"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
In message , Dr. George O.
Bizzigotti writes
On Tue, 11 Nov 2003 08:25:26 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:
snip

If that is the
appearance, why did the French, German, and Russian intelligence
services arrive at the same basic judgment (the Iraqis did retain
WMDs) when their governments had decided they were _not_ going to war.

One guess - lack of capability to provide a significant threat outside
of a fairly narrow area centred on Iraq? An issue to remember is that
the Saudi Arabians and Kuwaitis and Israelis failed to either launch
pre-emptive strikes or demand US military cover against the threat of
Iraqi WMEs. They're the threatened neighbours... if they aren't shouting
for help, perhaps the threat is being slightly oversold?

(Or maybe there's more Arab pride at play. Or lots of other
possibilities. This is a _large_ question)

Paul, those Arab nations, and Israel, *had* demanded US protection
from that Iraqi threat. That is why Patriot batteries remained
stationed in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia throughout the nineties and up
through this last conflict, or in the case of israel, why it received
Patriot systems ahead of normal schedule (ISTR some of those came from
German stocks?). It was also IIRC used to help justify continued US
funding of Arrow.

As to preemptive strikes, the Kuwaitis and the Saudis were
non-starters in that regard--they were not going to be accused of
attacking a fellow Arab nation. Reasoning for Israeli recalcitrance
would undoubtedly include strong US pressure not to go that route; the
last thing we wanted was for Iraq to become a chip in the greater
Israel vs. Arabs game.


It appears that judgment was incorrect, but whatever faults led to the
error appear to have been shared by those nations both for and against
the war in Iraq.

Intelligence is inherently imperfect. My concern is that certainty was
assigned to data that was at best "highest probability". Nations that
acted on that worst-case threat now have to try to pacify Iraq until a
handover: nations that were more cautious about assigning certainty to
intel data are branded "axis of Weasel" even though hindsight shows them
correct. Lose-lose.

Hindsight has *not* shown them to be "correct"; as George noted, those
"Axis of Weasel" nations also believed Iraq had WMD's or an ongoing
significant program. They differed on *how* to address the problem,
not the fact that a problem existed.



Misuse intel, and you'll shape the results you get in the next crisis.

So, what does that say about US intel assesments that underestimated
the ability or intent of Japan to attack the US before 1942? Or
British intel assessments that missed the German intent to invade
Poland until too late, or its ability to overrun France in record
time? In the intel game, the lesson seems to be that underestimation
is more dangerous than overestimation in the long run.

Brooks