Enough said

"Drazen Kramaric" wrote in message
...
On Sun, 22 Feb 2004 23:31:15 -0000, "Jim Doyle"
wrote:



Churchill made the only decision he could under the circumstances, would
you
not make the same call?

No. It was the unison opinion of the experts, i.e. British admirals
that such attack was not necessary. Churchill was but an amateur who
just presided over the naval fiasco in Norway but managed to see his
boss kicked out of office and take his place.

Attack against Mers-el-Kebir was a political action, performed in the
worst tradition of the Perfidious Albion against an ally who was on
the ropes. For full nine months, Britain was unable to field more than
nine divisions, none of them armoured. The best British fighters have
been kept out of the front.

Wisely as the events of the Battle of Britain showed

British bombers pursued their own strategy while the front was crumbling

Incorrect, they were subservient to the tactical requirements
dictated by the army and paid the price in the destruction of
the Battle and Blenheim squadrons in futile attacks on
tactical targets defended by Bf-109's and light flak.
Bomber command didnt come in to existence until 1942.
In 1940 the 10 bomber squadrons in France (the Advanced Air
Strike Force) and the Blenheims of no. 2 Group were tasked
with providing tactical support to the army.
Meanwhile the 'heavies' (Hampdens, Wellingtons and Whitleys),
their flight no longer restricted by the neutral air spaces over the
Netherlands and Belgium, were required to disrupt communications
and transportation directly behind the German front. This turned out to
be impossible in the absence of escort fighters but some squadrons
took 85% casualties trying.


and Royal Navy failed to stop
Kriegsmarine from enabling a naval invasion of Norway.


How they could have stopped the forces crossing
from Denmark I dont know, perhaps you'd care
to provide a winning strategy ?

And such Britain decided to show to America how tough it was by
attacking France, of all nations.


There was a very real fear that those units would end up in German
hands. You are however correct that there was a political
dimension. One of the reasons voiced in the US congress
for not supplying Britain with weapons was the fear that they,
along with the RN would end up in German hands. Churchill's
actions tended to defuse this fear.

It was definitely not a Churchill's finest hour and he got every
single French sailor killed at Oran on his conscience.


It seems to me that the French Admiral in charge had a good
share of the blame, he could have agreed to internment
in a neutral port but decided this would offend against
'The Glory of France'. The French ships in Alexandria
were demilitarised without a shot being fired.

Keith