While I agree in principle with what is stated here, I have to point
out some errors.

"Lawrence Dillard" wrote:

Viet Nam warfare proved to be a learning experience for the US aviation
community, which had come to believe, by the 1960's, that guided missiles
were all that would prove to be needed to prosecute aerial warfare.

Let's note that there was really only one tactical jet procurred by
the "US aviation community" which was missile only. The F-4. In the
mid-60's when the Vietnam War expanded, the USAF was operating the
F-100, F-105, F-104. The USN was flying the A-4, F-8. All gun
equipped. Later (besides the F-4 B/C/D/J) there were the F-5, A-37,
A-1, A-7---all gun equipped.

Alarming, if not distressing reports were received fairly early on that a
number of US a/c downed over N Viet Nam had been shot down in error by US
missiles fired from beyond range of positive visual identification by other
US a/c.

ROE in MiG country until 1972--eight years into combat--always
required VID, except for a small number of Combat Tree,
close-controlled F-4s out of Udorn in '72. I can recall no
"distressing reports" of losses due to A/A fratricide. Simply didn't
happen.

That led to a belatedly-responded-to request, in which a redesign of the F-4
(which took over from the F-105) to include a useable integral cannon (F4E)
was accomplished.

While the F-4 was certainly deployed in-theater in '66, it didn't
"take over" for the F-105 which continued to carry most of the iron
into NVN until 1968 when it was finally attrited to the point of no
longer being combat effective.

The US aviation community learned that it had to be
especially careful in reaching the decision to fire a missile at another
a/c, if only because under the stress of "g"-forces, hurried identifications
of fleetingly-sighted targets, occasional failures of IFF squawks, and the
workload imposed on the friendly pilot team, enemy a/c were not so easy to
distinguish from friendlies as it appeared to be in training.

If "under the stress of "g" forces" it would certainly mean visual
conditions and tail aspect in '66, '67. Certainly not a player for
AIM-7 shots and with the AIM-9B of the period, the firing limit was
max of 2.5 G.

IFF squawk was irrelevant to missile firing or fighter-to-fighter ID.
We didn't have that kind of equipment until a limited number of Combat
Tree birds showed up in '72.

The solution was to close to ranges, before firing, at which a sound visual
ID could be obtained. That measure not only tended to reduce friendly-fire
losses, but also meant that rather often a US a/c would get so close to an
enemy that the minimum firing distance for the missiles carried might be
reached before the positive ID could be made. Under such circumstances, it
made sense to have an onboard cannon so as to deal with the situation.

It wasn't just tactically sound, it was ROE required. I agree
completely.

Missiles nowadays are far superior in reliability, and have much-improved
ranges. Some radars carried aboard fighters have the capability of ID-ing an
enemy a/c simply from its radar-return. Hence it is considered safe to fire
from beyond visual range, which allows the avoidance of close-in
WWI-WWII-Korea dogfighting. And that's good because it is hard enough to
maintain situational awareness even at a distance from an opponent with the
aid of positive control via AWACS, much less than in a complicated encounter
at close range.

Nonetheless, most pilots desire to have some sort of reserve punch, just to
cover the odd case where missiles haven't done the job or have been
expended, and an opportunity to disengage successfully coud hinge on being
able to shoot your way out.

More important than what you've said regard reserve punch is the
tactical practice of having a gun to threaten your opponent into
predictable action. Firing sequence wisely should be--BVR radar
missile, BVR/WVR all-aspect IR missile, then high angle gun shot as
you blow through the merge. Turn-n-burn should be avoided at all
costs.

If in a X-v-X engagement, your wingman maneuvers to insure the gun
threat on your adversary to allow for safe separation--i.e. keep him
turning as you break away to separate.

If we've got a man in the seat, we need a gun in the nose.





Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (ret)
***"When Thunder Rolled:
*** An F-105 Pilot Over N. Vietnam"
*** from Smithsonian Books
ISBN: 1588341038