On Thu, 13 Jul 2006 23:10:07 -0600, "Jeff Crowell"
Jcrow9DOTcableone.net wrote in
::

Just for the hell of it, do you know if he knew that he was entering
terminal airspace?

In this case, USAF Brigadier General ROBIN E. SCOTT, President of the
USAF accident investigation Board (not exactly an impartial observer),
found that Flight Lead Parker's decision to intentionally descend into
congested Class B terminal airspace at over 400 knots without the
required ATC clearance not to constitute "a deliberate disregard for
the safety of others."

In fact, his report intimates that the cause of Parker's misbehavior
was a loss of situational awareness, which lead to the death of
Jacques Olivier, was a malfunction of the navigation electronics on
board Parker's southbound F-16, when in fact, the documented equipment
errors actually placed Parker 10 NM farther north from the center of
the Tampa Class B airspace than he believed he was at the time. That
is to say, Parker would have been inside Tampa Class B airspace
without the required ATC clearance for many more miles had he actually
descended at the position he believed he was located instead of the
position the malfunctioning/miss-operated navigational.equipment
placed him.

The facts presented in the Air Force accident report support my
contention that Parker intentionally, willfully, deliberately and
recklessly descended into a very congested terminal area in excess of
400 knots and without being in communication with the authority
responsible for separating aircraft in that airspace, and without
regard for the life and safety of the civilians operating there nor
those residing under his flight path.

Assuming the Air Force accident report is 100% factual, it indicates
that Parker, Ninja Flight Lead, began his descent into Tampa Class B
airspace at a point he believed at the time was ~15 miles inside its
boundary. Any airman, even an illustrious Air Force pilot, knows that
the dimensions of Class B areas are roughly a 30 NM radius from the
central airport (KTPA in this case).

Parker was aware he was above Tampa Class B airspace when he
recklessly decided to descend through it, or he is a careless and
incompetent pilot (or both).

The errors in the systems did not cause this mishap.

According to the Air Force accident report, he INS system mysteriously
developed a ~10 NM southerly steering error spontaneously, subsequent
to the first sortie. This had the effect of indicating that the
aircraft's position was ~10 NM south of its true position. Parker
failed to do the _required_ position check which would have detected
this error.

Parker also erroneously input a slew error, and failed to make the
_required_ check when he engaged that navigation equipment. The
results of that error placed him 5 NM west of his indicated position.

Neither of the errors, electronic nor Parker's erroneous input, were
adequate in explaining why a highly trained Air Force pilot chose to
descend into Tampa Class B airspace at what Parker's navigation
equipment indicated was 15 miles inside the Class B boundary at the
time. The malfunctioning/misdialed navigational errors actually
assisted Parker's flight in being closer to the edge of the Class B
area when he chose to descend (at 140 knots in excess of his
aircraft's minimum safe speed in violation of FAR 19.117(d)) without a
clearance into the congested Class B terminal area. So the
navigational system errors lessened the time Parker's flight posed a
threat to Class B air traffic.

THE NAVIGATIONAL ERRORS DO NOT IN ANY WAY EXCUSE PARKER FOR HIS
RECKLESS ACTIONS. In fact the opposite is true.

There is no doubt in my mind that Parker's decision to descend into
the Tampa Class B area without the required ATC clearance was
deliberate and intentional; He had to be aware that he wasn't clear of
the class bravo airspace.

I believe Parker's decision to recklessly descend without a
clearance was a result of the situation created by all the careless
errors he made. Due to Parker's canceling IFR and failure to contact
Tampa Approach Control because he input the wrong frequency in his
radio, he either had to descend without a clearance, or fly past the
MTR entry point. He thought he was ~10 NM closer to the MTR entry
point then he actually was at the time. Parker just chose to chance
what he thought would be only a few moments of violating FARs, and
indulged in unprofessional, unsafe operation, rather than pausing to
safely regain control of the rapidly determining situation.

Parker made more than a _few_ careless mistakes and/or reckless
decisions. Some of them were indeed minor, but others were
unforgivable and deadly. The Air Force accident report mentions
these:


1. Lieutenant Colonel Parker did not specifically brief Class B and
Class C airspace restrictions in the Tampa area during the flight
briefing. Air Force directives _require_ the flight lead to brief
applicable airspace restrictions.

2. Canceled IFR with Miami Center.

3. Declined flight following service.

4. Erroneously thought he was given frequency 362.35 by Miami Center
and attempted to contact Tampa Approach Control there.

5. Failed to obtain ATC clearance from Tampa Approach for entry into
the Tampa Class B airspace.

6. Failed to establish two-way radio communications with Tampa
Approach Control prior to entering Sarasota Class C airspace.

7. Failed to adequately deconflict flight path (Air Force training
manuals emphasize that flight path deconfliction is a critical task,
one that can never be ignored without catastrophic consequences.)

8. Lost situational awareness.

9. Failed to recognize a significant 9 to 11 nautical mile position
error in his aircraft's Inertial Navigation System.

10. Did not crosscheck the INS accuracy with other systems.

11. Parker failed to notice the degradation in INS system accuracy.
The system showed a navigational system accuracy of 'medium', which
eventually degraded to 'low' prior to the collision.

12. Unintentional cursor slew bias input by the pilot. A crosscheck
of system indications is _required_ so that unintentional slews are
recognized and zeroed out. Parker didn't bother to perform the
_required_ crosscheck.

12. Failed to recognize a cursor slew bias in his ground attack
steering.

14. Mis-prioritization of tasks.

15. Parker had a normal post-mishap physical examination on 24
November 2000, 8-days after his flight killed Jacques Olivier!

I believe the high-speed of Parker's flight reduced the time the
pilots had to detect an aircraft on a collision course, and prevented
the late Cessna 172 pilot, Jacques Olivier, from maneuvering his
aircraft out of the path of the F-16s in time to avoid the collision
(which scattered parts of his still warm remains over 4 acres
surrounding the 2nd hole of busy Rosedale Golf and Country Club) that
afternoon. Olivier's aircraft was in a right turn at the time of the
480 knot (~550 mph) impact, so he had seen the rogue F-16 before it
shattered his light aircraft (and virtually caused his body to
explode), but because of its excessive speed, he lacked sufficient
time to get out of its way.

High speed leaves little time for human responses. (I direct your
attention to the table in the article included below.)



How long does a full windscreen traffic scan take?

I believe that the FAA or NTSB standard requires/suggests 15
seconds to scan left to right (but this assumes only one person
scanning the whole field of view).

How long does it take you to spot an F-16 against low-level
ground clutter at 12'O clock and one mile? How frequently do
you fail to see traffic called by ATC? We're both pilots. You
know what I'm talking about.

It is estimated that the average person can detect an object on a
collision course (stationary in the field of view rather than
moving) when it occupies 12 minutes of arc in the field of view
(1/5th of a degree) or (ISTR - badly ) something like 450-500m
range for each m radius of the central mass.

Assuming no glare reflection, which can confound any calculation
on detection range and probability, statistically, it would take
7.5 seconds to reach 12 O'clock using approved search patterns.
(OTOH, if its against low level ground clutter, then its probably
not on a collision course with you )
[This last sentence may be somewhat true in _level_ flight over
_level_ terrain with meteorologically restricted visibility; it
is not pertinent otherwise.]


If we generously assume that the head-on frontal-area "central mass"
of an F-16 is approximately 2 meters, we find that it should be
humanly detectable at a distance of ~1,000 meters, or ~3,250 feet.
This is roughly 1/2 of a nautical mile.


The table of airspeeds equated to feet-per-second below can be used to
compute the time-budget available to pilots for visually _detecting_
conflicting air traffic at that distance. It does not take into
consideration lighting, contrast, the time necessary to deduce and
make _appropriate_ control inputs, nor the time for the aircraft to
actually maneuver out of the path of the conflicting aircraft's path.


Time Until Impact
Closing-speed Feet Per Second At 3,250 Foot Distance
------------- --------------- ----------------------
250 knots 417 feet per second 7.8 seconds
300 knots 500 feet per second 6.5 seconds
350 knots 583 feet per second 5.6 seconds
400 knots 667 feet per second 4.9 seconds
480 knots 800 feet per second 4.1 seconds


From this table it is evident that the pilot of a military aircraft
traveling at a 400 knot closing-speed has _inadequate_ time to
"see-and-avoid". Using Kerryn Offord's figures, the pilot would have
the impossible task of repeatedly, spending 15 seconds, 8 to 12 times
a minute, scanning the entire windscreen during that portion of the
flight conducted below 18,000 feet. Clearly, there is only time for 4,
not 8 to 12, full scans in a minute. So it is not possible to rely
solely on visual detection of conflicting air traffic to prevent
midair collisions at high-speed. Even if the scan for conflicting air
traffic is divided among 4 pilots, there is no time left to do
anything else such as visual navigation, tuning radios, ...

These calculations only concern detecting the conflicting air traffic,
not avoiding collision with it. So, it is patently evident that some
other means of collision avoidance must be _required_ to insure the
hazard to air-safety posed by high-speed low-level military operations
is mitigated.

It is also evident that the FAA IS FAILING TO PROVIDE SAFE SKIES for
the public when it permits the military to indulge in this reckless
high-speed low-level operation.

It is my belief that there came a time when Parker had to descend to
reach the MTR start point, or admit to his student that he had lost
situational awareness. At that instant, he chose to descend into
Class B airspace without the REQUIRED ATC clearance, rather than
confess his confusion. This would have been consistent with Parker's
failure to perform all the other REQUIRED items/checks he failed to
accomplish on the mishap sortie.

Can you explain how Parker could possibly NOT have known that Class B
airspace lay just below him when he descended into it (clear & 10
miles visibility at the time)?

Class B airspace is typically 30 nautical miles in radius around the
central airport; that's 60 NM in diameter. This particular Class B
abuts the Sarasota Class C to the south. The MTR VR1098 start point
is ~1 nm outside the boundaries of these areas just west of Manatee
Dam. Given VR1098 extends to the eastsoutheast, it begs the question,
"how does a flight enter VR1098 WITHOUT being in contact with ATC, and
remain within the governing regulations?"

To have been UNAWARE that Class B airspace lay beneath the Ninja
flight, Parker would have to have been incapacitated in some way.
Another reason Parker may not have known his position relative to the
Tampa terminal airspace is mentioned in the Air Force AIB report:

"Lieutenant Colonel Parker did not specifically brief Class B
and Class C airspace restrictions in the Tampa area during the
flight briefing. Air Force directives require the flight lead
to brief applicable airspace restrictions."

The malfunctioning INS erroneously indicated Parker's position to be
~10 miles north of his true location. This resulted in his southbound
flight being ~10 miles FARTHER toward the edge of Tampa International
(TPA), the core airport, Class B airspace than indicated by Parker's
INS. Thus, the INS error actually contributed to moving the flight
toward the (presumably safer) periphery of the congested terminal
airspace, just not far enough. So, while the INS error may have
contributed to confusing Parker, it does not excuse his actions in any
way IMNSHO.

If he was disorientated, he should have remained above the terminal
area until he regained situational awareness. But, Parker was the
instructor on this sortie; did his ego play a part in his decisions?

Without evidence to the contrary, I have to attribute his decision to
descend NORDO into Tampa Class B airspace (and accelerated to 440
KIAS) to unprofessional arrogance rather than lost situational
awareness. His failure to perform the required airspace briefing, and
failure to perform the required navigational cross-checks is
indicative of a lack of professionalism or incapacitation; the AIB
report fails to substantiate the later due to the eight day delay in
the medical examination of Parker.



So if you were unable to contact the Class B ATC controlling
authority, would you descend into 60-mile diameter congested Class B
terminal airspace without the required clearance?