Why was the Fokker D VII A Good Plane?

That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far
worse than the RAF did.

Incorrect, Walter has a small selected set of quotes from some Germans
he tries to pretend mean all
Germans and that their quotes are supposed
to prove Walter's claims. For a start put Coastal Command's record into
the mix.

Coastal Command? Give me a break.

Let's get the full efffect though:

'The
British
inflicted grievous and bloody injuries upon us' said Milch after the
war, 'but
the Americans stabbed us to the heart.'

--"Bomber Command" p. 408 by Max Hastings

"In the course of the year 1943 the accent of the Reich defense
shifted more
and more toward action against daylight raiders. Even though
numerically the
British were still stronger than the Americans and were undoubtedly a
great
trial for for the civilian population, the American precision raids
were of
greater consequence to the war industry. They received priority
attention
over the British raids on our towns."

--"The First and the Last" p. 178, Adolf Galland

'The Americans' attacks,
which
followed a definite system of assault on industrial targets, were by
far the
most dangerous.

It was in fact these attacks which caused the
breakdown of the
German armaments industry. The attacks on the chemical industry would
have
sufficed, without the impact of purely military events to render
Germany
defenseless.--Albert Speer"

--"Luftwaffe War Diaries" p. 355 by Cajus Bekker.

" 'By the narrowest of margins, the strategic air offensive failed to
smash
Germany's economy by this one method of attack,' wrote the economist
Professor
Milward. 'The most successful operation of the entire Allied
strategic air
warfare was against Germany's fuel supply,' wrote Galland of the
Luiftwaffe.
'Looking back, it is difficult to understand why the Allies started
this
undertaking so late....' Thus the Allies threw away success when it
was
already in their hands,' wrote Speer, of the slackening of the oil
offensive as
far back as the summer of 1944. "Had they continued the attacks of
March and
April with the same energy, we would have quickly been at our last
gasp."

--"Bomber Command" p. 389 by Max Hastings.

'Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all
the
hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and
industrial
workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the soldiers at the
front--it
was not,as we have seen, area bombing by night that struck the vital
blow at
German survival.
This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the
selective and
precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in daylight. By
careful
choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks of armaments
production,
and finally brought the whole German war machine to a standstill."

--Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker


"After a survey of of Luftwaffe officers for "American Heritage", Carl
Sulzberger found agreement with one German flying officer that "There is no
doubt that the Americans harmed us most. The Russians were negligible as far
as the home front was concerned, and we could have stood the British attacks
on our cities. But the American devastation of our airfields, factories, and
oil depots made it impossible for us to keep going."

--"A Wing and a Prayer", p. 384 by Harry Crosby.


"The message was a statement from Hans Fay, a German test pilot who had landed
his twin-engine ME 262 jet at an American field. Fay was quoted as saying,
"The American Air Force has shortened the war by years as well as decided its
outcome...Only bomber attacks during daytime have crippled and destroyed our
industry....Bombing attacks on cities did not exert a profound influence on
German morale. This was true even on the devastating bomb carpets."

-- "Forged In Fire" p. 480 by De Witt S. Copp

"Over Kiel we run into heavy flak from our own guns. The shooting by the Navy
is unfortunately so good that we are considerably disorganized. I observe the
Yank bombing. They dump their load right on the German shipyards. I am
impressed by the precision with which those *******s bomb: it is fantastic."

--"I Flew for the Fuhrer" by Heinz Knoke

Now you quote some Germans to a different effect.

You've seen some of these quotes for 4 years, and now you say we should
consider the work of --Coastal Command--?



Walt

It's no use Walt. You will never get these guys to admit that we won the
war.
(sheesh)


Arthur Kramer

Art, Bomber Command did so poorly in the war and cost so much blood and
treasure to accomplish so little, that I suppose it is no wonder that some of
the non-US posters want everything thrown into this blanket "area bombing"
definition.

What they can't discount is that the Germans began re-deploying their fighter
force back to Germany to deal with the B-17s when the 8th AF was running raids
with only a few dozen bombers, with no escort, and only in visual conditions.

The Germans were having their night fighter aces engaging the 8th AF as early
as February, 1943.

And when did the RAF run its first 1,000 plane raid? Six months previously.

Here's the deal, although it's galling to some:

'Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all
the
hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and
industrial
workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the soldiers at the
front--it
was not,as we have seen, area bombing by night that struck the vital
blow at
German survival.
This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the
selective and
precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in daylight. By
careful
choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks of armaments
production,
and finally brought the whole German war machine to a standstill."

--Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker

And it wasn't done by area bombing either. Area bombing was ineffective, and
this was known well before the end of the war.

But Bomber Command was kept at its Sisyphean task by the almost criminally
incompetent Arthur Harris until the very end.

Walt

Walt

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
And it wasn't done by area bombing either. Area bombing was ineffective,
and
this was known well before the end of the war.

Which, I presume, is why Curtis LeMay used it with such enthusiasm.

--
Paul J. Adam

Subject: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
From: (WalterM140)
Date: 4/21/04 3:37 AM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

It's no use Walt. You will never get these guys to admit that we won the
war.
(sheesh)


Arthur Kramer

Art, Bomber Command did so poorly in the war and cost so much blood and
treasure to accomplish so little, that I suppose it is no wonder that some of
the non-US posters want everything thrown into this blanket "area bombing"
definition.

What they can't discount is that the Germans began re-deploying their fighter
force back to Germany to deal with the B-17s when the 8th AF was running
raids
with only a few dozen bombers, with no escort, and only in visual conditions.

The Germans were having their night fighter aces engaging the 8th AF as early
as February, 1943.

And when did the RAF run its first 1,000 plane raid? Six months previously.

Here's the deal, although it's galling to some:

'Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all
the
hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and
industrial
workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the soldiers at the
front--it
was not,as we have seen, area bombing by night that struck the vital
blow at
German survival.
This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the
selective and
precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in daylight. By
careful
choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks of armaments
production,
and finally brought the whole German war machine to a standstill."

--Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker

And it wasn't done by area bombing either. Area bombing was ineffective, and
this was known well before the end of the war.

But Bomber Command was kept at its Sisyphean task by the almost criminally
incompetent Arthur Harris until the very end.

Walt

Walt

Walt you are right on most ponts. But in all fairness lets look at the spot the
Brits were in. We had limitless men and machines. we could afford to fly
daylight missions,take our losses, bury our dread, send in replacements and
keep on going. The Bruts had no such luxury. If they continued daylight bombing
the Luftwaffe would have blown them ou tof the sky and totally destroyed BC
with nothing left. Night flying with area bombing was all they could do and
still hurt the enemy and survnve. They were brave men in hard times practising
the art of the possible. Let's thank them for that.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

From: "Paul J. Adam"

I wrote:

And it wasn't done by area bombing either. Area bombing was ineffective,
and
this was known well before the end of the war.


Mr. Adams:

Which, I presume, is why Curtis LeMay used it with such enthusiasm.

Not in Europe.

"I am a pilot, LeMay said, "but I am the only person in this room who is also a
trained navigator and trained bombardier. When I was a group commander in the
First Division, I flew a mission as lead pilot, a lead navigator and a lead
bombardier...."

One by one the colonels or lieutenant colonels who had flown right seat spoke.
Yes, my group assembled on time Yes, we made the wing rendezvous as briefed,
but the other groups weren't there. Yes, we flew good formation during the
whole mission. Yes, we were at the fighter rendezvous but the fighters
weren't. At the I.P., we tucked in tight, but the bombardier missed the
target.

After all the command pilots talked, LeMay said, "Do any of you lead navigators
or lead bombardiers want to add anything?"

Of course we didn't. We were all first and second lieutenants. Not one of the
command pilots had described a mission anything like the way it was really
flown. Even so, who wanted to contradict our own brass?

Silence. Uncomfortable silence.

"Lieutenant Shore, Group Navigator of the 390th. Who was the bombardier with
you in the nose on the mission of July 18th [1943]?" Marshall Shore pointed to
a bombardier.

LeMay turned to the bombardier. "Do you have anything to add?"

"No, sir."

"Were your bubbles level during the bomb run?"

When Colonel LeMay asked that question, I must have gasped. I knew exactly
what he had in mimd. Maybe because of the sound I made, Colonel LeMay looked
directly at me. He slowly winked. Something was wrong with the side of his
face, and it was a grotesque wink, but that is what it was.

I felt my heart speed up. I could hardly breathe. I looked around at the other
navigators and bombardiers. How many of them knew what LeMay's question meant?
What he was really asking was who was flying the plane. If the bubbles in the
bombsight were level, the Norden was flying. If the bubbles were off, a pilot
had overpowered the controls -- and was probably doing evasive action.

When I looked back at Colonel LeMay, he was still looking at me. I winked back
at him, and nodded. That funny smile again. He looked back at the bombardier.
"Did your equipment work all right?"

"No malfunctions, sir."

One by one LeMay addressed all the lead bombardiers and asked them several
irrelevant questions.-- and the one about the bubbles.

Then he turned to the navigators, me first.
"Lieutenant, give me your story."

"Sorry, sir, I wasn't leading any of those missions."

"What group are you in?"

"The 100th, sir."

Colonel LeMay turned to colonel Harding. "Why is he here, Chuck, if he isn't a
lead bombardier?"

"He was the lead on Trondheim and Warnemunde. Before he replaced the lead
navigator, he was on a wing."

Colonel LeMay looked back at me.
"Trondheim, good show."

"Thank you, sir."

He turned back to Lieutenant Marshall Shore of the 390th.

"Lieutenant, when you were on the run from the I.P. to the target, what was the
maximum deflection on your compass heading?"

"About twenty-five degrees, sir."

By now every lead navigator in the room knew what was going on. If the Norden
was in charge, the corrections wouldn't have been more than five or six
degrees. Only a pilot could jerk a plane around like that.

At the end of the debriefing Colonel LeMay knew what every bombardier and
navigator in the room knew, and I doubt if any of the pilots knew he knew.
I realized I was in the presence of a very bright man, and a very skilled
leader."

---"A Wing and a Prayer" pp. 75-78 by Harry Crosby.

Daylight precision bombing hurt the Germans very badly, much worse than area
bombing did. They began to redeploy their day fighters for home defense at a
time when the USAAF was striking only in visual conditions, and with only a
few dozen bombers. They had their night fighter pilots attacking the B-17's
and B-24's at a time when hundreds, not dozens, of British bombers were being
dispatched nightly.

Walt

WalterM140 wrote in message ...

Bomber Command did so poorly in the war and cost so much blood and
treasure to accomplish so little, that I suppose it is no wonder that some of
the non-US posters want everything thrown into this blanket "area bombing"
definition.

No actually. People note visual bombing of Germany was a minority
of the 8th's strikes even in 1943, visual bombing in good visibility
even less. People note the contradiction between claiming the oil
campaign was so good and the RAF was so bad when the German raid
reports make it clear the RAF raids were more effective. People note
the double standards used when Walter compares the RAF to USAAF.

What they can't discount is that the Germans began re-deploying their fighter
force back to Germany to deal with the B-17s when the 8th AF was running raids
with only a few dozen bombers, with no escort, and only in visual conditions.

Let us see now, the claim is now all the redeployed to Germany only,
none to France or Holland, correct?

None of those fighters tried to intercept the escorted missions over
France, nor react to the significant increase in allied day bomber
raids on France and the low countries in 1943 correct? Day Bomber
sorties up from 1,794 in 1942 to over 14,600 in 1943.

Last time Walter ran this line his list included the training units as
proof of the concentration. Note he keeps telling us about these
moves but does not provide a list of units and dates. He will
eventually define few dozen as well, it seems to be at least 8,
or just under 100 bombers.

By the way when the 8th air force was running raids of hundreds
of aircraft the Luftwaffe was using day fighter assets, the JG300
series units, as night fighters. Under Walter's rules of logic it
shows bad things about the USAAF, as opposed to everyone
else's rules of logic which state it shows bad things about Walter.

To most people the night fighter use in daylight and day fighter use
at night show improvisation and a Luftwaffe high command largely
misusing its assets, for Walter night fighters in daylight is the only
part considered, it fits the fiction.

At the end of 1942 the night fighter force was 5 Geschwader controlling
15 gruppen, except some of the gruppen were still staffel size, by the
middle of 1942 there were 6 operational Geschwader plus 1 training
unit controlling 22 gruppen, 18 of which were in the Reich.

The Germans reacted to the increasing pressure by day and night,
by beefing up the defences then firstly defeating the unescorted day
raids and then defeating the night raids. The allies then struck back.
The way the air war fluctuated, no absolutes.

The Germans were having their night fighter aces engaging the 8th AF as early
as February, 1943.

After the early death of an expert pilot the rules were changed to have
the inexperienced crews used. The fact 20% of night fighters did not
have radar in mid 1943 was a factor in using them. So was the heavy
armament on the Do217 night fighter version.

And when did the RAF run its first 1,000 plane raid? Six months previously.

As people can see Walter simply refuses to actually look at the history,
the fact the 1,000 plane raids were special one offs using training and
other command's aircraft to obtain the numbers. A proof of concept,
one the USAAF was happy to share in. Walter is now going to show us
all the Bomber Command 1,000 plane raids done before 1944, that is
using the aircraft assigned to the operational units only. Otherwise he
can start telling us how bad the USAAF was for having over 800 heavy
bombers in Britain in July 1943 but only using a maximum of around 300
at a time. (In October 1944 the heavy bombers on hand topped 1,100).
The rest of us understand the concept of reserves, training units and
serviceability levels. Harris used all three to put together his three 1,000
bomber raids in 1942, if this is to be considered normal then the 8th
stands condemned for not sending 1,000 bombers to Schweinfurt in
October 1943. Silly isn't it?

Here's the deal, although it's galling to some:

Here's the quote, though it is not saying what Walter wants it to say.

'Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all
the
hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and
industrial
workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the soldiers at the
front--it
was not,as we have seen, area bombing by night that struck the vital
blow at
German survival.
This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the
selective and
precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in daylight. By
careful
choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks of armaments
production,
and finally brought the whole German war machine to a standstill."

--Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker

The Luftwaffe war diaries is one of Walter's favourite books, note
there is a quote on page 355 which says there was no systematic
attack before May 1944, with the first attacks on oil installations.
So apparently we have to ignore all 8th Air Force raids before this
as part of the "careful choice of target", in a book which ends its
effective coverage in June 1944.

Walter has posted this quote many times without noting the basic
objections, like why no mention of the 15th air force, why no mention of
the 9th and 2nd tactical air force, why no mention of Bomber Command
strikes on oil and transport? How can the heavy bombers be considered
to be doing precision bombing? The 8ths target list until the oil
and transport plans were mainly the finished product factories,
the aircraft assembly plants, strikes on rubber and ball bearings
could not or were not followed up. The 8th did not strike in a
sustained way at production bottlenecks, that is key raw and semi
raw products except the oil campaign, where it provided part of
the effort along with the 15th and Bomber Command. The 8th had
a key part in this campaign in 1944, less so in 1945. Walter should
tell us all what materials the German armaments production ran
out of thanks to the 8th air force, steel?, ball bearings? what?

Instead perhaps the way the allied air forces severely damaged
the transport system in western Germany might be mentioned
as the way industrial output was hurt and the attacks on oil
firstly hurt the Luftwaffe by reducing avgas supplies and then
later went after the fuel the army and navy used.

See the book The Collapse of the German War Economy 1944-45,
Allied Airpower and the German National Railway by Mierzejewski.
It documents the decline of the German Rail system in late 1944
and early 1945 to the point where it could not even supply its own
locomotives with coal, where special derail gangs were formed
with quotas of cars to derail each day to clear congestion. Where
the German economy was collapsing, mainly due to the transportation
strikes, the canals, the railways and the oil. How the stocks were
run down and weapons that were made were stuck at the factories.
Tables give an idea of the run down in coal production. The book
makes the case the marshalling yards were the key.

See also A Forgotten Offensive: RAF Coastal Command Anti
Shipping Campaign 1940-45 by Goulter. In particular the last
chapter on the economic effects of cutting off most of the
Scandinavian iron ore trade in late 1944, it helped but the
Germans had stocks to keep going for a while. The tables give
the decline in steel production. If ever there was a sustained
strike against a vital raw material it was the anti shipping
operations against the ore ships from Narvik.

I have another question, why does Walter never mention
Bekker makes it clear his Luftwaffe War Diaries ends in
June 1944? Which is clearly relevant to conclusions about
the bombing since most of the bombs dropped on Germany
happened after that date.



And it wasn't done by area bombing either. Area bombing was ineffective, and
this was known well before the end of the war.

Which explains why the 8th air force kept doing it and, as expected
in winter weather, did most of such bombing in the 1944/45 winter.

But Bomber Command was kept at its Sisyphean task by the almost criminally
incompetent Arthur Harris until the very end.

Translation Walter has convicted Harris, the messy evidence side of
things is irrelevant.

In the last 4 months of 1944, according to the USSBS the 8th air force
dropped 50% of its bombs through 8/10 or thicker cloud (15% in 8 or
9/10, 35% in 10/10), in the same period Harris says 46% of Bomber
Command bombs went on "towns". Walter condemns Harris even
though he was doing (just) slightly less area bombing than the 8th.

In case you are wondering in 8 and 9/10 cloud the 8th managed 1% of
bombs within 1,000 feet, in 10/10 cloud 0.2% in these 4 months, the
within 0.5 mile figures are 7.3% and 1.2% respectively.

This was during the time period the USSBS found the RAF was more
accurate on average when dropping bombs on three large oil plants it
examined in detail.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

This will probably appear in the wrong place thanks to a buggy news server.

We are at the "delete most of the text and pretend to answer a bit of it"
phase, no reply to the holes in the accuracy claims, the effect of the
jets on the 1944 "strike package", the over claiming of bomb damage,
data on avgas production by plant and what air force hit what plant,
the holes in the idea only the 8th going to Germany in early 1944 enabled
Overlord and the way the wonder reference on the air war gives the
air war passing mention.

WalterM140 wrote in message ...
That the Germans are clearly on record that the USAAF hurt them far
worse than the RAF did.

Incorrect, Walter has a small selected set of quotes from some Germans
he tries to pretend mean all
Germans and that their quotes are supposed
to prove Walter's claims. For a start put Coastal Command's record into
the mix.

Coastal Command? Give me a break.

Lets See now, U-boats sunk by British shore based aircraft 195,
plus 2 shared with US shore based aircraft, plus a share in 1 with
ship borne aircraft plus another 23 shared with surface ships.

Most of the 573,000 GRT of merchant ships the Germans lost at
sea to air attack in Northern Europe. With first the reduction and
then the near cutting off of shipments from Scandinavia, that
precious iron ore.

Almost all the rest is my standard cut and paste reply to the standard
quotes Walter keeps pushing forward.

Let's get the full efffect though:

'The
British
inflicted grievous and bloody injuries upon us' said Milch after the
war, 'but
the Americans stabbed us to the heart.'

--"Bomber Command" p. 408 by Max Hastings

This is one of Walter's favourite quotes, it is so non specific,
what is the heart of Germany, or is Milch talking about some
or all of the Luftwaffe for example.

Yes the poetic stab in the heart, it must mean the Luftwaffe since
the Red Army destroyed most of the German Army and the RN
most of the Kreigsmarine. Just narrow down the time being
discussed to a few months in 1944 and ignore the rest of the war
to make Milch's quote look good.

See also Milch, 23 February 1944

"Everyone should pay a visit to Berlin. It would then be realised that
experience such as we have undergone in the last few months cannot
be endured indefinitely. That is impossible. When the big cities have
been demolished it will be the turn of the smaller ones."

"In the course of the year 1943 the accent of the Reich defense
shifted more
and more toward action against daylight raiders. Even though
numerically the
British were still stronger than the Americans and were undoubtedly a
great
trial for for the civilian population, the American precision raids
were of
greater consequence to the war industry. They received priority
attention
over the British raids on our towns."

--"The First and the Last" p. 178, Adolf Galland

The chief of the day fighters worrying about the day battle. Just ignore
the large rise in the day and night fighter strengths which show's
Gallands words to be incorrect.

The formation of single engined nightfighter forces in mid/late 1943.

'The Americans' attacks,
which
followed a definite system of assault on industrial targets, were by
far the
most dangerous.

It was in fact these attacks which caused the
breakdown of the
German armaments industry. The attacks on the chemical industry would
have
sufficed, without the impact of purely military events to render
Germany
defenseless.--Albert Speer"

--"Luftwaffe War Diaries" p. 355 by Cajus Bekker.

The systematic attack the USAAF launched pre May 1944 was
against the aircraft industry and it failed to halt increases in
fighter production, a key target.

By the way how did the US strikes cause the breakdown of the
u-boat building, tanks, steel? Given the USAAF rarely went
near them. The reality was the transport plan was the way the
allies finally started to really hurt the German economy, and
the plan required and used all types of allied air power, from
all the allies.

Also note the USSBS says many of the oil plants were dual
chemical and oil plants, and that the bombs on chemical,
rubber, explosives and propellant targets in Greater Germany,
excluding the dual plants, May 1944 to the end of the war were
USAAF 13,208 tons, Bomber Command 11,005 tons, which
is around 10% of the "oil target" tonnage.

By the way folks remember the USAAF dropped 34,334 tons
of bombs on the oil/chemical industry in 1945 (the synthetic
plants were also major sources of important chemicals), the
RAF 53,067 tons in the same period. What I like is the way
Walter attacks Harris for not bombing the oil targets, quotes
Speer about what effect they could have had, then fails to
mention the way the USAAF moved onto other targets, in
1945 for every ton of bombs dropped by Bomber Command
the USAAF heavies dropped 1.4 tons. Maybe the problem
of targeting oil plants was a little more complex than Walter
wants to believe.

Actually the quotes above are from Speer's interrogation by the RAF
on 18 July 1945.

Other words he spoke include,

"the raids on the aircraft and tank engine factories early in 1944
caused a serious renewal of anxiety and doubt, though as it
became evident in this case also that our industry was more
elastic than had been first assumed, our anxieties in this
connection lessened.

In May and June 1944 the concentrated day and night attacks
on the Rhur transport and communications system first began
to cause most serious anxieties about future developments
..... That these effects did not immediately manifest themselves
was due only to the fact that industry throughout the Rhur was
in possession of considerable stocks..."

"The opponent in the air is able to choose his objectives and in
doing so he can plan to concentrate on any vital target such a
weight of attack as hitherto has never before been possible in
the whole history of war. There was consequently no means
of defence.

In spite of this the Allied air attacks remained without decisive success until early
1944. This failure, which is reflected in the armament figures for 1943 and
1944, is to be attributed principally to the tenacious efforts of the German
workers and factory managers and also to the haphazard and too scattered
form of attacks of the enemy who, until the attacks on the synthetic oil plants,
based his raids on no clearly recognizable economic planning."

"As regards industrial production, concern was first felt following
attacks on communications in the Rhur in May 1944; this threat
grew from month to month and gave rise to a most serious
crisis from the autumn of 1944 onwards and to the final
catastrophe from January 1945 onwards."

Speer goes on to note the Electricity industry was a good target,
claiming it was the most effective method of bringing industry to
a standstill.

" 'By the narrowest of margins, the strategic air offensive failed to
smash
Germany's economy by this one method of attack,' wrote the economist
Professor Milward.

Except the German economy was not oil based, one of the reasons
the German army was largely horse drawn.

Note by the way Professor Milward talks economy, but Walter will not
defend the quote, or explain to us how depriving a non oil based economy
of oil would smash it.

'The most successful operation of the entire Allied
strategic air
warfare was against Germany's fuel supply,' wrote Galland of the
Luiftwaffe.
'Looking back, it is difficult to understand why the Allies started
this
undertaking so late....' Thus the Allies threw away success when it
was
already in their hands,' wrote Speer, of the slackening of the oil
offensive as
far back as the summer of 1944. "Had they continued the attacks of
March and
April with the same energy, we would have quickly been at our last
gasp."

--"Bomber Command" p. 389 by Max Hastings.

Does everyone else have the same problem as me with this quote,
there were no oil strikes in March 1944, and only the unofficial 15th
Air Force operations against Ploesti marshalling yards with big
bombing errors. Then comes the claim of slackening of effort in the
summer of 1944, yet the bomb tonnage devoted to oil targets went
up, April, May, June, and July 1944. There was a drop in August but
that was because Ploesti was captured. It also ignores the disruption
of oil supplies from Romania because of the mining of the Danube.

'Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all
the
hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and
industrial
workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the soldiers at the
front--it
was not,as we have seen, area bombing by night that struck the vital
blow at
German survival.
This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the
selective and
precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in daylight. By
careful
choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks of armaments
production,
and finally brought the whole German war machine to a standstill."

--Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker

The Luftwaffe war diaries is one of Walter's favourite books, note
there is a quote on page 355 which says there was no systematic
attack before May 1944, with the first attacks on oil installations.
So apparently we have to ignore all 8th Air Force raids before this
as part of the "careful choice of target", in a book which ends its
effective coverage in June 1944.

Walter has posted this quote many times without noting the basic
objections, like why no mention of the 15th air force, why no mention of
the 9th and 2nd tactical air force, why no mention of Bomber Command
strikes on oil and transport? How can the heavy bombers be considered
to be doing precision bombing? The 8ths target list until the oil
and transport plans were mainly the finished product factories,
the aircraft assembly plants, strikes on rubber and ball bearings
could not or were not followed up. The 8th did not strike in a
sustained way at production bottlenecks, that is key raw and semi
raw products except the oil campaign, where it provided part of
the effort along with the 15th and Bomber Command. The 8th had
a key part in this campaign in 1944, less so in 1945. Walter should
tell us all what materials the German armaments production ran
out of thanks to the 8th air force, steel?, ball bearings? what?

Instead perhaps the way the allied air forces severely damaged
the transport system in western Germany might be mentioned
as the way industrial output was hurt and the attacks on oil
firstly hurt the Luftwaffe by reducing avgas supplies and then
later went after the fuel the army and navy used.

See the book The Collapse of the German War Economy 1944-45,
Allied Airpower and the German National Railway by Mierzejewski.
It documents the decline of the German Rail system in late 1944
and early 1945 to the point where it could not even supply its own
locomotives with coal, where special derail gangs were formed
with quotas of cars to derail each day to clear congestion. Where
the German economy was collapsing, mainly due to the transportation
strikes, the canals, the railways and the oil. How the stocks were
run down and weapons that were made were stuck at the factories.
Tables give an idea of the run down in coal production. The book
makes the case the marshalling yards were the key.

See also A Forgotten Offensive: RAF Coastal Command Anti
Shipping Campaign 1940-45 by Goulter. In particular the last
chapter on the economic effects of cutting off most of the
Scandinavian iron ore trade in late 1944, it helped but the
Germans had stocks to keep going for a while. The tables give
the decline in steel production. If ever there was a sustained
strike against a vital raw material it was the anti shipping
operations against the ore ships from Narvik.

I have another question, why does Walter never mention
Bekker makes it clear his Luftwaffe War Diaries ends in
June 1944? Which is clearly relevant to conclusions about
the bombing since most of the bombs dropped on Germany
happened after that date.

"After a survey of of Luftwaffe officers for "American Heritage", Carl
Sulzberger found agreement with one German flying officer that "There is no
doubt that the Americans harmed us most. The Russians were negligible as far
as the home front was concerned, and we could have stood the British attacks
on our cities. But the American devastation of our airfields, factories, and
oil depots made it impossible for us to keep going."

--"A Wing and a Prayer", p. 384 by Harry Crosby.

Remember when in trouble look for a junior officer who tells you
that you had the most effect. Push poll anyone?

Also note the USAAF attacks on
oil refineries apparently had no effect, only the depots were
hurt, and that campaign did not start until June 1944 according
to the USSBS, and by the end of September 1944 the USSBS
has the RAF, with 3,300 tons of bombs, ahead of the USAAF
with 1,600 tons. So if the depots were the key the RAF was
the one turning it, not the USAAF.

"The message was a statement from Hans Fay, a German test pilot who had landed
his twin-engine ME 262 jet at an American field. Fay was quoted as saying,
"The American Air Force has shortened the war by years as well as decided its
outcome...Only bomber attacks during daytime have crippled and destroyed our
industry....Bombing attacks on cities did not exert a profound influence on
German morale. This was true even on the devastating bomb carpets."

-- "Forged In Fire" p. 480 by De Witt S. Copp

Yes a test pilot would be an economic expert, not to mention have
a major strategic insight and accurate knowledge of Luftwaffe losses.

"Over Kiel we run into heavy flak from our own guns. The shooting by the Navy
is unfortunately so good that we are considerably disorganized. I observe the
Yank bombing. They dump their load right on the German shipyards. I am
impressed by the precision with which those *******s bomb: it is fantastic."

--"I Flew for the Fuhrer" by Heinz Knoke

Knoke was looking from the air while dodging flak and trying to
line up for an attack on the bombers, and seeing the dust and
smoke come up, not going and looking at the bomb patterns.
Or was he was sent up to observe USAAF bomb patterns and
then look at the damage later to confirm his impressions?

Why, one German observer called the RAF accuracy "extraordinary."

"It must also be stated that the now frequent night attacks are more
effective than the day raids as heavier bombs are being used and
extraordinary accuracy achieved"

Speer to Hitler 19 January 1945.

Speer was receiving reports of the bombs that hit.

Hunt for that one quote, silly isn't it?

Now you quote some Germans to a different effect.

What is funny is the way Walter ignores the problems with the quotes
and seems to think another quote is the answer.

You've seen some of these quotes for 4 years,

And I have been refuting the silly claims they are supposed to be supporting
for 4 years, hence the way Walter deletes most of my post.

and now you say we should
consider the work of --Coastal Command--?

No, I have been mentioning it for quite a while, when the claim becomes
the USAAF versus the RAF, as opposed to the 8th versus Bomber
Command, or the US versus Bomber Command, or the US versus the
RAF, or the USAAF versus Bomber Command.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
From: "Paul J. Adam"
I wrote:

And it wasn't done by area bombing either. Area bombing was
ineffective,
and
this was known well before the end of the war.

Mr. Adams:

At least try to get my name right, Mr M140.

Which, I presume, is why Curtis LeMay used it with such enthusiasm.

Not in Europe.

Why did he choose such an apparently ineffectual technique for Japan, if
precision bombing was so efficacious and reliable? Did the RAF blackmail him
or something?

--
Paul J. Adam

Mr. Adam writes:

Why did he choose such an apparently ineffectual technique for Japan, if
precision bombing was so efficacious and reliable? Did the RAF blackmail him
or something?

The Japanese and German industrial systems were different. They were treated
differently.

Walt

People note visual bombing of Germany was a minority
of the 8th's strikes even in 1943, visual bombing in good visibility
even less.

The first radar assisted bombing by the 8th AF was in November, 1943. The
Germans started returning the day fighters to Germany to deal with the U.S.
bombers in April of that year.

Let us see now, the claim is now all the redeployed to Germany only,
none to France or Holland, correct?

By the end of 1943, one fighter wing was stationed in Eupen, in the
Netherlands. The Germans generally did not oppose strikes in France in this
time frame. As much as they could, they concentrated the day fighter force in
Germany, significantly reducing force levels in the Mediteranean and Russia to
do so.

None of those fighters tried to intercept the escorted missions over
France, nor react to the significant increase in allied day bomber
raids on France and the low countries in 1943 correct?

I never said that. It was shown, however, that the Germans did not generally
defend French targets after 1/1/44.

Last time Walter ran this line his list included the training units as
proof of the concentration.

"All told, the strength of the fighter force in North West Germany, France and
the Low Countries rose from 270 in April, 1943 to 630 by August."

-- "The Mighty Eighth", p. 54 by Roger Freeman.


"American bombing in the summer of 1943 had limited the planned
expansion of the Luftwaffe's forces. This expansion had begun in
mid-1941 when Goring ordered Milch to increase aircraft production
sufficiently to quadruple front-line strength. Hitler accelerated the
effort with additional demands for greater aircraft production in
1942. Milch merged existing factories into larger complexes in order
to increase production. Though efficiency of scale helped raise
output, it also made the American bombing effort easier by
concentrating production in a few large complexes. Eighth's bombing
efforts in the first half of 1943 were small by later standards, but
they forced the Air Ministry to request the dispersal of Germany's
aircraft manufacturing industry in May 1943.

Little was done until Hitler gave Minister for War Production Albert
Speer power to order plant dispersal in August 1943. This dispersal
and American bombing caused output to lag in the fall of 1943.

Speer and Milch planned to reach a production level of 2000 fighters
per month by the summer of 1944, but the intensity of the Blitz Week
attacks of late July 1943 convinced Milch to try to reach a production
level of 2,000 per month by the end of 1943. Continued bombing
frustrated Milch's venture and he reduced his production goals to
1,000 Bf 1O9s per month by December 1943 and 1,000 FW 190s per month
by March or April 1944."

-- "To Command the Sky" pp. 121-22 by Stephen McFarland and Wesley
Newton

Note he keeps telling us about these
moves but does not provide a list of units and dates. He will
eventually define few dozen as well, it seems to be at least 8,
or just under 100 bombers.

How about several dozen, instead of a few?

"Perhaps the best measure of the Eighth's success through the early summer
[1943] was its impact on the Luftwaffe. Eighth Air Force had forced the German
high command both to withdraw fighter units from other theaters to defend the
Reich and to form larger formations with more heavily armed fighters, thus
reducing their efficiency against U.S. fighters...On July 28, 1943, during a
meeting to evaluate the damage Germay had suffered Goring ordered Milch to give
the defence of the Reich the "main emphasis" in Luftwaffe planning. This order
was less significant than at frst apparent because in actual experience, if not
policy the defense of the Reich had been receiving priority since the Spring."

-- Ibid, pp. 100-109.

So daylight precison bombing -- and only by visual means -- caused the Germans
both to disperse their factories and also to concentrate the German day
fighters against them.


Amd I remind you again that in this time frame, the 8th was only sending
several dozen B-17's out on its raids, usually less than 100. The 8th
activated 5 new groups in Mid-May, 1943, pretty much doubling its strength. By
by May, the Germans had, as Galland says, begun putting more emphasis on
opposing the B-17's than they were against the night bombers.

The claim, by another poster, that it was all "area bombing" is just false.
Daylight precision bombing had a definite affect on the Germans, and they
preceived it as a greater threat than the night bombing. And this was well
before the first bomb was dropped by the USAAF using radar or other non-visual
targeting.

Checking Freeman, "Mighty Eighth War Dairy", I see the following numbers of
bombers dispatched:

3/18/43: 103

3/22/43: 102

3/31/43: 102

4/4/43: 97

4/17/43: 115

5/13/43: 97

So when the Germans were deploying their fighter units to fight the 8th AF and
deciding to disperse their aircraft industry, the Americans were penetrating
occupied Europe with several dozen bombers, on average.

Checking "The Hardest Victory" p. 126, shows that Bomber Command had @ 600
aircraft available, with @ 350 available on any given night, by the summer of
--1942--.

So even though the RAF had 3 times the striking power, the Germans were giving
the lion's share of the effort to defending against the USAAF. This coinfirms
what Galland said.

More later.

Walt