On Tue, 01 Jul 2003 05:24:17 -0400, Cub Driver
wrote:

Escorted raids did not begin and end with the Mustang. Look at German
pilot losses in August-November 1943 before the Mustang showed up.
The Mustang accelerated a pre-existing dynamic. I'm not suggesting
that it didn't have a major impact, just that it tends to appropriate
too much of the credit for losses caused by a more diverse force.
Luftwaffe defeats over the battlefronts in the east, over Tunisia or
Sicily or Salerno were not inflicted by the Mustang.

We're speaking of deep penetration.

No, we're talking about German pilot attrittion. It's irrelevant
whether that occurred on deep-penetration missions,
shallow-penetration missions, or over the battlefront.

Where did those German pilot
losses take place--at what distance from the Allied fighter bases?

I don't understand this point. In any case, I don't have that
information. I presume Luftwaffe combat losses (as opposed to
non-combat losses) were largely inflicted by enemy aircraft, with
enemy fighters being the most significant individual factor.

The Mustang's job was to enable bombers to reach Berlin, not Sicily, a
task that was indeed with the Spitfire's capabilities.

Sure. But that's not what I'm arguing about. The war-winning
criticality attributed to the Mustang usually stems from the level of
loss inflicted on the German day fighter arm in the spring of 1944. I
merely want to point out that this critical level of attrition had
already been achieved before the Mustang showed up, and that there
were other aircraft and forces working in concert with the Mustang to
achieve this end.

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003