ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids (was:
#1
From: Guy Alcala

We're talking heavies, Art. Longer missions than the mediums, much more time
(sometimes three hours or more) spent over defended territory, at alitude on

The longer the mission the greater the pilot strain. The tighter the formation
the greater the pilot strain.

Which is why they needed two pilots to switch off flying formation, as stated.

Heavies rarely flew missions as tight as rhe
mediums did.

I'll leave it to you to argue that point with pilots of heavies.

acing a much more numerous (and usually more determined) fighter threat.

I see you never flew in a medium that was attacked by fighters have you? Are
you suggesting that the fighters were serious whee they attacked heavies but
just fooling around when they attacked mediums?. Where do you get this crap
from?

I'm saying (not suggesting) that until the mediums were on the continent, only the
heavies were attacking targets in Germany. The German response to attacks by
mediums on tactical targets in France, Belgium, and Holland was much less
determined than their response to attacks on targets in Germany, for obvious
reasons. Intercepting the mediums was optional, intercepting the heavies
mandatory, in the period in question. Or are you claiming that the heavies 4.2%
ETO loss rate for 1943 as a whole, vs. the B-26's 0.5% in the same period, was due
to the B-26 being able to take more damage than the B-17 or B-24?

As an example of the different defense responses, I've been re-reading
Middlebrook's "Schweinfurt-Regensburg Raid", which details the dual mission of
August 17th, 1943. In addition to the heavies and their escorts (U.S. P-47s and
RAF Spitfires) going to the targets in Germany, there were also five diversionary
or support missions to French targets by U.S. B-26s, RAF B-25s, and Typhoons,
escorted by Spits or Typhoons.

The Germans intercepted one of the B-26 formations, the one to Bryas Airfield by
the 36 a/c of the 386th BG, escorted by 8 squadrons of Spits (a much higher ratio
of fighters to bombers than was possible with the heavies). On this occasion,
they did choose to intercept in about Gruppe strength, with two Staffels of
ME-109s and one of FW-190s, roughly 20-30 fighters total (facing about 90 Spits).
At least one of the units involved, 11/JG 26, was a training and replacement unit
for the rest of the Jagdgeschwader, with largely inexperienced pilots. Total
losses, two German fighters, two Spits, and no B-26s.

Dive bombing attack against Lille-Vendeville airfield by 8 Typhoons, escorted by
12 more. One small German force that had been looking for the U.S. force that had
bombed Bryas slightly earlier made contact with this group instead, and took some
long range shots that cost one Typhoon. This attack may have delayed the
concentration of II/JG 26 at Lille from its dispersal bases, possibly preventing
this unit from attacking the Schweinfurt force on their way inbound.

Similar strength Typhoon dive bombing attack against Poix Airfield, no
engagements, no losses.

7 Mitchells of RAF No. 226 Squadron, and 6 from 320 Dutch Squadron, each with
three squadrons of Spits as escort, were sent to attack railyards at Dunkirk and
Calais respectively, mainly as diversions, with any damage caused being
serendipitous. 226's mission was aborted due to escort rendezvous and formation
problems; the Calais mission went as planned. The Luftwaffe completely ignored
both missions.

Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe was repositioning fighters from bases in Northern Germany
and Western France to those in Belgium, Holland, and Central Germany to hit the
heavies on their way in and, in the case of the Schweinfurt force, on the way
out. And so they did, with many units flying two or in a few cases three sorties,
for a total of about 500-550 sorties (vs. perhaps 30 sorties total for all five
diversionary/support missions). against the Schweinfurt force they were able to
assemble 13 Gruppen of single-engined fighters, perhaps 300 fighters total, plus
twins to pick off cripples. And of course, they shot down 60 B-17s, out of the
376 dispatched, at a cost of 42 fighters.

And here's an example of their attitude:

"Only a few days earlier Major Galland [CO of II/JG 26, Adolf's brother, shot down
and KIA this day by a 56th FG P-47] had gathered his officers together and
stressed to them that their best effort must henceforth be directed against the
American four-engined bombers which were posing such a threat to Germany."

Not an option for the heavies, for the reasons I gave above. They flew tight
formation until they'd crossed the coast on the return and started the let
down.

Are you suggesting that they flew as tight to and from the target as they did
on the bomb run? More crap.

I'm stating that they flew tight formations the whole way, because any unit in
loose formation drew fighters like bees to honey. While they flew enroute in a
combat box of 54 a/c, for the bomb run the three groups (lead, high and low)
switched to trail with each group bombing individually, before reforming into the
combat box for the route back. Indeed, on the Regensburg mission, Lemay insisted
that his units (4th Bomb Wing) climb to enroute height before setting out instead
of forming at a lower altitude and then cruise climbing, so that they could get
the formation tightened up before they hit the defenses. They held that to the
target, loosened up somewhat for the next couple of hundred miles, then tightened
up again while they flew past the German fighter fields believed to be on Sardinia
and Corsica, before loosening up once safely past and making their way to North
Africa.

Guy