Note follow-ups

On Sep 7, 5:44 am, Mark Hickey wrote:
Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

On Sep 6, 1:35 am, Mark Hickey wrote:
Fred the Red Shirt wrote:

...

If you're REALLY interested in what UNMOVIC thought at the time of the
invasion, you should read their March 2003 report Not only does it
blow your "unfettered access" claim out of the water - errrr, air
(this is a flying ng, after all), but they stated that Iraq probably
had (among many other things) 10,000 liters of anthrax ready to
deploy... and the abilty to manufacture LOTS of WMD in short order in
one of their many "dual-use" facilities.

http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/docu...luster6mar.pdf

I think it's kinda funny that the best you can find in the report
supports my position (that no one could verify that Iraq had actually
destroyed their WMDs and the production facilities, other than those
that we destroyed or the minority that there was actual evidence for
the destruction).

False.

The report leaves no doubt whatsoever that the
production facilities were destroyed.

Lingering doubts that some fifteen-year old materials
might not have been destroyed at the time and place
reported to UNSCOM years earlier are mitigated by
the short shelf-life of Iraqi WMD.


Which WAS the whole point, after all.

Indeed. That Iraq was not a threat to the US, was
exacltly the point. In fact, Irraq was not a credible
threatto any of its neighbors either.


I think those who've actually read the entire report have seen what
they need to see,

Rather, you see what you want to see.

and now realize that the whole "Bush lied" mantra is
just another wild fabrication when it comes to the disposition of
Iraq's WMDs prior to the invasion. Virtually every intelligence
agency in the civilized world came to the same conclusions as
UNMOVIC...

Really? How did you become privy to the conclusions reached
by EVERY intelligence agency in the world?

In 1995, Saddam Hussein's son -in law, Hussein
Kamel al-Majid, who directed Iraq's clandestine
weapons program defected. He claimed that Iraq
had destroyed all of its WMD stockpiles. Later
he was persuaded to return to Iraq, where he was
executed.

Some years before the 2003 invasion, Iraqi Foreign Minister
Naji Sabri became a mole for US intelligence. He confirmed
what al-Majid had said--Iraq had no WMD.

The US also had a third source, code-names 'curveball',
an Iraqi exile living in Germany. Curveball claimed to have
worked in the Iraqi BW program and to have intimate knowledge
of the Iraqi CW program. Despite the evidence that he had
not left Germany for fifteen years and the fact that German
intelligence had characterized him as a 'crazy drunk'

The October, 2002 NIE on Iraq, or to be more accurate, the
declassified portions of it, rely entirely on Curveball and
ignore the other two sources.

Why do YOU suppose that is?

that there was no reason to believe or trust that Iraq had
in fact destroyed their WMDs and production capabilities
(as clearly evidenced by the quotes you provide from the
report below).

The report leaves no doubt as to the destruction of production
facilities and makes it clear that unresolved issues are
SPECULATIVE .


I'll let the report speak for itself - I don't really have anything
else to add.

Before you go, could you please point to the part of report that
supports your earlier claim that the report that blows my clain of
unfettered access with UNMOVIC out of the air?

Also, please refer us to the parts that cast doubt on the conclusion
that the Iraqi production facilities were destroyed and not rebuilt?


Mark "facts is facts" Hickey

The fact is that you have not presented evidence that Iraq
was a threat.


6 March 2003
APPENDIX
A (sic) HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF IRAQ'S PROSCRIBED WEAPONS PROGRAMMES
...

Destruction
...
During the bombing campaign the main CW facilities at
Al Muthanna and Al Fallujah were heavily damaged. In
addition, some of the CW weapons stored at airfields and
other locations were also destroyed. However, Iraq had
evacuated [note: 'evacuated' to other locations in Iraq,FF]
much of its strategic materials and equipment prior to the
war...

Thus, several hundreds of tonnes of Mustard and Sarin
were buried in the desert surrounding Al Muthanna during t
he war and survived the bombing. The agents was (sic)
subsequently destroyed by UNSCOM. ...

. It was clear, even from this first inspection, that the site had
been severely disabled, but not completely destroyed. The
scene was one of smashed production plants and leaking...
the second chemical inspection team visited the precursor
plants at Al Fullujah and inspected similar destruction levels.

...

Before UNSCOM could begin its work on the elimination remaining
CW capabilities, Iraq secretly began its own unilateral destruction.
Iraq declared that, in July 1991, under instruction from
Lieutenant- General Hussein Kamal, it began the unilateral destruction
of selected chemicals and munitions; this activity was not disclosed
to UNSCOM at the time. ...It is probable that one of the reasons
for
this unilateral destruction was an effort to bring what UNSCOM
might find more into line with the serious inadequacies in Iraq's initial
declaration of its holdings of proscribed weapons and materials. ...
In all, Iraq declared the destruction of over 28,000 filled and
unfilled munitions, about 30 tonnes of bulk chemical precursors for Sarin
and Cyclosarin, and over 200 tonnes of key precursors relating to
Vx.
[I presume this refers to a subsequent declaration, perhaps as late as
2002, FF]
...
The remaining weapons, materials and equipment declared by Iraq,
that could be identified and located by UNSCOM, were destroyed
under its supervision, mainly between 1992 and 1994. Thus, over
28,000
munitions, 480 tonnes of CW agent and 100,000 tonnes of precursor
chemicals were disposed of. About 400 major pieces of chemical
processing equipment and some hundreds of items of other equipment,
such as bomb-making machinery, were also destroyed under UNSCOM s
upervision.
...
Dual-use capabilities to 1998
...

Much of this civilian chemical industry used dual-capable technology
and was, therefore, under monitoring by UNSCOM until the end of
1998.

Herein lay the concern, that during tthe gap between UNSCOM and
UNMOVIC Iraq might have converted dual-use facilities to CW
production,
or rebuilt the destroyed factories. NO evidence to support those
fears
was found by UNMOVIC before the invasion or ISG afterwards. As
noted by Dr David Kay, " no factories, no weapons.". ]

Conclusions

UNMOVIC has a good understanding of the nature and scope
of Iraq's CW programme. The areas of greatest uncertainty
relate to questions of material balance and whether there may
be items still remaining. In this regard, Iraq's unilateral
destruction
of large quantities of chemicals and weapons, in July 1991, has
complicated the accountancy problem. The questions of uncertainty
are discussed further in the Clusters of Unresolved Disarmament
Issues.

Understand???

...
By some standards, the technology levels achieved by Iraq in the
production of its CW agents and weapons, were not high. The agents
were often impure and had a limited shelf-life. ...

[IOW, CW not disposed of during the 1990s would no longer be
effective by 2003. No new factories, no new weapons, FF]
..

It is evident that Iraq's CW capabilities posed a significant
regional threat.

[ IN 1991, not in 2003! ]

IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMME

...

Iraq went to considerable lengths, including the destruction of
documents and the forging of other documents, to conceal its
BW efforts from UNSCOM. After intensive investigations by
UNSCOM, Iraq disclosed some details of its offensive BW
programme on, 1 July 1995. ... in August 1995, Iraq
revealed a much more comprehensive BW programme.

[Note: UNSCOM pre-dated UNMOVIC and ceased activity
in Iraq in 1998. The secrecy and obstruction pre-dated
UNMOVIC.]

Iraq's efforts to conceal the programme, particularly the
destruction of documentation and its declared unilateral
destruction of BW weapons and agents, have complicated
UNMOVIC's task of piecing together a coherent and accurate
account of its BW programme.
...
In May/June 1996, all of the facilities, related equipment and
materials declared by Iraq as belonging to its BW programme
were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. Thus, the vaccine f
ermenters at Al Daura that Iraq had declared had produced
botulinum toxin were destroyed, as was the entire Al Hakam
complex, including all its equipment and materials.
...
These (other ostensibly civilian, FF] facilities were included in
routine monitoring by UNSCOM; no proscribed activities were
detected at these sites up to the end of inspections in December
1998.

[Once again the concern was that during the gap between UNSCOM
and UNMVIC, Iraq could have resumed production of BW. Again,
UNMOVIC found NO EVIDENCE of renewed production.]

Uncertainties regarding Iraq's BW programme

Unilateral destruction

The almost complete lack of documentation on unilateral
destruction activities in 1991 gives rise to the greatest
uncertainties
regarding Iraq's declaration of BW activities. Although there
is physical evidence that some such destruction took place,
it was difficult for UNSCOM inspectors to quantify the numbers
and amounts. This, in turn, has repercussions on assessment
of material balance and whether all materials and weapons
have been accounted for.

***

In summary, the numerous unresolved WMD
issues in the report are ubiquitously matters
left over from UNSCOM 1990s and in no way
constitute evidence of post turn of the century
WMD production or obstruction of UNMOVIC.

THAT is what the report says.

The argument that Iraq was a threat in 2003 relied on
confabulating UNSCOM of the 1990s with UNMOVIC
of 2002-3, ignoring the short shelf-life of Iraqi munitions,
ignoring the absence of manufacturing facilities, ignoring
the 'unprecedented' cooperation with UNMOVIC and
requiring that Iraq achieve the logical impossibility of
proving a negative hypothesis.

To argue that the March 2003 UNMOVIC report was
evidence that Iraq was a threat to the United States,
defies reason.