On Sep 6, 1:35 am, Mark Hickey wrote:
Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

...

If you're REALLY interested in what UNMOVIC thought at the time of the
invasion, you should read their March 2003 report Not only does it
blow your "unfettered access" claim out of the water - errrr, air
(this is a flying ng, after all), but they stated that Iraq probably
had (among many other things) 10,000 liters of anthrax ready to
deploy... and the abilty to manufacture LOTS of WMD in short order in
one of their many "dual-use" facilities.

http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/docu...luster6mar.pdf



6 March 2003
APPENDIX
A (sic) HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF IRAQ'S PROSCRIBED WEAPONS PROGRAMMES
....

Destruction
....
During the bombing campaign the main CW facilities at
Al Muthanna and Al Fallujah were heavily damaged. In
addition, some of the CW weapons stored at airfields and
other locations were also destroyed. However, Iraq had
evacuated [note: 'evacuated' to other locations in Iraq,FF]
much of its strategic materials and equipment prior to the
war...

Thus, several hundreds of tonnes of Mustard and Sarin
were buried in the desert surrounding Al Muthanna during t
he war and survived the bombing. The agents was (sic)
subsequently destroyed by UNSCOM. ...

.. It was clear, even from this first inspection, that the site had
been severely disabled, but not completely destroyed. The
scene was one of smashed production plants and leaking...
the second chemical inspection team visited the precursor
plants at Al Fullujah and inspected similar destruction levels.

....

Before UNSCOM could begin its work on the elimination remaining
CW capabilities, Iraq secretly began its own unilateral destruction.
Iraq declared that, in July 1991, under instruction from
Lieutenant-
General Hussein Kamal, it began the unilateral destruction of
selected
chemicals and munitions; this activity was not disclosed to UNSCOM
at the time. ...It is probable that one of the reasons for this
unilateral
destruction was an effort to bring what UNSCOM might find more
into line with the serious inadequacies in Iraq's initial
declaration
of its holdings of proscribed weapons and materials. ...
In all, Iraq declared the destruction of over 28,000 filled and
unfilled
munitions, about 30 tonnes of bulk chemical precursors for Sarin
and Cyclosarin, and over 200 tonnes of key precursors relating to
Vx.
[I presume this refers to a subsequent declaration, perhaps as late as
2002, FF]
....
The remaining weapons, materials and equipment declared by Iraq,
that could be identified and located by UNSCOM, were destroyed
under its supervision, mainly between 1992 and 1994. Thus, over
28,000
munitions, 480 tonnes of CW agent and 100,000 tonnes of precursor
chemicals were disposed of. About 400 major pieces of chemical
processing equipment and some hundreds of items of other equipment,
such as bomb-making machinery, were also destroyed under UNSCOM s
upervision.
....
Dual-use capabilities to 1998
....

Much of this civilian chemical industry used dual-capable technology
and was, therefore, under monitoring by UNSCOM until the end of
1998.

Herein lay the concern, that during tthe gap between UNSCOM and
UNMOVIC Iraq might have converted dual-use facilities to CW
production,
or rebuilt the destroyed factories. NO evidence to support those
fears
was found by UNMOVIC before the invasion or ISG afterwards. As
noted by Dr David Kay, " no factories, no weapons.". ]


Conclusions

UNMOVIC has a good understanding of the nature and scope
of Iraq's CW programme. The areas of greatest uncertainty
relate to questions of material balance and whether there may
be items still remaining. In this regard, Iraq's unilateral
destruction
of large quantities of chemicals and weapons, in July 1991, has
complicated the accountancy problem. The questions of uncertainty
are discussed further in the Clusters of Unresolved Disarmament
Issues.

Understand???

....
By some standards, the technology levels achieved by Iraq in the
production of its CW agents and weapons, were not high. The agents
were often impure and had a limited shelf-life. ...

[IOW, CW not disposed of during the 1990s would no longer be
effective by 2003. No new factories, no new weapons, FF]
...

It is evident that Iraq's CW capabilities posed a significant
regional threat.

[ IN 1991, not in 2003! ]

IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMME

....

Iraq went to considerable lengths, including the destruction of
documents and the forging of other documents, to conceal its
BW efforts from UNSCOM. After intensive investigations by
UNSCOM, Iraq disclosed some details of its offensive BW
programme on, 1 July 1995. ... in August 1995, Iraq
revealed a much more comprehensive BW programme.

[Note: UNSCOM pre-dated UNMOVIC and ceased activity
in Iraq in 1998. The secrecy and obstruction pre-dated
UNMOVIC.]

Iraq's efforts to conceal the programme, particularly the
destruction of documentation and its declared unilateral
destruction of BW weapons and agents, have complicated
UNMOVIC's task of piecing together a coherent and accurate
account of its BW programme.
....
In May/June 1996, all of the facilities, related equipment and
materials declared by Iraq as belonging to its BW programme
were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. Thus, the vaccine f
ermenters at Al Daura that Iraq had declared had produced
botulinum toxin were destroyed, as was the entire Al Hakam
complex, including all its equipment and materials.
....
These (other ostensibly civilian, FF] facilities were included in
routine monitoring by UNSCOM; no proscribed activities were
detected at these sites up to the end of inspections in December
1998.

[Once again the concern was that during the gap between UNSCOM
and UNMVIC, Iraq could have resumed production of BW. Again,
UNMOVIC found NO EVIDENCE of renewed production.]


Uncertainties regarding Iraq's BW programme

Unilateral destruction

The almost complete lack of documentation on unilateral
destruction activities in 1991 gives rise to the greatest
uncertainties
regarding Iraq's declaration of BW activities. Although there
is physical evidence that some such destruction took place,
it was difficult for UNSCOM inspectors to quantify the numbers
and amounts. This, in turn, has repercussions on assessment
of material balance and whether all materials and weapons
have been accounted for.


***

In summary, the numerous unresolved WMD
issues in the report are ubiquitously matters
left over from UNSCOM 1990s and in no way
constitute evidence of post turn of the century
WMD production or obstruction of UNMOVIC.

THAT is what the report says.

The argument that Iraq was a threat in 2003 relied on
confabulating UNSCOM of the 1990s with UNMOVIC
of 2002-3, ignoring the short shelf-life of Iraqi munitions,
ignoring the absence of manufacturing facilities, ignoring
the 'unprecedented' cooperation with UNMOVIC and
requiring that Iraq achieve the logical impossibility of
proving a negative hypothesis.

To argue that the March 2003 UNMOVIC report was
evidence that Iraq was a threat to the United States,
defies reason.

--

FF