Stephen Harding wrote:
Chad Irby wrote:
In article ,
Charles Gray wrote:
The U.S. had a radar guided missile called BAT deployed towards the
end of WWII. The source material I've read claim that it sank a
Japanese DD, as well as hitting a bridge and it had a ragne of about
20 MI.
Forgive me for being suspicious, but that seems like *incredible*
performance for a radar guided weapon in WWII, given that I doubt many
homing radar missiles of the 1960's coudl be used both on bridges and
ships, to say nothing of a 1945 missile.
Does anyone have any more information about it, and more
importantly, why if it existed, did the Russians beat us to the punch
with the Styx?
The Bat was really an unpowered glide bomb, but did have about a 20 mile
max range, and was radar-guided. If you're talking about hitting a
single ship in the middle of the ocean, or a large bridge, it's pretty
easy to manage.
http://www.nasm.edu/nasm/dsh/artifacts/RM-bat.htm
The SS-N-2 Styx came much, much later (almost 20 years). A lot of other
folks had build glide bombs of different types, as well as rockets.
"Beat to the punch?" Nope, although the SS-N-2 was a pretty good
missile for the time, and somewhat of a surprise.
Friedman ("U.S. Naval Weapons") describes its development and use at moderate
length. Carried by Privateers, it was first used after January 1945.
Quoting:
"VPB-109 was initially sent to Palawan in the Pilippines, where it encountered
poor conditions. For example, Bats dropped against a large freighter in a
land-locked harbor locked onto returns from the land surrounding it.
Transferred to Yontan on Okinawa, the squadron was more successful. As of 20
May it had expended a total of 13, of which five never had a chance due to
operational errors. Of the remaining eight, three were direct hits, two were
near-misses which inflicted damage, and only three failed entirelyin line with
the original expectation of 40% successes. In a later mission against a
6000-ton tanker in the Tsushima Strait, however, one Bat spun into the water
and the other struck several ship lengths short.
"The other two Bat squadrons arrived Yontan at the end of May, when about 40
undamaged Bats remained on the island. Results were mixed at best. For
example, on 25 June a VPB-124 Privateer released its two Bats against a pair
of destroyers tied up at a dock, but there was a mountain in the background,
and the missiles homed on it instead. Pilots became unenthusiastic,
particularly since Bat operation required flight at considerable altitude,
where they were vulnerable to fighter attack. Even when the Bat detachment on
Okinawa tried to convince them that the missile had not been used properly,
all that they would agree to was to load two Privateers with Bats and hold
them on alert, to attack targets which other a/c (on patrol) might sight.
He then describes a couple more attacks with questionable results (owing to
haze/mist it was difficult to see results). He then goes on to write:
"At the end of the war, 7000 Bats were cancelled, leaving a total of 3000.
most of which had already been produced. Of the latter, 2000 were retained as
a war reserve, and another thousand modified to train three squadrons. Bat
itself was redesignated ASM-N-2 in a new missile series. In tests against the
target ship Fleetwood, Bat Mod 0 made seven hits and one miss, whilst Mod 1
made five hits out of six drops (three short skips and two direct hits).
"Bat was extensively modified postwar, scoring up to 85% (with 15% component
failures) against a pontoon barge in January 1948. However, four drops
against a live target, the former battleship Nevada, on 30 July 1948, were
failures. The operators locked on their missile radars at a range of about
13-15nm, and launched at 6.5-8nm. One, improperly armed, spun in and exploded
when it hit the water. A second turned left a mile short of the target,
striking the water 600yds left and 100yds over. The third dove noticeably a
mile short, striking the water 750yds short of the ship. The fourth passed
about 600ft over the target striking the water 1000 yds beyond the ship.
These disappointing results were attributed at the time to a combination of
the sheer bulk of the target (which might overwhelm the missile radar) and to
interference from other ship and aircraft radars. However, coming after so
lengthy a development effort, they must have depressed advocates of fleet
missiles. The entire program was cancelled not long afterwards, as a simple
but effective countermeasure t the missile had been discovered."
What was the bomb used in the CBI to take out bridges (the River Kwei
bridge amongst them)?
It was known as the VB-1 (AN-M65 1,000 lb. bomb) and VB-2 (AN-M34 2,000 lb.)
AZON (AZimuth ONly), and was essentially a modular guidance and control
package for standard U.S. bombs (much like the later Paveway LGB systems). It
was a radio-controlled bomb similar in concept to Fritz X (i.e., visually
guided by watching a flare) which, as its name implies, was steerable in
azimuth only (this was done to simplify it and get it into service quicker).
It was originally developed with a TV camera in its nose but that
made for a bomb without enough explosive power to do much damage
(because the TV took up too much space and weight).
No, you're thinking of the GB-4 glide bomb. It had wings and a TV seeker with
radio control, and had to be carried externally.
It had radio control fins on it, and a flare that allowed the bombardier
to see and steer the bomb to its target.
See Azon.
Quite effective. Why weren't they used in ETO? Too late?
Both GB-1 (pure glide bomb, no guidance), GB-4, and (I think) VB-1/2 were used
in the ETO, and AZONs were used by the Fifteenth AF and in the CBI in addition
to (probable) use by the 8th AF. Problems were due to the need for good
visibility, flare (in AZON) or other failures, and also the difficulty of
integrating (and scoring) guided drops with conventional drops. Here's a
summary of the WW2-era US guided bombs, from a master's thesis by Maj. John
Blackwelder titled "The Llong Road to Desert Storm and Beyond: The Development
of Precision Guided Bombs," published by SAAS/ACSC:
"The guided weapons systems used and developed during the war generally
required clear weather, easily identifiable targets, and air superiority."
Guy
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