"L'acrobat" wrote in message news:belnd6

1. December 1965-September 1966. Since the Australian 1 RAR was
hardly up to the task, the US 173d Airborne Brigade committed two
battalions to operate against the VC and infrastructure in Phuoc
Tuy province, and to clear areas for an Australian base at Nui Dat.
The US Army provided helicopter lift for the Australian Army which
spent much of its time in Vietnam begging the United States to spare
more rotary wings. The joint force carried out four major operations
in the Phuoc Tuy province, SMASH, HARDIHOOD, HOLLANDIA and TOLEDO.
After that, the MACV hoped that Australia might be able to finish
the job without US assistance. They didn't.

"The Aussies taught us a lot about small unit ops"


For once I agree with you. But then again the 173d Airborne was green
in 1965 with no experience in combat, let alone in jungle warfare.
There was no Vietnam recondo schools in 1965. They did too much
shooting since they were not familiar with the sounds of the jungle
and often shot at various animals by mistake. They also made too much
noise, built too many fires, and left garbage laying around outside
of the firebases.

But they learned and improved whereas Australia did not improve much
at all, save for the SAS since they embraced US style airmobility.

The very low number of kills claimed by Oz infantry speaks louder
than your lame attempts at cooking up a cover story.


3. February - June 1968. After thumbing their noses at Australia
for two years, the 5th VC Division and parts of D445 VC Battalion
were shattered by US troops around Bien Hoa and Long Binh during Tet
and Mini-Tet. American troops should not have encountered these 2nd-
rate Viet Cong units at all, but unfortunately the Australians could
not handle them and let the buggers get away -- as they often did by
the admission of the Australian General Tim Vincent. The consequences
were that, thanks to US troops, it was quiet in the Phuoc Tuy province
while the enemy licked his wounds and slowly rebuilt 5th VC Division
and D445 VC Battalion.

6. July 1970 to April 1971. In addition to responsibilities in Long
Khanh and Bien Hoa provinces, 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
was forced to operate in the Phuoc Tuy province because the Australian
Army could not handle the enemy or pacification program without us.
This is in addition to the fact that US troops guarded the seaport and
other installations at Vung Tau, and provided road convoy security to
and from.

Yawn, 1 ATF pacified the area quite nicely, in the dates you indicate the
Australian deployment was winding down (like the US one) however -


Westmoreland never thanked Australia for "pacifying the Phuoc Tuy
Province" or "destroying the 5th VC Division and D445" because
they never did.

The VC had bunkers and tunnels EVERYWHERE and the Kangaroos-in-denial
could not find all of them. Everytime the Australian weenies thought
they "hunted out the province" the Communists paid them a nice visit.
From David Horner's history of Australian SAS:

April 1969: Lt. General Julian Ewell of the US Army II Field Force
issued a directive to 1st Australian Task Force they should change
their concept of operations to concentrate on pacification;
interdiction of local VC as they entered villages in the east of
the province". Nevertheless, there was no major VC main force activity
in 1969 other than the summer offensive.

May 1969: Elements of 33 NVA Regiment, 274 VC Regiment and local
VC began a month long operation around the villages and hamlets along
Route 15 and provincial Route 2. Their intentions were unknown, but
it was believed they may have wanted to disrupt normal government
administration. The build-up for a VC-NVA assault of this size
should have been obvious to Australian troops but they were taken
by surprise. The SAS failed to detect the staging areas and
Australian officers ignored the warning signs from previous contacts.
In May and June there were several enemy rocket attacks on the
Australian Task Force base at Nui Dat.

June 1969: 3 Squadron of the SAS Regiment conducted eleven patrols
with a total of 157 enemy troops sighted and five contacts resulting
in eight VC killed. Results for July 308 enemy sighted, five killed.

September 1969: As his Vietnam tour ended, Brigadier Pearson halted
operations around Dak Do and since the VC often moved to high ground
between raids, the SAS began patrolling around the May Taos, a VC
mountain stronghold on the border of the Long Khanh province.

April 1970: Task Force began Operation CONCRETE in the Xuyen
Moc district, Phuoc Tuy province, with the aim of destroying
D445 VC Main Force Battalion and its base areas.

September 1970: The SAS began operations in support of Operation
CUNG and CHUNG II in which 7 RAR had the mission of denying
access to Xuyen Moc, Dat Do and Lang Phuoc Hai. Unfortunately,
the successful results achieved were short-lived.

November 1970: Part of D445 VC Battalion supported by elements
of the disbanded D440 VC Battalion successfully attacked district
capital of Xuyen Moc. Nine days later a 7 RAR night defensive
position was mortared, followed by an attack by elements of the
D445 VC Battalion. On the night of 30/31 December elements of
7 RAR ambushed a large part of D445 VC Battalion south of Xuyen
Moc. In these incidents the enemy displayed classic VC tactics
and fought with a tenacity thought long dead in Phuoc Tuy.

March 1971: A 6-man patrol led by Sgt. Terry O' Farrell was inserted
twelve kilometers northeast of Xuyen Moc. While establishing a night
LUP, they heard a large force of enemy moving north east along a
track, to the west of their LUP. Four days later 3 RAR, which had
relieved 7 RAR, contacted a company of D445 VC Battalion about
4 kilometers northwest of Xuyen Moc. In an operation that lasted
well into April, 3 RAR and elements of the 2 RAR/NZ located and
attacked a bunker system recently occupied by the D445 VC Battalion.

April 1971: The month had been frustrating for the Australian SAS
and the overall situation had not changed appreciably. In 23 patrols
they had sighted three enemy and claimed two killed. Lt. B.R.A. Jones
was killed by Friendly Fire -- shot and fatally wounded by a member
of his own patrol. Contacts were still required but the enemy remained
elusive, once he realized ATF troops are looking for him he became
very careful in his daily routine and movement. He continued to move
freely about the province from bunker system to bunker system.

August 1971: Sgt. Frank Cashmore's SAS patrol observed some VC
troops hit by an airstrike and in the debris they found the dead
body of the assistant chief of staff, 274 VC Regiment. He was
carrying a satchel containing money, maps and documents that
provided an accurate and up-to-date picture of the 274 Regiment's
condition and intentions. The VC were moving into position to
attack populated areas in northern Phuoc Tuy to disrupt the
local elections.

September 1971: Because of a snafu, the Australian SAS was unable
to provide adequate coverage and screening for the Task Force and
they failed to detect that 33 NVA Regiment re-entered Phuoc Tuy
province. The SAS was not involved in Operation IVANHOE, the
Australian Task Force's last operation in which 4 RAR was engaged
in "heavy contacts with the North Vietnamese north of Binh Gia".

October 1971: The Australian SAS pulled out of Vietnam for good
and returned home to an openly hostile reception from their own
Army. Although the mission record of the SAS Regiment suggested
impressive statistics for a small unit, not everyone felt that
the SAS performed well in Vietnam.

January 1972: Ian McFarlane took over the regiment from Lawrie
Clark, at a time when "SAS" was considered "a dirty word" in the
Army. Officers were warned that a posting to the SAS could curtail
their careers and the regiment tried to find new roles to avoid the
possibility of being disbanded. It would be some time before the
SAS Regiment was widely accepted as a permanent part of the
Australian Army. One thing that saved them was working with US
Navy SEALs and the US Army Special Forces in Vietnam. The
members who served with the AATTV had a front row seat to a
wide variety of missions and concluded the potential special
ops extended far beyond the reconnaissance patrols that were
the focus of SAS operations in Vietnam.


5. May 1968. Part of the Australian TF found themselves besieged
at FSBs CORAL and BALMORAL and American air power was called
for help. US aircraft carried out airstrikes on advancing and
retreating NVA
and their supply lines.

You do know that that is the point of establishing FSBs don't you? (of
course you don't), give the enemy a target they must engage, then use max
force against them. That is why the Americans asked 1 ATF to move into the
previously US held AO Surfers, to clear it out, they did and then went back
to their own AO.



They never cleared it out, and were sent packing back to the Phuoc Tuy
province where they obviously failed to clear out the enemy there
as well.


All the airstrikes and arty in the world is of no use if the
Infantry can't hold the position.


Your infantry would have been dead meat without the airstrikes
and artillery. Being dead always makes it difficult to hold
a position.

Of course the enemy understood the real threats better than
you ever will. A Viet Cong officer spelled that out for us
with his thoughts on US Airmobility:


" The South Vietnamese government troops
did not pose too much of a problem to the
Viet Cong, but the Americans with their
helicopters and artillery changed the
face of the war overnight "
~ Hai Chua, PLAF