Best dogfight gun?

Since this bit of the thread has drifted into whether or not a gun
should be fitted at all, these are my thoughts on the matter, from
'Flying Guns: the Modern Era' by Emmanuel Gustin and myself, due to be
published in March next year. First, in air-to-air use:

"Modern short-range missiles have minimum ranges as low as 300 m, well
within gun range, and are highly agile, with wide engagement
envelopes, which make them able to hit targets well off to one side of
the firing aircraft, especially when cued by a helmet-mounted sight:
in fact, the capabilities of most recent models are such that the
aircraft carrying them barely need to manoeuvre. This does not mean
that guns are useless for air-to-air work. They have a particular
value in modern 'policing' applications, as they enable warning shots
to be fired in front of suspect aircraft. They also provide an
economical way of engaging low-value targets such as unmanned
reconnaissance drones, transport and liaison aircraft, or
drug-smugglers. In a 'hot' war they still have certain advantages in
close-quarter fighting, for example in 'picking off' an enemy
attacking a wingman, who may be too close for a safe missile shot. The
ability of modern fighters to adopt extreme attitudes, pointing well
away from the line of flight, significantly assists gun aiming in
dogfights. Cannon projectiles have a shorter flight time than a
missile, a significant advantage in a dogfight.

Finally, the gun provides a last-ditch capability if the missiles run
out, or are defeated by advanced countermeasures or simply by
circumstances. The 1991 Gulf War revealed the deficiencies of modern
IR-homing missiles when faced with trying to pick up a low-flying
target against a hot desert background (helicopters being in any case
difficult for IR seekers to lock on to from above). USAF A-10
aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and
550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to
lock on. Furthermore, the performance of even the best missiles cannot
always be guaranteed, for various reasons. In Kosovo, a US fighter
engaging a Serbian plane needed to fire three AMRAAMs to bring it
down. In other engagements in the late 1990s, USAF and USN fighters
fired a total of seven Sparrows, AMRAAMs, and Phoenix missiles against
Iraqi MiG-25s without scoring a single hit (although the Phoenix shots
were taken at extreme range).

In part, the low success rates are due to tactical considerations, in
that missiles may deliberately be launched outside the normal
engagement envelope to distract or scare off the enemy, and sometimes
two missiles are launched at one target to increase the hit
probability. Whatever the reason, this results in missiles being used
up at a high rate, making it more likely that they will run out during
a sortie. A cannon will typically carry enough ammunition for several
engagements, usefully increasing combat persistence at a minimal cost
in weight and performance.

One curious aspect to the use of AAMs in combat is that of the
approximately 1,000 kills achieved between 1958 and 1991, only a
handful were scored beyond visual range, which does raise questions
about the significance of the very long ranges of which some missiles
are capable. It is sometimes argued that modern short-range missiles
are so good that any aircraft with the benefit of long-range sensors
and missiles should use them to try to stay outside the envelope of
the enemy's short-range AAMs. However, it is not always possible to
dictate the terms of an engagement. The Iranians made good use of the
long-range AIM-54 in the war with Iraq, but the F-14s which carried it
still found themselves engaged in gunfights from time to time.

There is a continual battle between missile sensor and countermeasure
technology. In the future, stealth technology applied to aircraft may
considerably shorten target acquisition and combat ranges, putting
into question the worth of modern BVR (beyond visual range) AAMs. The
possible future use of anti-radar missile guidance as a way of
overcoming stealth characteristics may force fighters to make minimal
use of their own radars, further reducing acquisition and combat
distances. It may also prove increasingly difficult for either IR or
radar-homing missiles to lock on to their stealthy targets,
additionally protected by extensive electronic jamming and IR
countermeasures.

Of course, modern guns are usually aimed by the plane's radar which
could also be jammed (although less easily than the much smaller and
less powerful missile seekers) but laser rangefinders could make an
acceptable alternative in providing fire control data. If planes
eventually become 'laser-proof' as well, the possibility presumably
exists of linking variable magnification optical sights to a computer
which would be able to analyse the image, identify the plane,
calculate its distance, speed and heading and provide gunsight aiming
information accordingly, all without emitting any signals."

And in ground attack:

"The emphasis in the use of aircraft guns has now shifted more to
air-to-ground work, although even this is becoming increasingly
hazardous in a 'hot' war. With the proliferation of anti-aircraft gun
and missile systems, including MANPADS, even the specialist
ground-attack aircraft, fitted with powerful cannon, have found it to
be safer to rely on the long range of their air-to-ground guided
weapons rather than close to gun range, although as we have seen the
USAF's A-10s still made good use of their cannon against Iraqi targets
in 1991.

This trend is aided by the continued development of air-to-surface
missiles, with the latest ones having autonomous homing systems to
provide "fire and forget" capability over long ranges. Another current
development is the GD Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, which
aims to achieve low-cost accuracy by fitted a laser homer to the
little 2.75 inch (70 mm) rocket. The target is to achieve a CEP of 1 –
2 m at ranges of up to 5 – 6 km at a price of US$ 8 – 10,000;
one-sixth the cost of a Hellfire anti-tank missile.

However, not all conflicts involve front-line opposition; in fact,
armed forces are now commonly engaged on police work, frequently
dealing with guerrilla forces. In these circumstances, rockets and
missiles may represent an inappropriate degree of destruction, with a
high risk of collateral damage. The RAF was embarrassed during
operations against insurgents in Sierra Leone in 2000 to find that
they had no suitable weapon for their gunless Harrier GR.7 aircraft to
attack small groups of rebels operating close to innocent civilians.
Another advantage of using cannon was demonstrated in the invasion of
Afghanistan in 2002. During an intense infantry battle at Takur Ghar
in late May, in which US forces were ambushed and in considerable
danger, air support was called for. The AC-130 was not permitted to
intervene in daylight due to its vulnerability, so USAF fighters were
sent to help. For a part of the battle the Afghan combatants were too
close to the Americans for rockets or bombs to be used, so the
fighters – F-16s and even F-15s – went in strafing with their 20 mm
cannon, as did the Navy's F-14s and F/A-18s on other occasions. Even
RAF Tornadoes were reported to have carried out gun strafing runs on
at least one occasion. It may logically be argued that it is foolish
to risk an extremely expensive aircraft, with its expensively trained
pilot, to being lost due to very low-tech ground fire, but sometimes
the risk needs to be taken to save friendly lives."

The case rests...

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

"Tony Williams" wrote:

...

| USAF A-10
| aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and
| 550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to
| lock on.

How many rounds of 25mm or 27mm are they proposing to fit inside of USAF
JSF?

"Chad Irby" wrote ..
"Paul F Austin" wrote:

Nope, I just used weight as an example of the "cost" paid for a gun.
And my question stands: At the initial design stage of an aircraft
when you're making choices, is a gun worth more than a couple of
SRAAMs?

Yes. For flexibility, and for having a system independnt of the missile
system.

But you aren't buying "a missile system". Because you're building in the
interfaces (structural and electronic) for any missile that meets the
stowage and attachment envelope and interface specification, in fact the gun
is "less flexible" since over the life of the platform you can roll in a new
AAM every few years. With the gun, aside from changing ammunition natures,
you're stuck with the original decision for the life of the platform.


Yes, the "no-guns" fighter was 'way premature in 1955, the year the
F4H configuration was frozen. It's_really_not clear that's still the
case now.

Funny, the fighter pilots keep telling us differently.

Corporate experience is valuable but can sometimes lead us astray. As
another example, just about every fast mover pilot I've ever talked
to_thoroughly_believes "speed is life" when it comes to CAS/BAI. If that
advice had been heeded in the late sixties, there would be no A-10s.
Experience has shown that the original analysis, that using an airframe
that's tough enough and slow enough that the pilot can get lined up and nail
a CAS or BAI target first time is lots better than a Speed O'Heat pass that
minimizes the exposure to ground fire but which misses the target and means
you have to make another run. Now of course, since we have ubiquitous PGMs,
"speed is life" looks better and medium altitude weapons release looks
better still.

The point of that interminable one sentence analysis of a complex subject is
that technology really does work better now than it did in 1970 and because
it does work better, the answers to key questions changes with time.

High utility of an internal gun in air combat isn't what's reflected in
recent air combat experience nor in systems evaluations of latest-generation
platforms, sensors and missile systems. In fact, some reports I've read from
Air Force evaluations of off-platform sensor fusion and intraflight datalink
operation seem to say that even SRAAMs are rarely be used. That's one of the
reasons the Europeans bought Meteor. AAMs really have improved tremendously
in thirty years. The minimum range of SRAAMs has moved in, squeezing out the
place where guns clearly had utility and the effectiveness of current
seekers combined with helmet-mounted sights is clearly much higher than a
fixed gun. The 0.15 Pk days for AIM-7Es is 'way distant

So you really do need to justify a gun's place on the airframe on more than
"it might be useful and you never know"..


It's not just weapons fit either. The vibration from gun firing costs
significantly higher failure rates in electronics near the gun.

That's a nice theory, but not proven anywhere, and it certainly didn't
show up on the F-4Es I used to work on.

That's a good point and one I didn't know. From an analysis standpoint, an
F-4E's RADAR system should have experienced higher failure rates, especially
since that generation of avionics had much higher base failure rates than do
current systems. Reliability "analysis" as opposed to failure analysis and
"lessons learned" incorporation has always had a high bogosity index.

"Kevin Brooks" wrote
"Paul F Austin" wrote

"Chad Irby" wrote
"Paul F Austin" wrote:

Now, here's a question: for the 200Kg or so weight budget (I have no
idea
about volume) of an internal gun and ammo tank, would you rather
have
1,
2
or 3 more AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs?

It's not a question of "just weight," or we'd just build C-5s with a
big
automated missile launcher in them.

Nope, I just used weight as an example of the "cost" paid for a gun. And
my
question stands: At the initial design stage of an aircraft when you're
making choices, is a gun worth more than a couple of SRAAMs? Or some of
the
other goods that you snipped. Those are real choices and a gun has to
earn
its place on the airframe just like every other piece of gear. You (the
customer and systems designers) make choices that affect the aircraft
thoughout its life.

Yes, the "no-guns" fighter was 'way premature in 1955, the year the F4H
configuration was frozen. It's_really_not clear that's still the case
now.
Minimum range engagement? ASRAAM claim 300m minimum range and with
"looks
can kill" helmet sights, it's really not clear that a gun brings much to
the
table.. Strafing? Having 6 SDBs tucked away seems more useful.

Minimum safe distance (to friendly troops) for surface targets using the
20mm is 25 meters (according to a USAF chart included in the 1996 edition
of
CGSC ST 100-3). The same chart indicates minimum distance for bombs under
500 pounds is 145 meters (for protected friendlies, ie., bunkers,
trenches,
fighting positions) or 500 meters (if friendlies are in the open). Even
given a significant reduction in the latter figures for the smaller SDB,
it
is going to be substantially more than 25 meters. So what do you use to
engage bad guys located in the 25 meter to something-under-500 meter gap
if
you have no gun? This is not a purely hypothetical--it happened during
Anaconda.

That's a good point and one I can't answer. If it was me though, I'd expect
that the answer would lie with more organic fires available at the battalion
level rather than depending on CAS for "men in the wire".

Hi!

"Paul F Austin" writes:
So you really do need to justify a gun's place on the airframe on more than
"it might be useful and you never know"..

A gun is probably the cheapest way of killing low-performace targets
like UAV:s, cheap targets that an enemy can produce in large numbers
forcing you to deplete your stock of expensive AA-misiles.

The gun system reuse all the expensive parts, radar, electronics for
aiming the aeroplane and the gun while the ammunition can be dumb
and is easy to mass produce.

It is of course possible to develop a fairly cheap and small low
performance AA-missile but it is hard to get it as cheap as a gun
system. This gun competitor might be developed if someone decides to
arm small UAV:s with AA-missiles for killing other UAV:s and
helicopters.

And I realy like the idea of a backup weapon if the enemy has superior
countermeasures for your AA-missiles. But you can have that with a pod
filled with unguided rockets.

Best regards,
---
Titta gärna på http://www.lysator.liu.se/~redin och kommentera min
politiska sida.
Magnus Redin, Klockaregården 6, 586 44 LINKöPING, SWEDEN
Phone: Sweden (0)70 5160046

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
...

"Kevin Brooks" wrote
"Paul F Austin" wrote

"Chad Irby" wrote
"Paul F Austin" wrote:

Now, here's a question: for the 200Kg or so weight budget (I have
no
idea
about volume) of an internal gun and ammo tank, would you rather
have
1,
2
or 3 more AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs?

It's not a question of "just weight," or we'd just build C-5s with a
big
automated missile launcher in them.

Nope, I just used weight as an example of the "cost" paid for a gun.
And
my
question stands: At the initial design stage of an aircraft when
you're
making choices, is a gun worth more than a couple of SRAAMs? Or some
of
the
other goods that you snipped. Those are real choices and a gun has to
earn
its place on the airframe just like every other piece of gear. You
(the
customer and systems designers) make choices that affect the aircraft
thoughout its life.

Yes, the "no-guns" fighter was 'way premature in 1955, the year the
F4H
configuration was frozen. It's_really_not clear that's still the case
now.
Minimum range engagement? ASRAAM claim 300m minimum range and with
"looks
can kill" helmet sights, it's really not clear that a gun brings much
to
the
table.. Strafing? Having 6 SDBs tucked away seems more useful.

Minimum safe distance (to friendly troops) for surface targets using the
20mm is 25 meters (according to a USAF chart included in the 1996
edition
of
CGSC ST 100-3). The same chart indicates minimum distance for bombs
under
500 pounds is 145 meters (for protected friendlies, ie., bunkers,
trenches,
fighting positions) or 500 meters (if friendlies are in the open). Even
given a significant reduction in the latter figures for the smaller SDB,
it
is going to be substantially more than 25 meters. So what do you use to
engage bad guys located in the 25 meter to something-under-500 meter gap
if
you have no gun? This is not a purely hypothetical--it happened during
Anaconda.

That's a good point and one I can't answer. If it was me though, I'd
expect
that the answer would lie with more organic fires available at the
battalion
level rather than depending on CAS for "men in the wire".

There is not a soldier around who would disagree with your objective, since
groundpounders generally prefer having "their own" support completely
in-pocket. But that does not change the fact that there will be situations,
like during Anaconda, where the organic support assets are either not
available (i.e., no arty tubes were within range) or unable to handle the
scope of the mission (i.e., the mortars that the Anaconda troops did have
were over-tasked due to the unexpected number of concurrent targets, and
ammo resupply was problematic being fully dependent upon helos in what had
already become a less-than-helo-friendly environment). That is where the
internal gun on the CAS aircraft becomes a means for the commander to remain
flexible in how he responds to these "knife fight" situations.

Brooks

"Tony Williams" wrote in message
m...
Since this bit of the thread has drifted into whether or not a gun
should be fitted at all, these are my thoughts on the matter, from
'Flying Guns: the Modern Era' by Emmanuel Gustin and myself, due to be
published in March next year. First, in air-to-air use:

snip good analysis and summary

This trend is aided by the continued development of air-to-surface
missiles, with the latest ones having autonomous homing systems to
provide "fire and forget" capability over long ranges. Another current
development is the GD Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System, which
aims to achieve low-cost accuracy by fitted a laser homer to the
little 2.75 inch (70 mm) rocket. The target is to achieve a CEP of 1 -
2 m at ranges of up to 5 - 6 km at a price of US$ 8 - 10,000;
one-sixth the cost of a Hellfire anti-tank missile.

To nitpick, APKWS is not currently slated for use on fixed wing assets--it
is an Army program intended for use on helos only. Even if it were adopted
for fixed wing use, it still leaves the problem of having to identify the
need for its load-out ahead of time (i.e., pre-ATO cycle). The beauty of the
internal gun on these airframes is that it is an asset that is always
available, regardless of the external loadout, so the grunts who are forced
to make an immediate (or "Oh, ****...") CAS request can count on at least
having that strafe support available if/when things go to hell in a
handbasket. That (immediate missions as opposed to pre-planned) is the kind
of mission that this capability will be critical to--if we are *planning* to
get into a "knife-fight" on the ground, other than in the urban fight, then
we have probably already screwed up big-time.


However, not all conflicts involve front-line opposition; in fact,
armed forces are now commonly engaged on police work, frequently
dealing with guerrilla forces. In these circumstances, rockets and
missiles may represent an inappropriate degree of destruction, with a
high risk of collateral damage. The RAF was embarrassed during
operations against insurgents in Sierra Leone in 2000 to find that
they had no suitable weapon for their gunless Harrier GR.7 aircraft to
attack small groups of rebels operating close to innocent civilians.
Another advantage of using cannon was demonstrated in the invasion of
Afghanistan in 2002. During an intense infantry battle at Takur Ghar
in late May, in which US forces were ambushed and in considerable
danger, air support was called for. The AC-130 was not permitted to
intervene in daylight due to its vulnerability, so USAF fighters were
sent to help. For a part of the battle the Afghan combatants were too
close to the Americans for rockets or bombs to be used, so the
fighters - F-16s and even F-15s - went in strafing with their 20 mm
cannon, as did the Navy's F-14s and F/A-18s on other occasions. Even
RAF Tornadoes were reported to have carried out gun strafing runs on
at least one occasion. It may logically be argued that it is foolish
to risk an extremely expensive aircraft, with its expensively trained
pilot, to being lost due to very low-tech ground fire, but sometimes
the risk needs to be taken to save friendly lives."

Exactly.

Brooks


The case rests...

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

In article ,
(Tony Williams) wrote:

We know the Mauser works, too - it's been in service in large numbers
for two decades. The initial assessments by the JSF team concluded
that the Mauser was the most cost-effective choice, and they knew all
about the GAU-12/U then.

Part of that "cost effectiveness" appeared to be a lowball pricing
structure that fell through on closer examination.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 20:39:51 +0000, Greg Hennessy wrote:

On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 13:21:39 -0600, Alan Minyard
wrote:


Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

You have no idea. The Mauser was an inferior weapon.

Al Minyard


ROFLMAO! How did you draw that stunning conclusion.


greg


Well, if you signature is and indication, you are involved in the use
of serious drugs, not someone that I would assume could make
rational judgements. The fact that the US chose a different system pretty
much tells me that the Mauser was (and is) an inferior system.

Al Minyard

On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 22:16:33 GMT, (Paul Krenske) wrote:

On Thu, 11 Dec 2003 09:29:33 -0600, Alan Minyard
wrote:

On 10 Dec 2003 12:56:12 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

Alan Minyard wrote in message . ..
On 9 Dec 2003 13:40:45 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

Alan Minyard wrote in message . ..
And who out there is going to use significant numbers of unreliable, heavy, slow
cannon to oppose a US Force? The rate of fire of the .50 was not enough to
make up for the somewhat smaller calibre, that is not the case with the M-61.

Possibly, possibly not. The bigger the target is, the more damage you
have to inflict to down it. A MiG-15 weighed under 3,800 kg empty, a
Su-27 around 18,000 kg - nearly five times as much. A 20mm shell
weighs only just over twice as much as a .50 bullet. You can double
its effectiveness in recognition of the HEI content, but even so you
are still left with a pretty even match between the .5/MiG-15 and
20mm/Su-27 in terms of destructive effect compared with target weight.

Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into gun range
you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch, desperation
weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.

Guided missiles? Now that you mention it, I have heard something about
them - but IIRC this thread is all about guns.

Your post seems to imply that you think that anything bigger than a
20mm is by definition bulky, heavy, slow-firing and unreliable. Well,
lets take the M61A1 as the standard, shall we? It weighs 114 kg, and
is very bulky because there are six barrels which all need room to
spin. Then, because it fires its little shells so fast (and you need
to hit with a lot of them to have the desired effect) it needs a big
ammunition capacity, with a big magazine - much more space and weight.
In fact, the magazine and ammo feed weigh about as much as the gun,
and the full load of ammo typically weighs the same again.

Now let's look at the opposition. The 'European standard' 27mm Mauser
BK 27, selected over any US gun by the JSF contenders

That has changed. The Mouser is out.

, weighs 100 kg
and uses much less space (only one barrel). The ammo is bigger, but
less of it is needed because it's much more effective.

And I suppose that you have verifiable combat records to support this??

For a bit more
weight (120 kg) you can get a GIAT 30M791 which is equally powerful
and can fire up to 2,500 rpm. Both of these guns hit their top speed
instantly, unlike the M61.

The spin up of the M-61 is so minor as to not be an issue, ask the
people who have used them.

Look to Russia and things get even more
interesting:

If you consider bankruptcy interesting.

the GSh-30 weighs 105 kg and fires powerful 30mm ammo at
up to 3,000 rpm (again, instantly). The little GSh-301 used in the
MiG-29 and Su-27 only fires at 1,500-1,800 rpm (instantly) but weighs
a trivial 45 kg and is tiny by comparison with the M61. If you really
want firepower, then there's the GSh-6-30 which fires the same,
powerful, 30mm ammo at around 5,000 rpm for just 160 kg. I admit that
is heavier than an M61, but it's hardly any bigger and has several
times the firepower.

There is no evidence that it works, much less its firepower, accuracy, etc.


There is a legitimate debate about whether fighter guns are needed
anymore, given the much improved performance of guided missiles. I am
willing to argue that on several grounds, and am supported by the fact
that despite all the high-tech gee-whizz weaponry used recently in
Afghanistan and Iraq, US fighters were still using their guns in
circumstances where nothing else was suitable. If you're going to
retain a gun, it might as well be the best you can get. The price,
space and weight costs are negligible as a fraction of a modern
fighter.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

Your anti-US bias is noted. The best is the M-61.

Al Minyard

Ummmmm. I think you are being very critical without much actual
logical rhetoric about the points put forward considering the person
you are criticising.

Tony writes reference works on automatic canons and firearms and has
spent ages collecting and documenting just about everything you may
want to know, especially with regards to aerial cannon and ammunition.
If you are going to make declerative statements about his points, at
least elaborate so we can have a proper discussion.

While Tony does often put forward raw stats in comments, these do work
for many comparrisons. A lighter cannon that throws heavier ammunition
at faster speeds and with similar or better reliability does tend to
'win' arguments. Of course a m61 will still do damage but what if the
engagement is fleeting and you can only get 2 or 3 rounds on target. I
would prefer them to be 30mm rather than 20mm based simply on HE
content expectations. If it happens to come from a lighter gun then
thats all the better.

Learn to use the English language, it will make your posts "seem" much
more reasonable. Tony is one of those people who will search within
the "numbers" until they can be made to "support" his pre-defined
conclusions. His idea of being "objective" is "the US sucks".

Al Minyard