US Army Cancels Comanche Helo

"Thomas Schoene" wrote
Kevin Brooks wrote:
"Paul F Austin" wrote
"robert arndt" wrote

Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2.
Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and
the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche
was last-war's weapon.

Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable.

I'd put a different read on the same events, but with basically the same
conclusion.

What probably did in Comanche (IMO) was not the fact that the Apaches were
getting hit, but the realization that they were getting hit by weapons
that
didn't care at all about radar signature (i.e. optically pointed guns and
IR
MANPADS). If those non-radar-guided systems are really the major threats
to helos -- as the last couple of years of fighting in various places
certianly suggests they they are -- it makes no sense at all to spend
large
sums on a helicopter whose main claim to fame (and major cost driver) is
radar signature reduction.

If this logic is true, Comanche died not because it's a helicopter, but
because it's *the wrong kind* of helicopter.

Yep. A suprising outcome, that LO isn't really worth much when operating at
low altitude. The Iraqis adopted the levee en masse tactics that the
Vietnamese used, with every available tube firing upward as soon as the
alarm is given. And that's at_night_. During daylight hours things get even
worse. Slow-movers operating at low altitudes will suffer unacceptable
attrition if they're manned. The Army should develop a low-cost unmanned
weapons platform, one that can use fused data from off-board sources to cue
a low-cost on-board targeting sensor. Being a helo isn't important, carrying
heavy ordnance loads may or may not be the way to go but being able to
persist in the interdiction area_is_.

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
. ..

"Thomas Schoene" wrote
Kevin Brooks wrote:
"Paul F Austin" wrote
"robert arndt" wrote

Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2.
Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and
the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche
was last-war's weapon.

Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable.

I'd put a different read on the same events, but with basically the same
conclusion.

What probably did in Comanche (IMO) was not the fact that the Apaches
were
getting hit, but the realization that they were getting hit by weapons
that
didn't care at all about radar signature (i.e. optically pointed guns
and
IR
MANPADS). If those non-radar-guided systems are really the major
threats
to helos -- as the last couple of years of fighting in various places
certianly suggests they they are -- it makes no sense at all to spend
large
sums on a helicopter whose main claim to fame (and major cost driver) is
radar signature reduction.

If this logic is true, Comanche died not because it's a helicopter, but
because it's *the wrong kind* of helicopter.

Yep. A suprising outcome, that LO isn't really worth much when operating
at
low altitude. The Iraqis adopted the levee en masse tactics that the
Vietnamese used, with every available tube firing upward as soon as the
alarm is given. And that's at_night_. During daylight hours things get
even
worse. Slow-movers operating at low altitudes will suffer unacceptable
attrition if they're manned. The Army should develop a low-cost unmanned
weapons platform, one that can use fused data from off-board sources to
cue
a low-cost on-board targeting sensor. Being a helo isn't important,
carrying
heavy ordnance loads may or may not be the way to go but being able to
persist in the interdiction area_is_.

Why? Maybe the lesson should instead be to refrain from using attack helos
in the deep fight (what you call the "interdiction area", I presume) when
(a) the terrain is unsuitable, and/or (b) the normal SEAD support package is
not provided. Ever been in the woods when helos were operating around you?
Or in rugged terrain? During those situations it is hard to find the helo
during daylight hours; at night you are hopelessly confused. In those kind
of environments the deep attack option becomes more tenable. Even in the
situation that the 11th AVN encountered during their dissapointing OIF deep
attack mission might have had a very different outcome had the SEAD arty
support been included (it was not executed due to collateral damage
concerns). Again, you are reading a bit too much into the results of a
single mission which was conducted under rather unique circumstances, and
very likely with some serious planning flaws included in the mix.

Your UCAV concept is not new--the Army has already initiated a rotary UCAV
R&D program. In fact, the early idea was to have such UCAV's support the
Commanches, and even be controlled from the Commanches in some cases.

Brooks

"Thomas Schoene" wrote in message
ink.net...
Kevin Brooks wrote:
"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
. ..

"robert arndt" wrote

Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2.
Between the Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and
the demonstrated advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche
was last-war's weapon.

Eh? I think you are reading a bit more into it than is reasonable.

I'd put a different read on the same events, but with basically the same
conclusion.

What probably did in Comanche (IMO) was not the fact that the Apaches were
getting hit, but the realization that they were getting hit by weapons
that
didn't care at all about radar signature (i.e. optically pointed guns and
IR
MANPADS). If those non-radar-guided systems are really the major threats
to helos -- as the last couple of years of fighting in various places
certianly suggests they they are -- it makes no sense at all to spend
large
sums on a helicopter whose main claim to fame (and major cost driver) is
radar signature reduction.

I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark. But be
careful drawing any hard and fast conclusions in regards to helo
survivability vis a vis the 11th AVN deep attack during OIF. About the best
you can do in that realm is to say that "Deep attack helo missions over open
terrain with good visibility afforded to the bad guys, and without the
benefit of the normal SEAD support from your own arty assets is extremely
risky." Not much beyond that.


If this logic is true, Comanche died not because it's a helicopter, but
because it's *the wrong kind* of helicopter.

I could generally agree with that, with the caveat that part of what was
wrong was a skyrocketing program and unit cost.


we have no UAV as yet, or in the
near term, that can do what an aircraft like the AH-64D can do;

Absolutely true. However, we may soon have UAVs that can do what the
RAH-66
could do, except for actual weapon delivery, which the Apache can handle
just fine. (Why the Comanche was bombed up to rival the Apache, I'll
never
understand.)

You have to understand the changes in the Army aviation missions over the
past few years. Dedicated attack helos were pulled from a number of units
(i.e., a portion of the divisional aviation battalions in airborne/air
assault divisions, cavalry units) some years back in favor of the AH-58D,
which was nothing more than the OH-58D with armament added. I did not like
Commanche, but I *can* see the wisdom of including a strike capability in
your cavalry scout birds--increased versatility for when things don't go as
planned, the ability to engage time sensitive targets of opportunity during
the scout mission, and ensuring that your *cavalry* units can perform their
cavalry roles, to include both guard and (even) covering force battle
operations.

That said, I am quite happy to see the demise of this program, and only wish
it had happened earlier when the resultant savings could have been applied
to other critical needs.

Brooks





--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

Kevin Brooks wrote:

I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark. But
be careful drawing any hard and fast conclusions in regards to helo
survivability vis a vis the 11th AVN deep attack during OIF.

I'm not looking only at that attack. There are a bunch of incidents, from
Operation ANACONDA on, that suggest that attack helos are going to get hit
fairly often, and that those hits will come from optical or IR weapons.

I did not like Commanche, but I *can* see the wisdom
of including a strike capability in your cavalry scout
birds--increased versatility for when things don't go as planned, the

Sure, but I question the scale of the armament actually selected. With the
stub wings (which I think were deferred from the most recent production
plan), a Comanche could carry 14 Hellfires, almost 90% of the armament of an
Apache. That's a lot of targets of opportunity. And the requirement for
internal carriage for part of that load added both cost and complexity.

Personally, I think they should have started building a much less complex
scout sometime in the early 1990s, starting with AH-58 capabilities but
built in into a more combat-worthy airframe. It would look strikingly like
an early AH-1 or the Japanese OH-X in general outline. Sensors consist of
Londbow above the mast and Comanche optics above the cockpit but below the
rotor (the second-best spot,a fter the mast it taken by radar). Armament of
perhaps 4 Hellfire (or two rocket pods) and 4 Stinger (for UAV killing as
much as for self-defense) on stub wings plus maybe a GAU-19 .50-caliber
gatling in a chin mount for small arms suppression. Don't worry about radar
LO; concentrate on IR, front-aspect visual, and maybe acoustics.

With luck and planning, the same dynamic system can be adapted for that long
overdue Light Utility Helo requirement (shades of UH-1/AH-1 in reverse?).
--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

Kevin Brooks
I always thought the emphasis on radar stealth was off the mark.

Consider missions like the one at the start of Desert Storm, where
(iirc) Apaches sneaked in low at night and destroyed Iraqi early
warning radars. Obviously, radar stealth seems useful for such
missions.

So, a few stupid(?) questions: Am I wrong about radar
stealth being quite useful in addition to terrain masking?
Is using helos for such missions outdated? Are such deep
missions a marginal issue nowadays, or was it so already
back then? Or is it that the US is focusing its capability
on tackling third rate opponents with minimal own-losses,
rendering the issue of radar-based airdefences largely irrelevant?

without the benefit of the normal SEAD support from your own
arty assets is extremely risky."

More naive questions: Is artillery SEAD really seen as a
requirement for attack helo missions within the envelope
of enemy short-range airdefences? If so, what about operating
out of arty range? Or without having arty on theatre in the
first place (eg much of Afghanistan, esp early on)? And, finally,
if artillery is that effective for SEAD, wouldn't it also be
effective against the targets of the attack helos? Couldn't
smart AT-MP submunitions, or whatever, then do all the job
of the AH's, and more safely?

Moreover, while MLRS can saturate fairly large areas with
submunitions, and will probably ruin the day of any
manpad operator in the target area, one can't possibly
use arty to saturate all the potential locations of
air-defences. At least not with low-level ingress/eggress.
A guy with a manpad can hide easily - in the worst
case he'll be lurking just next to your base, like has
been the case in some Russian helo losses in Chechenya.

And what if the enemy has useful counter battery capability
that limits arty SEAD support? Use AH's to take it out, but...
g

All good points. Bad tactics in one engagement do not mean attack helicopters
are useless. And for all their hype, UAVs are nowhere near a true replacement.


The Army screwed up Comanche development by under-funding the effort and
dragging it out over 20 years. The aircraft itself performed, but the program
failed. This decision still leaves the Army without a replacement for the
OH-58D.

Frank

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
. ..

This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between
the
Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated
advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's weapon.

There's also another factor: the development of GPS-guided munitions and the
arrival of the JSTARS command platform with its powerful side-scanning radar
that could track targets hundreds of miles away. During Operation Iraqi
Freedom, JSTARS planes frequently guided attack planes carrying JDAM and
JSOW weapons to attack targets with great accuracy where the launch plane
was well away from MANPAD rockets and low-altitude AA guns. At the rate
things are going, we may see after 2010 stealthy fast-flying UAV's dropping
GPS-guided bombs and launching TV/laser-guided missiles.

In short, the days of low-flying attacks by manned aircraft are coming to an
end.

--
Raymond Chuang
Sacramento, CA USA

"Raymond Chuang" wrote
"Paul F Austin" wrote

This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between
the
Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated
advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's
weapon.

There's also another factor: the development of GPS-guided munitions and
the
arrival of the JSTARS command platform with its powerful side-scanning
radar
that could track targets hundreds of miles away. During Operation Iraqi
Freedom, JSTARS planes frequently guided attack planes carrying JDAM and
JSOW weapons to attack targets with great accuracy where the launch plane
was well away from MANPAD rockets and low-altitude AA guns. At the rate
things are going, we may see after 2010 stealthy fast-flying UAV's
dropping
GPS-guided bombs and launching TV/laser-guided missiles.

No single sensor sees all and knows all. For example, JSTARS is extremely
limited in mountainous terrain (because of limited sight lines). Likewise,
very high fliers like U-2 and G-Hawk have trouble with some sensors and some
angles. It takes (and we're deploying) a wide range of sensorcraft that
complement each other. Some of the key ones (U-2, G-Hawk, Rivet Joint and
JSTARs) are extremely over-committed right now.


In short, the days of low-flying attacks by manned aircraft are coming to
an
end.

That may be true in the future, which isn't here yet.

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
...
No single sensor sees all and knows all.

I think that's the point. The total awareness concept called for 5000
Comanches in service. Pfft.. 5000 UAVs is doable.

On Mon, 23 Feb 2004 17:26:04 -0500, Paul F Austin wrote:

"robert arndt" wrote

Too bad, only wish it would have been the V-22 or F-22 programs.

This is the first big lessons learned to come out of Iraq War-2. Between the
Apaches getting put out of action by massed gunfire and the demonstrated
advantages of UAVs, the Army decided that Comanche was last-war's weapon.

That's my take on it too.

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