting very much these days with the concomitant
requirement for "danger close" employment. It might recur or might
not. And, the gun will be available although not the first choice.

Strafing as a mission may suck today, but it always did -- even when it
was just too much damn fun to ignore. But as a capability and a skill,
it must be respected and won't go away. You can do things with a gun you
can't do without it, I'm sure you'll agree. And those are very important
jobs -- CAS jobs -- the kind that keep our people fighting or bring them
home when they can't.

I'm not sure I agree if we are talking ground attack that there are
things that can be done with a gun that can't be done better with
another weapon--except for maybe writing your name in the snow.

The new generation of small bombs are going to be very nice tools for
killing Abdullah in the bedroom next door.

T-I-C and SAR assets won't always have laser-designators and GPS. If
they had all that stuff working they might not be in so much trouble in
the first place.

It will be a very rare detachment that doesn't have GPS or laser
capability. When you can buy a Garmin to fit in your shirt pocket from
Cabela's, there's no reason not to have one in the infantryman's kit.
And, they do.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Good discussion and I respect what Ed says immensely however gentlemen there
are some very critical differences being experienced in counter-insurgency
warfare now underway in Iraq and Iran and for the moment I want you to stop
looking around the world and realize that we must now bring an end to these
hostilities and it will take a good measure of air power to return the third
dimension to the fight simply because the Army failed to do that when its
"boots on the ground efforts" recognized that the armed helicopter (mostly
Apache and Kiawa) were now unrealiable against a ground sprinkled with armed
insurgents shooting wildly at them from all directions (Cobra II Chapter 14
and Fiasco Chapter 6). The war, which again remmebr is costing billions
every month and is taking nearly one hundred lives every month with many
more wounded has gone on now for five years. So at the moment we are not
looking at a conventional war with China or an invasion of North Korea, we
are focused on Iraq and Afghanistan for this next budget cycle and for the
next few years. We can not afford the new technology breakers that cannot
be applied to these conflicts in good measure and something has to give. We
no longer can deal with "nice to have" and starfing "may be stupid" in most
fighter pilots eyes but our of necessity in this war because of the caveats
of collateral damage and the vulnerability of the attack helicopters fighter
aircart are being asked to come in and strafe - and they do. And note that
just recently an F-16 killed itself either out of ground fixation or ground
fire, but in essence it was close to the ground and firing on the enemy.

A new F-15E or F-16C or F/A-18E coming off the production line is in no way
an "old" aircraft when considering whether it can do a job or not. These
machines have been continually maturing and continually improve to the point
that now they are more capable in just about every category of fighter
comparisons that you can think of except the materials and shapes that lend
itself to so called stealth features. To say that the JSF has a mystical
integrative advantage over the F-15E is simply a case of displays, antennas,
and circuit boards because the ever changing software tapes are deliberately
held up as different beasts in different models because we have long past
the day when you could distinguish the difference between an F-16 or F-18 or
F-15 or B-2 or JSF radar - it is just boards, components and software - all
of which is grossly overpriced and enornmously over-paced to drag out the
whole process as if we really were designing and developing something so
critically different.

Gentlemen - these wars are about reliable platforms that can duke it with a
lightly armed but numerous ground threats that simply overwhelm the space
around which our outnumbered and not-so mobile troops are forced to operate
in environments that are not tactically smart yet forced because the mission
implies a presence (boots on the ground), small units, and unfortulately for
all the failures of the great technologists and IT'ists, and band width
masters we find that in reality almost every one of the small unit patrols
and convoys that venture out beyond their safe zone go without a direct
linked eye-in-the-sky to support them for the duration of their mission. The
technologists promised them this and it fell through and now we have to fill
in gaps with everything we can use because we do not have a survivable Blitz
fighter (cross between A-10 and AH-64) that can support the troops. We could
argue this five years ago, but its 2 billion a week, 3000 lives, and still
operations without a clear strategy and time is wasting - the JSF has to go
and we will use the billions it is sucking up to flood into the war zones
enough air power to do the job. I think it would be wise to extend the
development of the JSF so that down the road it may merge with things that
could better use its qualities - lasers, unmanned, etc., but to say it is
the maneuveruing wonderdog of the next generation fighter force is like
saying the the P-40 should replace the P-51's - no guys, we have all got to
get out collective heads out of our asses and look to what is happening in
COIN warfare and realize a step back for the moment may really be the case
needed yet there are small diamonds of technoklogy that still need to be
used - it is in that integration we can overcome the air needs of urban-COIN
warfare.

So as much as we like Ed and his writes, Ed also has to think about what is
going on and come to grips with the mess that the air-ground efforts are in.
Something went so wrong after Gulf War I and now the fixes I am saying may
not again reflect the needs for a North Korea, but for OIF and OEF they
certainly make a point. The direct manned ISR, the "shooter" with you, the
"eye-in-the-sky" attached to every unit, the forcing of the enemy tyo
recognize that day or night there are small aircraft and UAV's overhead
watching and ready to shoot something and ground units that have a renewed
offensiveness in capability to do their presence mission better.

For the overall umbrella and border areas, the President then gets his
"hammer" to change the course of any incursion any challenge from outside

Ed - for OIF and OEF the "morf" is back to close direct fire. Small calibre
guns and rockets without warheads may have more merit. Concrete bombs were
considered but they skip and bounce sending a high speed hockey puck down
streets. For another war it will go back to standoff and precision but we
need to re-figure all this



"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Sat, 23 Dec 2006 16:01:33 -0600, Jack wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:


We've got no disagreement about putting a gun in every fighter that
has any possibility of being engaged air-to-air.

Careful wording, that. What matter the medium in which your target
operates, to a true fighter pilot? We wouldn't want to give the
impression of air-to-air arrogance. Would we?

I'm hardly from the age of air-to-air arrogance. I was more in the
Jack-of-too-many-trades era. As a true Neanderthal I vociferously
protested against the idea of specialization--one in which the
aircraft has more capabilities than the operator. Yet, that's the way
we've gone and I'll freely admit that it has turned out to be a better
AF.

My contention has always been that air-to-air is something a fighter
pilot does on the way to and from the target.


"CAS is continuing to morph into a stand-off delivery game.
The troops-in-contact provide accurate coordinates or laser-
designation and the stand-off platform dumps iron on the
cross-hairs. It isn't as glamorous as snake-n-nape at 50 feet,
but it is much more accurate and effective." -- E. Rasimus

Oh sure, very glamorous indeed, but not much use when bad guys are not
only in the wire, but on your side of the wire. And that brings up the
question of whether 30mm might not be a little too heavy for this
particular scenario?

Agreed, in principle, but rare in practice. We don't see fixed
position fighting very much these days with the concomitant
requirement for "danger close" employment. It might recur or might
not. And, the gun will be available although not the first choice.

Strafing as a mission may suck today, but it always did -- even when it
was just too much damn fun to ignore. But as a capability and a skill,
it must be respected and won't go away. You can do things with a gun you
can't do without it, I'm sure you'll agree. And those are very important
jobs -- CAS jobs -- the kind that keep our people fighting or bring them
home when they can't.

I'm not sure I agree if we are talking ground attack that there are
things that can be done with a gun that can't be done better with
another weapon--except for maybe writing your name in the snow.

The new generation of small bombs are going to be very nice tools for
killing Abdullah in the bedroom next door.

T-I-C and SAR assets won't always have laser-designators and GPS. If
they had all that stuff working they might not be in so much trouble in
the first place.

It will be a very rare detachment that doesn't have GPS or laser
capability. When you can buy a Garmin to fit in your shirt pocket from
Cabela's, there's no reason not to have one in the infantryman's kit.
And, they do.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Mon, 01 Jan 2007 03:00:47 GMT, "Ski"
wrote:

Ed - for OIF and OEF the "morf" is back to close direct fire. Small calibre
guns and rockets without warheads may have more merit. Concrete bombs were
considered but they skip and bounce sending a high speed hockey puck down
streets. For another war it will go back to standoff and precision but we
need to re-figure all this


It's always good to get input from first-hand observers. The way
things have evolved in the current unpleasantness there is a lot of
unstructured urban close-quarters battle going on. That doesn't lend
itself to CAS but does indeed respond to direct fire. And,
particularly with organic rather than on-call assets. Having the
weapon on the Hummer, Bradley or Abrams is what's going to be used.

Only if the situation allows for a fall back do you get the
opportunity to use the various indirect fire options.

But, there's always the need to plan for the future engagement rather
than the last and in the process to include sufficient adaptability to
be responsive to changing requirements. (That's staff talk for having
high tech, brute force, sophisticated and crude, large and small,
precision and volume ordnance included in large enough numbers to be
available at a small enough price tag to fit in the budget.)

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Hit it right on the head Ed - the situation is unique and it got that way
because we went in blind on the wishes of the politicals and not with a good
plan - hence we are backed into a wall and bleeding for it. You caught on
also that there is no doctrine for this, hardly any proper terms and as CAS
was evolving to use the UAV's and the links the real situation on the ground
just up and ran over the thinking and then again the split between the USAF
and Army has not helped.

How would you tackle this - seriously with all respect - how would you put
this fire out or in the least what role would you see air power



"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 01 Jan 2007 03:00:47 GMT, "Ski"
wrote:

Ed - for OIF and OEF the "morf" is back to close direct fire. Small
calibre
guns and rockets without warheads may have more merit. Concrete bombs were
considered but they skip and bounce sending a high speed hockey puck down
streets. For another war it will go back to standoff and precision but we
need to re-figure all this


It's always good to get input from first-hand observers. The way
things have evolved in the current unpleasantness there is a lot of
unstructured urban close-quarters battle going on. That doesn't lend
itself to CAS but does indeed respond to direct fire. And,
particularly with organic rather than on-call assets. Having the
weapon on the Hummer, Bradley or Abrams is what's going to be used.

Only if the situation allows for a fall back do you get the
opportunity to use the various indirect fire options.

But, there's always the need to plan for the future engagement rather
than the last and in the process to include sufficient adaptability to
be responsive to changing requirements. (That's staff talk for having
high tech, brute force, sophisticated and crude, large and small,
precision and volume ordnance included in large enough numbers to be
available at a small enough price tag to fit in the budget.)

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

On Mon, 01 Jan 2007 21:07:03 GMT, "Ski"
wrote:

Hit it right on the head Ed - the situation is unique and it got that way
because we went in blind on the wishes of the politicals and not with a good
plan - hence we are backed into a wall and bleeding for it. You caught on
also that there is no doctrine for this, hardly any proper terms and as CAS
was evolving to use the UAV's and the links the real situation on the ground
just up and ran over the thinking and then again the split between the USAF
and Army has not helped.

How would you tackle this - seriously with all respect - how would you put
this fire out or in the least what role would you see air power

First, recognize that asking a fighter pilot for an opinion is always
dangerous. Second, if the fighter pilot also teaches political science
and international relations, you're going to get nuance (i.e.
gobbledegook) and bias (i.e. bias.)

I'm a long distance outside of the area of operations and my picture
is provided by the left-stream media. I get some very positive
feedback through back-channel links to folks still in the business to
gain a bit of balance.

Let's start by stating my impression that the current hostilities are
predominantly sectarian between Shia and Sunni, with the US getting
nailed in the cross-fire and offering a convenient scapegoat for each
side to point at as the cause. Not a good situation.

Essential to the discussion is recognition of the need to acknowledge
majority rule--that means mostly Shia, unfortunately. Balance and
stability don't come without some compromise that guarantees input
from the Kurds and Sunni, but they want sovereignty in their
regions,not just a voice. Won't come easy, if at all.

Our role is to get security forces trained (to whatever minimum
standard is achievable) and then get out of the way. The underlying
principle is that eventually the population will tire of the fighting
and determine that their self-interest is better served by stability.
Don't know if that is possible given the Arab mentality.

For US operations model, I'd look to the Israeli. Build a strong intel
system, both national tech (i.e. hardware) and HUMINT (i.e. wetware).
Then stand off and apply the intel when required at points of
decision. That allows selective application of firepower without
getting your troops into indefensible and high vulnerability
situations like house-to-house urban fighting.

I'd get out of the patrolling business as much as possible and get
into the conflict response mode. Wait for a 911 call from the local
authorities before intervening. When major scale operations are
required, do it with precision and supported by a well-managed PR
campaign that clearly spells out that folks who allow insurgents to
live next door, hide in the basement or shoot from their roofs will be
subject to instant response. "We will not lie, cheat or steal--or
support jihadists, or TOLERATE AMONG US those who do..."

The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any
war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass. The current
"mission" is untraditional to say the least. If it fails, it isn't
because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a
nation-building job. Yet, it is very much in our national interest to
try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of
government in the region.

See what you get when you ask?

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Ed , very well said - straight shooting and from the heart - thanks
I am working these issues and will carry these words with me - thanks again

Ski




"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 01 Jan 2007 21:07:03 GMT, "Ski"
wrote:

Hit it right on the head Ed - the situation is unique and it got that way
because we went in blind on the wishes of the politicals and not with a
good
plan - hence we are backed into a wall and bleeding for it. You caught on
also that there is no doctrine for this, hardly any proper terms and as
CAS
was evolving to use the UAV's and the links the real situation on the
ground
just up and ran over the thinking and then again the split between the
USAF
and Army has not helped.

How would you tackle this - seriously with all respect - how would you put
this fire out or in the least what role would you see air power

First, recognize that asking a fighter pilot for an opinion is always
dangerous. Second, if the fighter pilot also teaches political science
and international relations, you're going to get nuance (i.e.
gobbledegook) and bias (i.e. bias.)

I'm a long distance outside of the area of operations and my picture
is provided by the left-stream media. I get some very positive
feedback through back-channel links to folks still in the business to
gain a bit of balance.

Let's start by stating my impression that the current hostilities are
predominantly sectarian between Shia and Sunni, with the US getting
nailed in the cross-fire and offering a convenient scapegoat for each
side to point at as the cause. Not a good situation.

Essential to the discussion is recognition of the need to acknowledge
majority rule--that means mostly Shia, unfortunately. Balance and
stability don't come without some compromise that guarantees input
from the Kurds and Sunni, but they want sovereignty in their
regions,not just a voice. Won't come easy, if at all.

Our role is to get security forces trained (to whatever minimum
standard is achievable) and then get out of the way. The underlying
principle is that eventually the population will tire of the fighting
and determine that their self-interest is better served by stability.
Don't know if that is possible given the Arab mentality.

For US operations model, I'd look to the Israeli. Build a strong intel
system, both national tech (i.e. hardware) and HUMINT (i.e. wetware).
Then stand off and apply the intel when required at points of
decision. That allows selective application of firepower without
getting your troops into indefensible and high vulnerability
situations like house-to-house urban fighting.

I'd get out of the patrolling business as much as possible and get
into the conflict response mode. Wait for a 911 call from the local
authorities before intervening. When major scale operations are
required, do it with precision and supported by a well-managed PR
campaign that clearly spells out that folks who allow insurgents to
live next door, hide in the basement or shoot from their roofs will be
subject to instant response. "We will not lie, cheat or steal--or
support jihadists, or TOLERATE AMONG US those who do..."

The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any
war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass. The current
"mission" is untraditional to say the least. If it fails, it isn't
because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a
nation-building job. Yet, it is very much in our national interest to
try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of
government in the region.

See what you get when you ask?

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

You are right, the whole cost issue is a big bag of swirling numbers and I
used license to steal,
yet the USAF pays much less for its Block 50 F-16's then FMS customers pay
but that difference is not desired to be spread all around however it is
significant and your new F-16 at a good production rate (say 10 / month)
would be around $30 million each and the JSF started at a fixed $28 million
a decade ago projected. The F-15E would also be around $50 million to the
USAF with a production rate (say 8 / month) going (that's important). For
instance the UAE paid over $4 billion to develop the AESA radar, Israel and
Greece paid over $2 billion for the same work - not bad a deal for the USA,
but if the USAF or another customer buys or sells the Block 60 it must pay
the UAE a hefty royalty - that's why you are not seeing the Block 60 in the
Guard or Reserves or anywhere and why the newer Block 50/52's are so
advanced.

The JSF gets the shaft (as all new aircraft do) because the loaded
development costs start off the price tag so if a two billion program nets
one aircraft it is a 2 billion machine - not fair of course, but the cost
projections for a production set would drop things radicaly - however the
problems with the JSF in weight and strength are causing design changes and
that's millions in man hours and millions in delay of schedule. So the unit
cost rises and if the production numbers shrink the numbers go out of sight.
It seems past $80 million each now and we have to complete the aircraft and
finish testing. But it still comes down to "what does it do better" - not
much and what it should do better is not proven yet.

I am saying give it a breather - pursue the development longer, but drop the
STOVL and focus on a CTOL that has more meat down stream. Air Force
Magazine (AFA) has an article this month "UAV's with a Bite" - a look at the
X-47 concept that is looking to far - to me merge that with JSF and start
with a set of manned and unmanned platforms so we can see how unmanned earns
its way into the force structure and mission sets.

It is possible to say to Lockheed for instance - how many F-16's would I
need to produce to get a $25 million aircraft off the production line and
there would be an answer - probably around 1000 at 50 / month, but it would
be possible. This is the benefit of having a "line" and "tooling" and
"venders" and "work force" etc... as the production lines dry up these small
essentials fade away and hurt. Many of the original F-16's were produced
with parts that are non-existent today, hence the great upgrade program for
the F-16A that brought C model avionics and more to the European A and B
models essentially died a natural death as the guts of the aircarft ran out
of spares. On the other had, the A/B market "used" has continued so
strongly (Portugal, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand and C users
for training machines etc.) commercial suppliers have stepped up and filled
again the needs of the components - so you never know.

Building 2000 F-35's would again bring the $28 million figure back to it -
but still - what would it do better in the present wars at this time and
down road for bigger nastier enemies, it does not have the performance or
legs which brings on the F-22 growth













"eponymous cowherd" wrote in message
...
In article C22ih.954$Eo.367@trnddc08,
"Ski" wrote:

f the JSF did not cost three times an F-16 or twice a F-15E then you
might
say lets press with the F-35 and let the maturity build up fix all this,
but
with the F-35 is dragging dozens of billions of dollars in investment
that
goes into its employment - money i think we can not afford now.

Where are you getting these numbers? The -35 will likely cost less than
either
the -16 or the -15.

Anti-military types in the press and government like to quote the costs of
the
-16 and the -15 based on the last time the USA bought one. The price keeps
going
up since then. I think the last time the USA bought a -15 the cost was $50
million each, when Korea bought them in 01 the cost was $81 million each.
A
quick googling shows that the -16s bought by the UAE will cost an
estimated $80
million each. If you use the cost of recent purchases of the -16 and
the -15 you
will see that the -35 will be competitive on cost alone. Since the -15 has
two
engines the chances of it being cheaper than any single engine plane are
extremely low.


http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/facts-...apon-costs.php

On Tue, 02 Jan 2007 15:52:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

[snip detailed & responsible analysis from Ed]

Jumping in unbidden to pick on a couple of points just to expose my
poor manners...

The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any
war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass.

True, but only in so far as the first stage of operations. The war
continues. The failure of the US forces (and British) to suppress the
insurgency and sectarian conflict, despite all the cultural and
operational factors outside their control, remains a failure. I think
it's explicable, and understandable, but still a failure to adapt to
changing operational conditions.

The current
"mission" is untraditional to say the least.

On the contrary, I'd say it's similar to several historical examples,
from the Philippines to numerous Latin American interventions, and
that's simply from within the context of US military history. The
supremacy of the US force's operational and technological capacity
doesn't mean that every situation can be resolved by the blind
application of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy.

If it fails, it isn't
because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a
nation-building job.

Ah, but the wrong tool (the DoD) was used for the nation-building job.
An ideological aversion to the term "nation-building" doesn't excuse
the DoD and military for failing to engage with the neccessity for
doing just that in order to win the war. At least to start with.

Yet, it is very much in our national interest to
try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of
government in the region.

See what you get when you ask?

Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and
rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are
commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to
uphold.

Gavin Bailey

--
Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost."
Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better
than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En

On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 15:59:23 GMT, The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion
wrote:

On Tue, 02 Jan 2007 15:52:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

[snip detailed & responsible analysis from Ed]

Jumping in unbidden to pick on a couple of points just to expose my
poor manners...

The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any
war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass.

True, but only in so far as the first stage of operations. The war
continues. The failure of the US forces (and British) to suppress the
insurgency and sectarian conflict, despite all the cultural and
operational factors outside their control, remains a failure. I think
it's explicable, and understandable, but still a failure to adapt to
changing operational conditions.

If you are only happy by ascribing "failure" to the military
operation, far be it from me to disabuse you of the notion. We aren't
dealing here with changing operational conditions. This isn't fluidity
of a front or unforeseen maneuvering of enemy forces. It isn't
resistance efforts by an occupied nation to an imperialist force--it
is cultural, tribal and ethnic dissonance very similar to the Balkans.
Absent a unifying (and often oppressive) leader like Tito or even
Sadaam, the underlying animosity resurfaces and the national construct
fractures.

If there is a failure involved, it is very similar to the failure of
Vietnam for American foreign policy. That is, it is the failure to
recognize the culture and the historic background of the regional
strife. It is a tendency to ascribe Eurocentric values to Asian or
Middle-eastern people. Fundamentalist Muslims may never accept the
concept of Hobbesian rule by "consent of the governed" just as
Southeast Asians may never subjugate family and relationship to the
land to the dictates of the majority as expressed through an arguably
corrupt government.

The current
"mission" is untraditional to say the least.

On the contrary, I'd say it's similar to several historical examples,
from the Philippines to numerous Latin American interventions, and
that's simply from within the context of US military history. The
supremacy of the US force's operational and technological capacity
doesn't mean that every situation can be resolved by the blind
application of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy.

Without applying a shotgun historical approach to your "examples" let
me simply suggest that neither the Philippines nor any recallable
Latin American involvements had the overlay of: 1.) three divergent
religious sects; 2.) an imposed national identity from British
colonial rule; 3.) thirty years of minority control under a
totalitarian, brutal dictatorship; 4) a distinct separatist movement
seeking national identity in a third of the nation; 5.) a dozen or
more competing warlords seeking ascendency to fill a perceived power
vacuum and 6.) a recent history of application of weapons of mass
destruction against national enemies and their own people.

I'd also be hard pressed to label the flexibility demonstrated by the
US military in approaches evolving from the collapse of the Soviet
Union into Desert Storm into Afghanistan into Iraqi Freedom into the
current referee for civil war and scapegoat role as "blind application
of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy"--whatever that
means.

If it fails, it isn't
because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a
nation-building job.

Ah, but the wrong tool (the DoD) was used for the nation-building job.
An ideological aversion to the term "nation-building" doesn't excuse
the DoD and military for failing to engage with the neccessity for
doing just that in order to win the war. At least to start with.

It isn't a case of ideological aversion. It is recognition of the fact
that the essential function of a military is to kill people and break
things--quicker and more efficiently than the opposition. Period.
"Everything else is rubbish"...B. M. vR

Yet, it is very much in our national interest to
try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of
government in the region.

See what you get when you ask?

Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and
rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are
commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to
uphold.

Thanks...I needed that! ;-)



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com