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#1
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In article . net,
"Carey Sublette" wrote: "WaltBJ" wrote in message om... Comments: 1) It is true that there is no theoretical limit to the size of a TNW. The practical limit is when the bomb vents to space rather than expanding across the surface of the earth. Big bombs are impractical since they blow the hell out of the hypocenter (spot directly under the bomb) but the radius of destruction increases as the cube root of the bomb's yield. One could take the same amount of critical material and make numerous smaller bombs and achieve a much greater area of destruction by carefully distributing them over the target zone. The fundamental reason why 'Ivan', the Tsar Bomba, had no relevance to the strategic balance was that it was undeliverable against the U.S. The weight of this bomb - 27 tonnes - was nearly equal to the Tu-95's maximum payload, and two and a half times its normal weapon load. Range of the Tu-95 was already marginal for attacking the U.S. even with a normal bomb load. Even worse, since the bomb's dimensions - 2 meters wide and 8 meters long - were larger than the bomb bay could accommodate part of the fuselage had to be cut away, and the bomb bay doors removed. The bomb was partially recessed in the plane, but not enclosed, with over half of it protruding in flight. A deployed version of a Tsar Bomba carrier would of course had a bulging bomb bay enclosure added, but this would have further reduced range from the drag. Clearly, it was unsuitable as an aircraft-delivered weapon. While I tend to think the motivations were propaganda and perhaps some technologists gone wild, I would not, however, dismiss it is unusable. Impractical and fraught with risks? Of course. Ship or submarine delivery systems, probably sacrificing the delivery platform, certainly wouldn't have the same restrictions on cubage and weight. Would we have been as alert then to a third-country tramp steamer? Conceivably, there might be some prepositioned ground options, perhaps in Germany, as an ultimate deterrent against a NATO counterstrike. Even nastier would be placement on seabeds. |
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#4
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SNIP
Size and Weight. Nobody was capable of putting a 30-40 ton warhead of that size at those heights. Well, that, and atmospheric attenuation - all the prompt stuff, and the heat, gets absobed pretty quickly by the Atmosphere, and there'd be no fallout. There would, if you chose the right height, be pretty severe EMP effects, but you don't need a whopping huge bomb for that. SNIP: No fall out? The 100 MT was achieved by wrapping a multi-ton U238 jacket about Ivan. The fast neutrons from Ivan fission the U238 and now you have multi tons of fallout added to Ivan. This of course is the fission-fusion-fission bomb in mega-size. I make the fireball from 100MT about 67,000 feet in diameter. using known sizes and the W^1/3 relation. Walt BJ |
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#5
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#6
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(Peter Stickney) wrote in message ...
In article , (Tom Adams) writes: (Tom Adams) wrote in message . com... "james_anatidae" wrote in message ... I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to war with the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual destruction. I'm assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what I've seen of the Soviet nuclear capability before that point doesn't seem to be all that threatening. It looks like they would have been really bad for us Americans, but not unsurvivable. I think October 23, 1961 is a watershed date. That is the day that the Soviet Union exploded the Tsar Bomba, the largest bomb ever exploded. Note that the yield of this bomb did not represent the technical limit on the yield of a hydrogen bomb. It is my understanding that there is no known limit. Instead, the Tsar Bomba represents a kind of political limit in a historical context. After the Tsar Bomba, the politicians on both side put on the brakes. It was possible to create a threat to kill everyone in the US or the USSR almost instantly (on a clear day, anyway) between 1962 and 1965, by deploying space-based high-yield orbiting hydrogen bombs. But no such threat was ever developed. I am not sure what considerations prevented the development of such a threat. Size and Weight. Nobody was capable of putting a 30-40 ton warhead of that size at those heights. Well, that, and atmospheric attenuation - all the prompt stuff, and the heat, gets absobed pretty quickly by the Atmosphere, Less than half the radiant energy of the sun is absorbed. and there'd be no fallout. There would, if you chose the right height, be pretty severe EMP effects, but you don't need a whopping huge bomb for that. |
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#7
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"Tom Adams" wrote (Peter Stickney) wrote Size and Weight. Nobody was capable of putting a 30-40 ton warhead of that size at those heights. Well, that, and atmospheric attenuation - all the prompt stuff, and the heat, gets absobed pretty quickly by the Atmosphere, Less than half the radiant energy of the sun is absorbed. From Glassstone (10.29), "stopping altitude" is the altitude below which there is no significant ionizing effect for radiation sourced from above. From table 10.29, the most penetrating prompt ionizing radiation (gamma and neutrons) stop at 15 miles altitude. For the thermal pulse, most of the thermal effects from a thermonuclear weapon are sourced from X-ray heated air. For an exo-atmospheric detonation, the thermal source region will be at approximately 270Kfeet altitude (7.91-92). Again from Glassstone "In fact for bursts at altitudes exceeding some 330,000 feet (63 minles) the thermal radiation from a nuclear explosion even in the megaton range is essentially ineffective so far as skin burns, ignitition etc..." |
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#8
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(Peter Stickney) wrote in message ...
In article , (Tom Adams) writes: (Tom Adams) wrote in message . com... "james_anatidae" wrote in message ... I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to war with the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual destruction. I'm assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what I've seen of the Soviet nuclear capability before that point doesn't seem to be all that threatening. It looks like they would have been really bad for us Americans, but not unsurvivable. I think October 23, 1961 is a watershed date. That is the day that the Soviet Union exploded the Tsar Bomba, the largest bomb ever exploded. Note that the yield of this bomb did not represent the technical limit on the yield of a hydrogen bomb. It is my understanding that there is no known limit. Instead, the Tsar Bomba represents a kind of political limit in a historical context. After the Tsar Bomba, the politicians on both side put on the brakes. It was possible to create a threat to kill everyone in the US or the USSR almost instantly (on a clear day, anyway) between 1962 and 1965, by deploying space-based high-yield orbiting hydrogen bombs. But no such threat was ever developed. I am not sure what considerations prevented the development of such a threat. Size and Weight. Nobody was capable of putting a 30-40 ton warhead of that size at those heights. Well, that, and atmospheric attenuation - all the prompt stuff, and the heat, gets absobed pretty quickly by the Atmosphere, and there'd be no fallout. There would, if you chose the right height, be pretty severe EMP effects, but you don't need a whopping huge bomb for that. In a rough translation from LEO weight to ICBM throw weight I can see the SL-12 Proton and variants delivering something in the 30 T range as an ICBM. IIRC that was what its justification was for Khurshchev. Comparison, SS-9 6 T ICBM warhead,, 4 T to LEO as SL-11 (and variants), SL-12 (Proton) 42T to LEO. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/icbm/r-36.htm SS-9 http://www.braeunig.us/space/specs/proton.htm SL-12 |
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