Jacek,

First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!

Some words about Coonts' comment in The Intruders...

Remember that The Intruders is a work of fiction. Having said that, Coonts' account - like nearly everything in his "Intruder" books - has a factual basis, and this account is one about which I have some personal knowledge.

Coonts appears to be referring to the deployment by the VMA(AW)-224 "Bengals" during 1971-1972 with CVW-15/USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43). Those interested in the details can find enough on pp. 105-107 of Morgan & Morgan's Intruder: The Operational History of Grumman's A-6 to underscore Coonts' general theme.

There were factors unique to 224's situation, some of which Morgan & Morgan do not mention or only hint at. Until 224's deployment, no USMC A-6 squadron had ever deployed afloat so the "corporate knowledge" within Marine Corps aviation of A-6 boat ops was nonexistent. For that reason, Phil Bloomer, "Buck" Belcher, Phil Schuyler, and Daryl Kerr - all experienced USN A-6 folks - were seconded to 224 for this deployment. Also, there was essentially no recent afloat flying experience in any aircraft among any of the Bengal crews, most of whom had not seen a rounddown since the training command.

So, it may not be flattering to view USMC afloat capabilities as Coonts did, but it was a view based on a sad fact of those times. In today's environment, especially with the emphasis on "jointness," I would expect the likelihood of repeating the Bengals' "goon show" to be very low.

Two codas to the above:

* 224 shaped up very nicely after CAG Sheets sent the errant 224 skipper to the beach. The Bengals ended the cruise with a fine reputation within the air wing.

* Phil Bloomer went from 224 to a department head billet in the VA-95 "Green Lizards," which replaced 224 in the CVW-15 lineup for its 1973 deployment. As 95 was then a newly-reestablished squadron, and like 224 with very little A-6 "corporate knowledge" of its own, Phil found himself reprising his role in a back-to-back deployment, albeit now among folks like himself who did not sport funny haircuts due to institutional imperative. (Yours Truly was one of the many Lizard nuggets that Phil whipped into shape.)

Owl sends

--
Mike Kanze

"It's easy to delegate once you've learned to let a toddler spend 23 minutes buttering toast without an overwhelming urge to intervene."

- Jared Sandberg, Wall Street Journal, 5/29/2007

wrote in message oups.com...
Two more ideas for the "no F/A-18s supporting Marine riflemen on the
beach" discussion:

First: In Stephen Coonts book "The Intruders" the fictional Marine
A-6E/KA-6D squadron embarked on a carrier was described almost as "a
bunch of clowns incapable to safely fly and fight from the Boat, if no
experienced Navy officers were assigned". I think that is a Blue Ops
days view, very harmful and unjust for the Marine Corps aviation!

Second: No massive assault on the beach was seen recently (there is no
beach in Afghanistan at all;-))), but I cannot resist the impression
that new gizmos like ROVER, low-collateral-damage and small-diameter
bombs, land-based detachments of carrier-based units (so-called
"Cactus Air Force", once involving VFA-15 and VFA-87's F/A-18s) are
just for improving CAS capablities...

No matter if that were carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18s flying over
Iraq, or Navy's VFA-94 and VFA-97 rotating at Iwakuni, now CAS looks
to be too important to be forgotten. Through the definition now
switched from "assault on the beach CAS" to "urban CAS".

Just some of my observations, no first-hand experience with CAS, or no-
CAS...

Best regards,
Jacek