Seeking anecdotes about "instructor in command"

Michael wrote:


But in order to trust the instructor, you have to believe the
instructor really knows best. In other words, you have to believe
that while you are operating outside your envelope, the instructor is
well within his. This is made more difficult because there are many
documented cases where this was not true. All I can say is, choose
your instructor carefully. Just because the FAA gives a guy a piece
of paper doesn't mean he's qualified.

You're absolutely right about making the right instructor choice.

But I still think that there's a line here that can be drawn, if not easily.
Yes, we're trusting the intructor. But there's still a difference, at
least as I see it, between (1) deliberately going past one's envelope with
the backup of an instructor, and (2) letting one get out of one's envelope
due to complacency. One is an intentional - and communicated, but I'm
thinking this is merely a consequence of intent - act while the other
occurs through a relaxation of one's attention/care/responsibility.


However, this idea of the instructor as a safety mechanism can be taken
too far with the pilot has in his mind, even if quietly, "if this was
bad, he'd say something".

Now you're changing the situation. Yes, poor communications can be
deadly.

Yes. But I'm thinking that this - communication - is more a symptom than
cause in the "syndrome" I'm trying to define.

It is indeed quite possible for the student to see something
the instructor has missed. It is absolutely legitimate and proper for
the student to bring this up. However, it is equally legitimate for
the instructor to say "Yes, I'm aware of this, and it's not a problem
because..." and you either trust the instructor and keep going or you
get another instructor.

But this is a perfect example of "trust" and not "complacency". To turn
this into "complacency", the student would either (1) not notice because
he's paying less attention or (2) not tell the instructor. Either could
result from the student assuming that if there really were a problem, the
instructor would say something.

[...]

The concerns of the copilot should be addressed, but the ultimate
decisionmaking authority remains with the captain. Always. And yes,
somtimes that means pressing on when the copilot is uncomfortable
because the captain is comfortable.

This is something on which I'm not yet clear. In my reading, some of the
accident descriptions include the captain overriding the copilot's
discomfort. In one example, the last words on the CVR were "I told you
so". I think that what's being offered is that sometimes the more
comfortable pilot *should* be overridden.

However, an instructional flight is - as you note - obviously a different
situation. There's the expectation of discomfort, if you will. As long
as "envelope excursions" are made explicitly, this is "trust". It's the
unawared excursion that's the problem.

[...]
I think you need to separate the two.

Right. That's exactly what I'm doing grin.

[...]
When operating outside one's envelope, there is unavoidable risk.

That is a good point. Justified, but there nevertheless.

[...]

This was a perfect example of poor communication.

Yes. Thanks for sharing it.

[...]
Basically, I think you're invoking intent when what we're really
dealing with is just communication. The intent was the same first and
second time around; it's just that the first time around we botched
the communication and nearly put a wing in the trees.

Perhaps. In this example, you accepted going past your envelope explicitly,
even though there was a communication failure. I still believe that
there's "more room for error": performing a task outside the envelope w/o
explicitly realizing/considering that fact.

Of course, failure to realize something will cause that non-realization to
not be communicated.

- Andrew

I think that what's being offered is that sometimes the more
comfortable pilot *should* be overridden.


But when?

Jose


--
(for Email, make the obvious changes in my address)

Andrew Gideon wrote
Yes, we're trusting the intructor. But there's still a difference, at
least as I see it, between (1) deliberately going past one's envelope with
the backup of an instructor, and (2) letting one get out of one's envelope
due to complacency. One is an intentional - and communicated, but I'm
thinking this is merely a consequence of intent - act while the other
occurs through a relaxation of one's attention/care/responsibility.

So what you're postulating is the existence of a pilot who stops
asessing risk just because the instructor is there, even though he's
actually a pilot who is already able to fly on his own, and thus
necessarily able to asess and manage risk? Are you sure this actually
happens? Because from my point of view, that's like abdicating one's
responsibility as a pilot, and dropping to the level of a passenger
who is allowed to manipulate the controls or share some cockpit tasks.

If that's what you mean, well, I admit there is a difference between
that and simply poor communication - but are you sure this actually
happens?

But this is a perfect example of "trust" and not "complacency". To turn
this into "complacency", the student would either (1) not notice because
he's paying less attention

But in training, it's fairly common and perfectly legitimate to force
the student to operate at task saturation for extended periods. This
will cause him not to notice things because he is paying less
attention - but this is the unavoidable price of teaching the
emergency survival skill of flying at task saturation.

(2) not tell the instructor. Either could
result from the student assuming that if there really were a problem, the
instructor would say something.

And that may be part of the ground rules of the flight.

For example, a hooded pilot abdicates the responsibility for collision
avoidance to the safety pilot. He can pretty much keep on trucking
unless the safety pilot says something.

This was a perfect example of poor communication.
Yes. Thanks for sharing it.

But do you see that there was no complacency involved? We both fully
understood that we were undertaking envelope expansion - that we would
be operating within his envelope but outside mine. Yet we still
screwed it up.

Perhaps. In this example, you accepted going past your envelope explicitly,
even though there was a communication failure. I still believe that
there's "more room for error": performing a task outside the envelope w/o
explicitly realizing/considering that fact.

I simply have a hard time imagining how it would happen. I mean, if
what you're doing is within your envelope, why do you have the
instructor there? You could simply do it yourself.

Michael

Andrew Gideon wrote in message gonline.com...
Hi, all:

I'm giving a presentation on what someone here called "instructor in
command" syndrome: a pilot getting complacent because there's an instructor
in the aircraft.

I've found a number of good ones here, but any more - esp. with something
"interesting" - would be welcome.


When I was checking out in a 182RG the CFI took me to an airport that
was in a bowl (rising terrain on either end of the runway). He was a
very high time CFI but I was an experienced pilot. The visual ques of
the terrain caused me to be way too high on final. I asked the CFI if
I should go around and he didn't respond. I assumed that meant I was
ok (since he knew the plane more than I). He assumed I knew short
fields better than him (I'd probably done more real short field
flying). We touched down 1/2 way down the runway and were just able to
stop in time with the elevator back and the brakes cooking (did I
mention the runway was 300 feet shorter due to some repaving on the
end ).


I'd also appreciate it if someone could point me at a reference to something
that I've been told occurred. A CFI was sitting in the back of an aircraft
that made a bad landing. Even though the CFI had no role in the flight, he
bore some of the brunt from the FAA.

I've heard this to and have decided it must be an Urban legend. I have
heard similar but none of them seemed as bad as the story went.

-Robert, CFI