ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Aircrew casualities
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 9/29/03 9:27 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Aircrew casualities
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 9/26/03 3:15 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

ArtKramr wrote:

snip

If I think back to the
missions I flew with the 344th and had to name a "typical" mission, I
couldn't
do it. We had no typical mssions.. Each one was unique, except of
course
for
the milk runs, which in themselves were not typical.

Sure, but we're looking for statistical data on survival rates, and so far
the
only such data presented in the course of this thread is that which I
provided in
that post. Everything else has been perceptual or anecdotal. We now have
some
actual data (limited to a single mission though it is, and only 60 B-17
combat
losses out of the 4,688 B-17s combat losses in the European war as a
whole),
which
is more than we've had otherwise.

Guy

You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort
mission.
If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical.

Juvat has already pointed out that I specifically stated that my comments
referred
to the mission tactics, techniques, and weapons employment. As he says, the
losses
were unheard of _to that time_

That alone makes it atypical.

High percentage losses had been suffered prior to that mission, albeit with
smaller forces dispatched (which is why I left them out). For instance, the
mission to Bremen on 17th April 1943 lost 16 out of 115 dispatched (107
effective), or 13.9%. The mission to Kiel (among several targets; a total of 228
bombers were dispatched) on 13th June lost 22 of 60, which is to say, 36%, far
exceeding the loss rate at Regensburg/Schweinfurt or Second Schweinfurt.


, but as I pointed out in my reply to one of
his
posts, not all that un-representative of subsequent similar missions.
Regensburg/Schweinfurt was the deepest penetration of Germany to date

Again. atypical.

And again, to that date. Stuttgart on September 6th was about as deep as
Schweinfurt, with similar results (45 losses, 13.3%). As I said, this level of
losses could be expected on such deep penetrations.

but
the
results were similar on other missions, if not quite so extreme.

Not so extreme?. Hardly typical.

See above.



In the case
of
first Schweinfurt, the German fighter controllers guessed right for the wrong
reasons;

Irrelevant to the guys who got hammered and those who were lost.

Sure. As it happens, the German controllers gambled that we wouldn't dispatch a
second force to targets in northern Germany, as they'd moved all those Gruppes
south, leaving the north unprotected. They were aware that the Regensburg force
was less than half of the available bombers, so were taking a big chance.

they'd re-positioned much of their fighter force to hit the
Regensburg
force when it returned to England. That force continued on to Africa, but
the
Schweinfurt force came in and returned on virtually the same track (neither
force
had the range to take anything other than the most direct route to the
target), so
the fighters hit them instead, both coming and going. The only reason they
were
able to do so in that case was owing to English weather, and the decision by
BG
Anderson to delay the takeoff of the Schweinfurt force for several hours as a
consequence. Sometimes things don't break your way.

Tell me about it.

Find me
one guy who went to Schweinfort and said it was just another mission like
all
others. No big deal. Nothing special. Find me just one such guy. Guy you
post a
lot of good stuff here, but sometimes you just slip away from reality.

How about several guys who went to Regensburg, who Middlebrook interviewed
(and he
interviewed crew from every single U.S. bomb and fighter group that took
part in
the mission, as well as German crew from every single fighter gruppe, and RAF
pilots from all the RAF fighter squadrons)? It really all depends on where
you
were in the formation, and your perspective.

Y'mean if we put up 56 aircraft and 55 were lost but one got back unscathed we
could write the mission off as a milk run due toi that one plane?

Nope, but if your group and wing suffered no or minimal casualties, and you never
saw other groups/wings taking major losses, you'd certainly think it was an easy
mission, now wouldn't you? The higher commanders would think otherwise, but
that's due to the difference in their and your perspective.

Middlebrook wrote:

"Two of the groups in the leading combat wing - the 96th and 388th - had
never been
under serious attack and had so far suffered no casualties [Guy note: on the
way in
to Regensburg; the 388th subsequently lost one a/c that ditched short of
Africa
after being damaged by flak over the target). Several men in these groups
refer to
the Regensburg mission as 'almost like a milk run'. But the officer
observing from
the tail turret of the leading plane had been sending a steady stream of
reports
about the action which had been taking place further back in the force and
reporting those losses which he could see. LeMay was well aware that his
force had
taken heavy casualties."

Hardlly typical or a milk run in spite of what one flight had experienced

Again, depends on your perspective. It was a milk run for those groups, and not
for others further back. To LeMay, it certainly wasn't a milk run for the 4th
Bomb Wing, although it was a milk run for him personally (he flew in the lead
plane of the 96th BG, leading the first combat wing to Regensburg. As mentioned,
the 96th suffered no casualties, a/c or personnel, at all, one other group in the
combat wing lost one a/c and the high group lost 6 of 21, although one of those
made it to Switzerland and two others ditched out of gas (there'd been a snafu in
the field order, which caused that group, the 390th, to take off well before the
rest of the force).

So, several of the crews who Middlebrook interviewed considered Regensburg
"almost
like a milk run," despite the fact that the percentage losses were actually
higher
(16.4% vs. 15.7%) than the Schweinfurt force suffered.

Looks like those "several crews " got it wrong.

Not for them, they didn't. For an individual crew, which is harder, a mission
where the force as a whole takes heavy casualties but they themselves are
untouched and unaware of any attacks in their area, or one where the rest of their
unit is undamaged, but they themselves take casualties/are shot down? The latter
would be a milk run from the command perspective, a disaster for them personally.

There were also units
on
the First Schweinfurt mission who suffered no or low casualties, and may not
have
even seen a German fighter. For those units and crews it was a milk run _for
them
personally_.

Why do you keep evaluating based on "several crews"

I'm doing no such thing. You were the one who asked me to find, "one, just one
guy who went to Schweinfurt and said it was just a mission like all the others.
No big deal. Nothing special." I then provided you with evidence that several
crews going to Regensburg (on the same mission, and suffering higher percentage
losses than the Schweinfurt task force) thought the mission was indeed fairly
quiet, albeit obviously unusual in that it was going so deep and then on to
Africa.

We evaluate by overall
losses, not by "several crews" To those who never flew a mission. all missions
are milk runs. It all depends on who's ox is gored.

And that's the point, it all depends on the perspective of the observer. If
you're commanding an army, you may report your front "quiet, little enemy activity
except patrols," and from your perspective you'd be right; if you happen to be a
private in a squad that ran into an enemy patrol, had a vicious little firefight
lasting several hours and lost two dead and six wounded (including yourself), from
your perspective the war is anything but "quiet, little enemy activity" as your
unit has just suffered somewhere between 66 to 100% casualties, and you'd also be
right.

Guy