Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Sun, 20 Mar 2005 15:15:52 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

And, as for the RWR being lit up solid for several minutes--all I can
say is, "poor baby"! What was lit up solid? It was common to be
pinged by EW on the tanker. Fan Song and Firecans, along with Barlocks
and other radars would be painting consistently from the border to the
target and back. Was it radar pings, or Activity Light, or LAUNCH, or
AS (Azimuth-Sector)?

I don't remember. IIRC, his point was that sneaking in under the radar was a practical impossibility; the NVN
were always aware they were coming. ISTR there were also claims that the North Vietnamese fired chaff to make
the TFR see 'terrain' and command a pullup, which could put them at 10,000 feet within seconds. Whether there
was any independent proof of this or this is just one of those myths that the crews believed, I don't know;
there were plenty of TFR auto-pullups for unknown reasons. Monsoon rain was a problem in '68, but they
apparently figured that one out.

The whole point of terrain masking was to hide or interfere with
weapon guidance. Breaking the lock of the tracking radar by getting
below the antenna depression minimum or putting something solid
between the airplane and the defender.

Coming in undetected was not on the table for consideration. Everyone
pretty much knew we were coming and when. Simple HUMINT reports from
the Thailand bases or ground observers under the refueling tracks
would cover the TOT windows +/- 20 minutes or so.

Sorry for the delayed reply; I've been waiting to get Thornborough's 2nd Ed. "thePhantom Story" from the library,
so I could check my memory against it. AFAIR the Varks didn't need to tank on the way in, and they were usually
operating at night (on solo missions to RP VI) in any case, so I don't think the warning time was anywhere near
what it was for the typical Alpha Strike.

My recollection was that we never had Shrikes in sufficient quantity
for pre-emptive application. We didn't do it with F-100F Weasels; we
didn't do it with F-105F Weasels in '66, we didn't do it with F-105G
Weasels in LB I/II and I never saw it done with F-4C Weasels.

I pulled Thornborough off the shelf to see if I had missed something.
In discussion of the 67th deployment to Korat, starting on 25 Sept '72
(shortly before suspension of bombing N. of 20 degrees), they don't
mention pre-empting. And, most of their missions would have been flown
in areas of low defensive density and hence not very productive for
pre-emptive firing.

When LB II started, the 67th augmented the F-105G Weasels primarily at
night. The mission descriptions track with my recollection of
"detached support" for the night Hunter/Killer mission. F-4C Weasels
separated from F-4E killer elements and roamed, mostly single-ship,
engaging emitters as they were detected. But, no coordinated or
preplanned pre-emptions.

Which Thornborough book are you referring to, the F-4 book or the Iron Hand one? I think this info was in the
(revised) second edition of the F-4 book, but am not certain; it might have been in the Iron Hand book.

"Iron Hand"

It would be good to define "pre-emptive firing" before going much
further. My definition is firing without an emitter targetted.

That
is, lobbing or lofting the Shrike into an area of known defensive
radar but without a specific target for the purpose of keeping an ARM
airborne over the emitter and thereby keeping him shut down.
Time-of-flight for a pre-empt would be on the order of 2-3 minutes
maximum. Probability of detecting, tracking and engaging a radar
during such a tactic would be very low and the only effect would be as
a deterrent, not as a radar kill mechanism.

That's the definition.

If that's the definition, I categorically state that I never saw it
done. Never. Not even considered in discussions of how to improve our
tactics. First time I ever heard it suggested was around '74-'75 when
we were going to use it (simulated) in missions against CVBG forces in
the Mediterranean. (I discuss the tactic in my Air Command/Staff
College paper, "Sink the Kiev" as a means of rolling back the defenses
and providing suppression during an attack against a Soviet battle
group.)

As it turns out, my memory was off; "The Phantom Story" doesn't include any accounts of pre-emptive firing by the
67th TFS in 1972. Knowing that I hadn't dreamed reading an account bya participant who stated they did so, I went
looking on googlegroups and lo and behold found this in a past discussion involving you, Dweezil, Kurt Plummer and
several others on the same subject. You had stated that you were unaware of any, and then we got these posts:
----------------------------------------------------------------

matheson
Feb 6 1999, 12:00 am show options


Ed Rasimus wrote in message et...
Kurt Plummer wrote:

snippage

I NEVER heard of pre-emptive lofting of Shrikes either in early Weasel
days as a 105-driver or during Linebacker as a Phantom Pilot in H/K
teams. The first consideration of pre-emptive ARM firing that I can
recall was in tactics manuals that I researched while at Command &
Staff in '77-78 writing about anti-ship operations.

That's funny, as the Israelis used pre-emptive shrikes at high altitude and
absolute max range (and time of flight) to great advantage in 1967 attacks
on Egyptian SAM sites. Again in '73.

When I started flying C model F-4 Weasels in '78 the pre-emptive shot was
dogma, especially in PACAF, and every check ride we were expected to
calculate a point in space from which to preempt a -45 so as to impact just
prior to strike force bombs on target (supposedly they would unmask and get
the trons on the air and the -45 would hit before reaction time of the
system.

Les
--------------------------------------
Even more relevant was this one:
--------------------------------------

Robert W. King
Feb 6 1999, 12:00 am show options


Hi Ed!

Ed Rasimus wrote in message

t...

[stuff snipped]

I NEVER heard of pre-emptive lofting of Shrikes either in early Weasel
days as a 105-driver or during Linebacker as a Phantom Pilot in H/K
teams. The first consideration of pre-emptive ARM firing that I can
recall was in tactics manuals that I researched while at Command &
Staff in '77-78 writing about anti-ship operations.

In the 561st TFS flying from Khorat RTAFB in 1972, we lofted pre-emptive
Shrikes on a fairly regular basis on force goes to high threat areas. We
also briefed this tactic to the the non-Weasel guys because we had a couple
of incidents where the MIGCAP or strike guys saw the Shrike in flight,
yelled "SAM" and called for a break.

I vaguely recall it being discussed as a possible tactic among the Weasel
crews as early as my tour with the 333rd at Takhli in 1968, but I don't
recall ever actually deliberately launching in that mode on that tour. Of
course, there was the day that Bob Beckpre-empted a Shrike from level flight
on a "patrol the border" mission over Laos after the bombing pause was
ordered by the President in November 68.

(Bob was Major Robert J. Beck, Command Bar-Stooler and highly experienced
Thud driver previously stationed at Spangdahlem AB. He was a sierra hotel
dive bomber.)

It was a couple of months later when that happened. My memory says it was in
Feb 1969 but I'm too lazy to dig out my log book. It was mid-morning. We
were crusing at altitude southbound over Laos a few miles west of the west
end of the DMZ. I had my head down in the cockpit updating the Doppler when
from the corner of my eye, I saw the Shrike come off the outboard station.
Being the Wild Weasel bear of our little crew and in charge of listening for
enemy radar signals (There were none.) and being an all-around alert chap, I
said "What the hell was that!" and then asked Bob what he was shooting at.
He mumbled a bit and then said "We'll talk about it at the debrief." So I
held my water until we got on the ground.

In the step-van on the way in from the flight line to debrief, I got the
whole story. As you know, there aren't a lot of suitable locations to stash
loose items such as checklists, maps and what-not in the cockpit of the
Thud. Bob's solution for map storage when it was not in use was to stick it
under his left thigh. In the course of stretching, he had shifted his weight
on the seat and the map had slid off the seat to the left between the seat
and left console. He tried picking it up with his left hand. He could only
touch the edge of the map with his fingertips.

So in an effort to force his left hand a bit further into the narrow space
between the seat and the console and recapture the map, he moved his right
hand from its normal position on the stick and re-gripped it with his right
wrist rotated so that the thumb was pointed down instead of up. In that
unfamiliar configuration -- while fishing for a map near the cockpit floor
with his left hand -- his right pinkie came in contact with the pickle
button on the stick. The Shrike, ever obedient to its electrical signals,
launched on a independent search and destroy mission over southern Laos.

It was astonishing how much attention we garnered after landing back at
Takhli without that AGM-45 hanging on the outboard. With the bombing halt
still in progress, the Weasels hadn't expended a Shrike in months. As Bob
put it later that night at the bar, "I've been on this base nine months but
I had to debrief guys I'd never seen or heard of before this afternoon."

--
Robert W. King
I'm an ingenieur, NOT a bloody locomotive driver!
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So it appears that it was common at least among the 67th TFS guys, and you were unaware of it at the time. This
suggests that it might also have been happening among the F-105G crews in the April-December period, since the 67th
crews flew with the105Gs at first (as theater indoctrination and to bone up on the latest techniques before they
started flying separate missions).

Guy