"Sam Spade" wrote in message
...

Before folks here reject or support the message of the original poster you
should listen to the ATC tape recording while following along on the
official transcript, then draw your own conclusions as to the sole
controller's workload during the few minutes that count.


I did that. I concluded his workload was quite light.



And, consider the language in the 7110.65P (in effect on the date of the
accident). Does it mean what it says, or is it simply ATO CYA "puff." If
it means what it says, doesn't that become an impossible task for a IFR
tower/TRACON staffed with only one controller, and who is acting as local
controller, ground controller, radar controller, and data controller?

I don't have the answer; perhaps someone here does.

Pertinant references from 7110.65P

2-1-2. DUTY PRIORITY

a. Give first priority to separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts as
required in this order. Good judgment shall be used in prioritizing all
other provisions of this order based on the requirements of the situation
at hand.

3-1-4. COORDINATION BETWEEN LOCAL AND GROUND CONTROLLERS

Local and ground controllers shall exchange information as necessary for
the safe and efficient use of airport runways and movement areas. This may
be accomplished via verbal means, flight progress strips, other written
information, or automation displays. As a minimum, provide aircraft
identification and applicable runway/intersection/taxiway information as
follows:

a. Ground control shall notify local control when a departing aircraft has
been taxied to a runway other than one previously designated as active.

3-1-10. OBSERVED ABNORMALITIES

When requested by a pilot or when you deem it necessary, inform an
aircraft of any observed abnormal aircraft condition.

3-1-12. VISUALLY SCANNING RUNWAYS

a. Local controllers shall visually scan runways to the maximum extent
possible.

b. Ground control shall assist local control in visually scanning runways,
especially when runways are in close proximity to other movement areas.

And, finally, do safety alerts apply only to radar operations? If so, why
is it in Chapter 2 and not Chapter 4 or 5 of the 7110.65?

2-1-6. SAFETY ALERT

Issue a safety alert to an aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is in a
position/altitude which, in your judgment, places it in unsafe proximity
to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft. Once the pilot informs you
action is being taken to resolve the situation, you may discontinue the
issuance of further alerts. Do not assume that because someone else has
responsibility for the aircraft that the unsafe situation has been
observed and the safety alert issued; inform the appropriate controller.

NOTE-
1. The issuance of a safety alert is a first priority (see para 2-1-2,
Duty Priority) once the controller observes and recognizes a situation of
unsafe aircraft proximity to terrain, obstacles, or other aircraft.
Conditions, such as workload, traffic volume, the quality/limitations of
the radar system, and the available lead time to react are factors in
determining whether it is reasonable for the controller to observe and
recognize such situations. While a controller cannot see immediately the
development of every situation where a safety alert must be issued, the
controller must remain vigilant for such situations and issue a safety
alert when the situation is recognized.

2. Recognition of situations of unsafe proximity may result from
MSAW/E-MSAW/LAAS, automatic altitude readouts, Conflict/Mode C Intruder
Alert, observations on a PAR scope, or pilot reports.

3. Once the alert is issued, it is solely the pilot's prerogative to
determine what course of action, if any, will be taken.

a. Terrain/Obstruction Alert. Immediately issue/ initiate an alert to an
aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is at an altitude which, in your
judgment, places it in unsafe proximity to terrain/obstructions. Issue the
alert as follows:

PHRASEOLOGY-
LOW ALTITUDE ALERT (call sign),
CHECK YOUR ALTITUDE IMMEDIATELY.
THE (as appropriate) MEA/MVA/MOCA/MIA IN YOUR
AREA IS (altitude),
or if an aircraft is past the final approach fix
(nonprecision approach),
or the outer marker,
or the fix used in lieu of the outer marker (precision approach),
and, if known, issue
THE (as appropriate) MDA/DH IS (altitude).


How is 3-1-4 pertinent in this case? Nothing in the transcript suggests the
controller failed to comply with anything you pasted above.