"Emmanuel.Gustin" wrote in message
...
John S. Shinal wrote:

: Not a bad parallel, but we must ask why France would offer
: assistance of the Foreign Legion and a few jet squadrons for GW1, but
: not for GW2 ?

Because GW1 involved the defense of a sovereign (and rich)
nation, Kuwait, against blatant aggression by Iraq -- the
event has been described as the greatest bank robbery of
all time. The political framework for GW1 was quite strong,
as it involved not only the defense of vital interests
but also the enforcement of an international rule banning
unprovoked aggression which it is beneficial to uphold
for all nations.

GW2 on the other hand was an American pre-emptive and
aggressive move against an old enemy whose very survival
was seen by hardliners in Washington as an insult to the
USA's power.

That might be your perception, but that would not make it the correct one.

The political framework consisted of a set
of dubious claims about Iraqi WMD and vague pipe-dreams
about a rosy-colored middle east formulated by the loonies
who were not only allowed to advise the Pentagon, but also
to appear on TV as the administrattion's talking heads.

Odd, ISTR every major European power, France included, also had concluded
that Saddam had an ongoing WMD program.


With all respect for Colin Powell, US diplomacy failed
dismally on this occassion. James Baker would have been
ashamed to preside over this muddle, but much of the
blame rests on a president who allows his staff to voice
contradicting policies and silly statements in public ---
and senior ministers who are, err, less than tactful.

It would probably have been possible to get French support
for the removal of Saddam Hussein if the US had negotiated
and formulated a clear foreign policy for the middle east.

And said French support would undoubtedly also have been predicated upon the
self-powered and enabled flight of swine. The recalcitrance of France
towards easing the debt status of the emergent post-Saddam Iraqi government
would tend to indicate that France is more interested in seeing any attempt
to resolve the Iraqi dilemma fail. While France had the right to not support
the coalition's effort to topple Saddam (just as other European nations had
an equal right to support it, something that Chirac, if you recall, found
very distasteful), then why all of the subsequent attempts at obstructing
CURRENT progress, if the French are truly interested in the welfare of the
Iraqi people and the formation of a fair, representative government?

After all, Saddam was a brutal, murderous dictator, and
his removal from the region has obvious benefits.

Which the French have been rather slow in recognizing, as their reluctance
to forgive the debts accrued to them by the same "brutal, murderous
dictator" on behalf of the Iraqi people demonstrates. Maybe the fact that
France had just recently concluded a huge oil/gas development contract with
same said "brutal, murderous dictator" (TotalFina?) has something to do with
same said current reluctance. Or maybe it is just unthinkable for the French
to have to suck up the financial loss involved with all of those major
weapons systems to same said "brutal, murderous dictator". Whatever the
reason (and it more than likely has as much to do with that strange visceral
French desire to snipe at things American), the fact that they have
continued to be an obstacle even after the fall of Saddam does not seem to
support the idea that France was very keen upon seeing him fall in the first
place, regardless of the method used.

What was
lacking was, conspicuously, time; the hawks in Washington
wanted to use the momentum created by 9/11 to carry the
policy.

Or was it that 9/11 gave us a sharper focus towards doing what has to be
done as opposed to wringing our hands for another ten years of concurrent
unbacked UN resolutions and French duplicity (hey, making that TotalFina
deal while also claiming to REALLY be anti-Saddam took some panache, huh?)?


: It's entirely their choice to participate or not - they have
: often been rather troublesome as allies - once in, they are highly
: motivated fighters, but it can be tricky to get them to commit...

Well, the defense of American national interests as a policy
goal does not get a particularly high priority in Paris...

Fine. But the oft-repeated French refrain of allegedly supporting the fall
of Saddam but opposing the manner in which the US went about it is so much
poppy-cock. What were those reports of the French providing Saddam with
their analysis of the US intent? What about that sweetheart TotalFina deal
(which I sincerely hope is now in the trash can) concluded so lately with
Saddam?


: I think it was less clear at the time. The Jewish deportations
: and pogrom were just getting underway, for example.

Nazi Germany's anti-semitic policies were already perfectly
clear. However, given that anti-semitism prevailed worldwide
in the late 1930s, also in the USA, this would have been
difficult to use (at least in public) as motive for military
intervention; there were have been a public uproar against it.

Anti-semitic policies, yes. Outright genocide? No, we were clueless. Did we
learn from the experience? You bet; we learned a lot. We learned to never
again draw down our military after a victory so far as we did after WWI. We
learned that we can't afford to accept the pronouncements of European
nations that "We can handle our own Euro affairs without your input, thank
you very much" (something we had to relearn when France began making similar
mutterings during the lead-in to Serbia). Finally, we learned a healthy
amount of disrespect for a nation that not only fell in six weeks but then
managed to actively oppose the Allies during the North African campaign.
Lots of lessons.

Brooks


--
Emmanuel Gustin