Well, throughout the process, Airbus has submitted a large number of documents
in the effort to prove that they've been trying for years to get American
Airlines to wake up and correct their flawed training procedures. Some of
these documents are co-introduced by Boeing, and apply to "Airliners"
indicating efforts on Airbus' behalf to get the spotlight away from their
product.

Some pilots expressed their astonishment at the fact that there would be
instances, in normal operations and within the manoeuvering speed of the
aircraft, where full-amplitude control inputs would have the risk of
destroying the aircraft.

The most surprising thing to me in all of this is that in their never-ending
quarrel over whose "method" is better - the hardcore fly-by-wire method of
Airbus or the "assisted" method of Boeing, Airbus never ceases to stress the
fact that their computers will prevent inadvertent "inappropriate" control
inputs from pilots, such as increasing pitch angle to where the AOA exceeds
stall margin.* Now are we supposed to believe that rudder inputs were simply
"not included" in this guardian angel policy?

Though it may not be fair to the NTSB, it is sometimes hard not to conclude
that placing the blame on a pilot, who is no longer here to defend himself, is
far less "costly" than implicating an airline or major airfarme manufacturer.




*Boeing, it must be said, has not done much better, because they chose to
counter the Airbus argument by saying there could be cases where the
theoretical limits of useful control inputs could (an should) be exceeded
momentarily in an emergency situation. They chose to illustrate this with the
757 accident in Cali. Couldn't they find a more, well, successful,
illustration?

G Faris