People note visual bombing of Germany was a minority
of the 8th's strikes even in 1943, visual bombing in good visibility
even less.
The first radar assisted bombing by the 8th AF was in November, 1943. The
Germans started returning the day fighters to Germany to deal with the U.S.
bombers in April of that year.
Let us see now, the claim is now all the redeployed to Germany only,
none to France or Holland, correct?
By the end of 1943, one fighter wing was stationed in Eupen, in the
Netherlands. The Germans generally did not oppose strikes in France in this
time frame. As much as they could, they concentrated the day fighter force in
Germany, significantly reducing force levels in the Mediteranean and Russia to
do so.
None of those fighters tried to intercept the escorted missions over
France, nor react to the significant increase in allied day bomber
raids on France and the low countries in 1943 correct?
I never said that. It was shown, however, that the Germans did not generally
defend French targets after 1/1/44.
Last time Walter ran this line his list included the training units as
proof of the concentration.
"All told, the strength of the fighter force in North West Germany, France and
the Low Countries rose from 270 in April, 1943 to 630 by August."
-- "The Mighty Eighth", p. 54 by Roger Freeman.
"American bombing in the summer of 1943 had limited the planned
expansion of the Luftwaffe's forces. This expansion had begun in
mid-1941 when Goring ordered Milch to increase aircraft production
sufficiently to quadruple front-line strength. Hitler accelerated the
effort with additional demands for greater aircraft production in
1942. Milch merged existing factories into larger complexes in order
to increase production. Though efficiency of scale helped raise
output, it also made the American bombing effort easier by
concentrating production in a few large complexes. Eighth's bombing
efforts in the first half of 1943 were small by later standards, but
they forced the Air Ministry to request the dispersal of Germany's
aircraft manufacturing industry in May 1943.
Little was done until Hitler gave Minister for War Production Albert
Speer power to order plant dispersal in August 1943. This dispersal
and American bombing caused output to lag in the fall of 1943.
Speer and Milch planned to reach a production level of 2000 fighters
per month by the summer of 1944, but the intensity of the Blitz Week
attacks of late July 1943 convinced Milch to try to reach a production
level of 2,000 per month by the end of 1943. Continued bombing
frustrated Milch's venture and he reduced his production goals to
1,000 Bf 1O9s per month by December 1943 and 1,000 FW 190s per month
by March or April 1944."
-- "To Command the Sky" pp. 121-22 by Stephen McFarland and Wesley
Newton
Note he keeps telling us about these
moves but does not provide a list of units and dates. He will
eventually define few dozen as well, it seems to be at least 8,
or just under 100 bombers.
How about several dozen, instead of a few?
"Perhaps the best measure of the Eighth's success through the early summer
[1943] was its impact on the Luftwaffe. Eighth Air Force had forced the German
high command both to withdraw fighter units from other theaters to defend the
Reich and to form larger formations with more heavily armed fighters, thus
reducing their efficiency against U.S. fighters...On July 28, 1943, during a
meeting to evaluate the damage Germay had suffered Goring ordered Milch to give
the defence of the Reich the "main emphasis" in Luftwaffe planning. This order
was less significant than at frst apparent because in actual experience, if not
policy the defense of the Reich had been receiving priority since the Spring."
-- Ibid, pp. 100-109.
So daylight precison bombing -- and only by visual means -- caused the Germans
both to disperse their factories and also to concentrate the German day
fighters against them.
Amd I remind you again that in this time frame, the 8th was only sending
several dozen B-17's out on its raids, usually less than 100. The 8th
activated 5 new groups in Mid-May, 1943, pretty much doubling its strength. By
by May, the Germans had, as Galland says, begun putting more emphasis on
opposing the B-17's than they were against the night bombers.
The claim, by another poster, that it was all "area bombing" is just false.
Daylight precision bombing had a definite affect on the Germans, and they
preceived it as a greater threat than the night bombing. And this was well
before the first bomb was dropped by the USAAF using radar or other non-visual
targeting.
Checking Freeman, "Mighty Eighth War Dairy", I see the following numbers of
bombers dispatched:
3/18/43: 103
3/22/43: 102
3/31/43: 102
4/4/43: 97
4/17/43: 115
5/13/43: 97
So when the Germans were deploying their fighter units to fight the 8th AF and
deciding to disperse their aircraft industry, the Americans were penetrating
occupied Europe with several dozen bombers, on average.
Checking "The Hardest Victory" p. 126, shows that Bomber Command had @ 600
aircraft available, with @ 350 available on any given night, by the summer of
--1942--.
So even though the RAF had 3 times the striking power, the Germans were giving
the lion's share of the effort to defending against the USAAF. This coinfirms
what Galland said.
More later.
Walt
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