"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
m...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message
.. .
"phil hunt" wrote in message
. ..
On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 06:44:11 -0400, Paul Austin
wrote:

"Tony Williams" wrote

I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight
carrying
limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with
the
bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun?

By buying A400Ms?

Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling) sacrifices too much for
C-130
compatibility, particularly in the area of protection. The
MagicTech
remote sensing/remote fires stuff

What's this? Is it related to the "battlefield Internet" I've
head
about?

FCS if the ultimate MagicTech, consisting of ground and airborne
recon
platforms, data networks, robotic fire and logistics vehicles and
incidentally, replacements for the current generation mechanized
vehicles for troop carriers, fire support, C&C and direct fire
combat.

Where does this term "MagicTech" come from? First I have ever heard
of
it...

It's a term science fiction readers use to describe overwhelming
technological advantages that make the plot come out the way the
author intents. US forces combine superb training (often overlooked by
people who focus on equipment too much), doctrine and systems that
seem like MagicTech to our opponents.



In the interim, "digital battlefield" electronics, wide
distribution
of ubiquitous and persistent recon imagery and analysis and
precision
fires from airborne and ground systems help a lot. The USMC
completed
a wargame about 6 months ago using all of this stuff and a light
Marine Blue Force did very well against a conventional mech OPFOR.
They also discovered that the Red Force could compensate for the
advantages these technologies give US forces by targeting
communications and fire support elements. If they can be degraded,
then light forces lose the means to stand up to enemy mechanized
forces and are often defeated.

No, the "digital battlefield electronics", as you call it, is NOT an
interim solution awaiting the fielding of FCS. Instead, FCS is
merely
a concept of an entire family of new equipment that will more
completely integrate the evolving digital, ISR, targeting, and C3
developments that we have already instituted. And be careful of
citing
these battle simulations as "evidence"; as we saw last year during
that JFC simulation, these exercises are designed and managed to
acheive very specific goals, and even then are subject to anomalies;
having seen a mechanized engineer battalion (minus) (one still
mounted
in the M113 battle taxis to boot) destroy the better part of an
OPFOR
mechanized brigade during a combined division/corps WFX (and this
occured while the engineer unit was fleeing an overrun situation,
for
gosh sakes), I can tell you that trying to draw finite tactical
conclusions is risky at best. Add in the fact that the usual process
is to weight things a bit towards the OPFOR, since the objective is
usually to stress the Bluefor, and you can see where this is
anything
but a clean and neat process.

Perhaps I expressed myself badly. The "Digital Battlefield" systems
are in no way temporary and stopgap but_are_here and now. FCS is
intended to fully exploit the advantages of enhanced battlefield
digitization by making recon ubiquitous and every present and by
extending the logic of automated systems to all levels of the
battlefield. The remarkable thing about FCS is what a small part the
replacements for current Bradley, Abrams and artillery system are
within the complete FCS.

I agree with you about the perils of simulations but there are lessons
to be learned from them. In the case I cited, the Marines demonstrated
an obvious counter to the FCS approach.


As usual with military affairs, there's no panacea and the guy
you're
trying to kill has powerful incentives to circumvent your
advantages.

And just as usual, the accuracy of computer simulations of tactical
ground fights is strongly suspect.



isn't ready yet, never mind
"electric armor"

And this?

Britain has done development on large capacitor banks that pass
very
large currents through shaped charge jets hitting an armored
vehicle,
melting the jet before it can hit the inner armo(u)r. They say
that
scaled up versions might be able to do the same to long-rod
penetrators.

"Melt the jet"? OFCS, that jet is already at extremely high
temperature, courtesy of its being shoved inside out and pushed into
a
"jet" moving at thousands of meters per second. "Melting" it does
nothing to change its mass, and it is the combination of that mass
and
attendant velocity that makes a shaped charge (read up on the Munroe
Effect) work.

Read more closely about the physics of shaped charges. The jet in a
shaped charge is actually composed of a stream of solid particles. The
article in IDR describing the "electric armor" didn't go into details
about mechanism but a shaped charge's jet doesn't have anything like
the penetrating power if the jet is turned into a liquid. In this
case, liquid copper. The "electric armor" notion, still unproven in
the field is that a jet shorts out two plates of a very high value
capacitor and the resulting current melts the jet before it can travel
into the armor array proper. Actually building such a vehicle
encompassing capacitor in such a way that it 1. doesn't electrocute
the crew or the attending infantry and 2. can be recharged reasonably
quickly is left as an exercise for the development engineers.




that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV mounted
army viable. If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and
as
effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more
capable
airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small

ITYM A400M.

Yup. The A300M is obviously the two-engined version intented to
replace the G.222

Mehopes that was offered tongue in cheek, as the G.222 is being
replaced by the C-27J, and IIRC the A300 was a commercial design
development...

Yup.

Brooks