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#81
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In article , Thomas Borchert
wrote: C, The Cirrus cannot recover from a spin without pulling the parachute and did not do so in tests Ok, quote me where it says that in the POH. SR22 POH, Section 3 Emergency Procedures, page 20 (3-20) |
#82
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In article , EDR
wrote: In article , Thomas Borchert wrote: C, The Cirrus cannot recover from a spin without pulling the parachute and did not do so in tests Ok, quote me where it says that in the POH. SR22 POH, Section 3 Emergency Procedures, page 20 (3-20) Section 3 Cirrus Design Emergency Procedures SR22 Spins The SR22 is not approved for spins, and has not been tested or certified for spin recovery characteristics. The only approved and demonstrated method of spin recovery is activation of the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (See CAPS Deployment, this section). Because of this, if the aircraft ³departs controlled flight,² the CAPS must be deployed. While the stall characteristics of the SR22 make accidental entry into a spin extremely unlikely, it is possible. Spin entry can be avoided by using good airmanship: coordinated use of controls in turns, proper airspeed control following the recommendations of this Handbook, and never abusing the flight controls with accelerated inputs when close to the stall (see Stalls, Section 4). If, at the stall, the controls are misapplied and abused accelerated inputs are made to the elevator, rudder and/or ailerons, an abrupt wing drop may be felt and a spiral or spin may be entered. In some cases it may be difficult to determine if the aircraft has entered a spiral or the beginning of a spin. ï WARNING ï In all cases, if the aircraft enters an unusual attitude from which recovery is not expected before ground impact, immediate deployment of the CAPS is required. The minimum demonstrated altitude loss for a CAPS deployment from a one-turn spin is 920 feet. Activation at higher altitudes provides enhanced safety margins for parachute recoveries. Do not waste time and altitude trying to recover from a spiral/spin before activating CAPS. Inadvertent Spin Entry 1. CAPS .................................................. Activate |
#83
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"Dave Katz" wrote in message ... "Vaughn" writes: Saying that the plane "will occasionally end up in an inadvertent spin" is a lot like calling it a plane that "will occasionally end up crumpled on the side of a mountain in clouds and freezing rain." You have to be trying really hard to spin one; it's hard to pin that on the plane. Nicely put. Actually I think it must be pretty hard to spin just about anything accidentally, but people do. The plane gives you a LOT of warning before it stalls - any plane. For a start it slows down, which is fairly noticeable. (I forget exactly what I was doing over the weekend, but for whatever reason I ended up a few knots slow - nowhere near stalling - and it immediately just felt wrong, before I even looked at the airspeed and confirmed it). It has a high angle of attack. In many planes (though not really the case in high-wing Cessnas) there is a buffet. (There is in the Cirrus iirc). Then to spin a wing will start to drop, and in the Cirrus you will still have some aileron control even if you do the wrong thing and try to fix it with the stick. At this point in just about any plane, Muller-Beggs will work fine (let go of everything and wait). That said, it strikes me that everyone ought to do some spin training, maybe after they've got a few more hours than during PPL training. It's fun, it's interesting, and it could save your life. Now if you want a plane that is a challenge to fly, I flew a Waco over the weekend. Now THAT is different. Things like absolutely zero forward visibility during taxi, take-off and landing - and precious little even when you're flying. I'll admit that my first couple of take-offs and landings were not that great (well, none of them were really GREAT but they did get better). But boy, what a lot of fun. John |
#84
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Mike Beede wrote:
I've flown a Cirrus and while it does land fast compared to say a 182, it didn't seem to be particularly hard to slow down compared to say a 182RG with the gear up. That's true, but I can drop the gear in my club's 182RG once below 140 (although I avoid doing so until below 120 just to be kind). The gear doesn't add a *lot* of friction, but there's enough to make a difference. - Andrew |
#85
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"Dave Katz" wrote in message ... "Vaughn" writes: Saying that the plane "will occasionally end up in an inadvertent spin" is a lot like calling it a plane that "will occasionally end up crumpled on the side of a mountain in clouds and freezing rain." True, but most planes can recover from a spin but not from a crash into a mountain so I don't get your comparison. You have to be trying really hard to spin one; it's hard to pin that on the plane. I am not blaming the plane! This is a serious plane that will be flown IFR by owner-pilots who do not fly actual IFR every day; as such, it will occasionally end up in a spin. The BRS will give a wonderful last-ditch option that a certain Kennedy would have appreciated, but IMO that does not substitute for the capability of recovering normally should you spin out of the bottom of a cloud or (for example) end up in an inadvertant training-induced spin. Again, I love the BRS but think that it should not substitute for live-saving flying qualities. We can probably all recite the standard spin recovery procedure. I suspect that a significant number of us have never experienced a spin nor actually done the procedure, and should it happen in real life will probably be really confused and disoriented for long enough to die. That is a whole 'nuther thread. Vaughn |
#86
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Jeff wrote
the SR22 is fast compared to other planes with smaller engines, but compare it to a plane with the same 310 HP engine, I dont think you will see much speed difference. what other planes out there have a 310 HP engine? The 300 hp IO-550 is an option on at least the S-model Bonanza (and probably many others). A friend of mine has one and I've flown it - it's a great airplane, and it will comfortably cruise at 180 kts on 16-17 gph. Michael |
#87
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"C J Campbell" wrote
Therefore, the Cirrus cannot recover from a spin when below 900' AGL. Many other aircraft can. Name one aircraft that can cruise better than 170 kts, carry four people, and can recover from a spin at 900 AGL. Michael |
#88
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I don't know for sure, but I would put 20 on the new lancair.
"Michael" wrote in message om... "C J Campbell" wrote Therefore, the Cirrus cannot recover from a spin when below 900' AGL. Many other aircraft can. Name one aircraft that can cruise better than 170 kts, carry four people, and can recover from a spin at 900 AGL. Michael |
#89
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"Dave Katz" wrote in message ... "Vaughn" writes: We are not talking about a trainer, we are talking about an advanced, owner-flown, plane that will occasionally end up in an inadvertant spin. Any pilot that has enough experience to be flying one shout at least be able to recite the standard spin recovery procedure. Saying that the plane "will occasionally end up in an inadvertent spin" is a lot like calling it a plane that "will occasionally end up crumpled on the side of a mountain in clouds and freezing rain." You have to be trying really hard to spin one; it's hard to pin that on the plane. No, you don't have to be trying real hard to spin one. If this were true, people would not be dying due to approach and departure stalls. We are a many of us excellent pilots on the ground. Stuff happens in the air. People make mistakes. We can probably all recite the standard spin recovery procedure. I suspect that a significant number of us have never experienced a spin nor actually done the procedure, and should it happen in real life will probably be really confused and disoriented for long enough to die. When I moved to California I was able to recite the standard earthquake procedure, but when it happened the first time I had no idea what was happening to me until it was already over... |
#90
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"Dude" writes:
though there isn't much data on the crash in Spain) were CFIT. Hard to blame these on the plane per se. "per se"? Trying to separate out the "plane is a death trap" argument from the "plane attracts idiots" argument. Accusing those of us who think the statistics are relevant of hyperbole will not save any lives, nor win the argument. The fatalities per 100,000 flight hours stat is a very valid and fair stat. And like all statistics it says only what it says, and drawing conclusions from a statistic (particularly a single one) is very risky. You have to ask a series of questions: What does the statistic actually measure? Is the measurement statistically significant? Are similar statistics comparable, and what do the comparisons mean? What does the statistic have to say as a predictor for an individual (which is really what people are concerned with)? For example, if there's never been a fatality in a DA40, does that mean that a Cirrus is infinitely more dangerous? If it turns out that lots of idiots by Cirrus aircraft, does that mean that if you decide to buy one then you as an individual are more likely to become an idiot? The statistics (assuming that they pass significance tests) really tell you only that something is going on, but they can't tell you what. This is a red flag to go and actually examine the accident records and try to make an honest evaluation and decide for yourself what they mean to you. Once again, you can't take out the "stupidity factor" from one manufacturer's stats, and not the others. I fully agree, and herein lies the heart of the issue. Since there is no independent "idiots per 100,000 pilots" statistic measured, it's very difficult to quantitatively describe it. Furthermore, an anecdotal analysis of GA accidents gives the impression that the "stupidity factor" overwhelms all other contributors, which implies that the planes, per se (there's that phrase again) are not a major part of the problem. So unless the plane causes you to become an idiot, as an individual thinking of purchasing one the statistics say almost nothing about how much risk the plane itself poses to you in particular. I believe they are over a million fleet hours, and I am told that is generally considered the time at which the numbers become valid. This would imply an average of somewhere around 700 hours per aircraft, which is way off the mark, considering that probably close to half of the fleet was delivered in the last year. I suspect that the fleet time is at most probably half of that, but of course we're just making up numbers since this is never actually measured. Another would be that everyone of us is likely to decide that we are not one of those idiots. In fact, the ones that are dead likely thought that. "Aviation, where all of the children are above average." ;-) Either the design is safe or it is not. C'mon, this is patently and obviously not true, unless your measure of "safe" is "nothing bad ever happens" in which case all designs are unsafe. Short of pieces coming off, it's almost impossible to measure safety, except in very specific ways (things like impact tests, though those are not necessarily predictors of anything useful either) or very general ways (statistics, which don't tell you much.) There is almost no practical way to prove the cause without changing the results. Therefore, the design is bad until it is found to be performing more safely. If Cirrus implements a change, and then gets different results, then we can talk again. (the parachute fix seems to have helped). I think you're overreaching logically here. Perhaps I can restate it: if there is a statistically significant difference in (accidents, fatalities, choose your measure) then there is likely to be some factor or factors that could be changed to reduce it. It's not just "design" or training or even marketing; it's also things like low time-in-type and mission profile (long XCs may be inherently more risky due to unfamiliar terrain, multiple weather systems, etc.) I don't see that a design change of the physical airplane will keep people from doing stupid stuff (I suppose TAWS might reduce CFIT accidents, but people would scream "crutch," which I agree with to a point, though I suspect it will be standard in the avionics before long.) Cirrus has implemented changes to the training program, and COPA has provided a number of resources, including recurrent training and critical decisionmaking seminars, and a number of the insurance underwriters are raising requirements for time and training. Whether these changes will reduce the accident rate (or have already) will take another chunk of time to determine. There are a few data points, however; the rate of landing accidents (prop strikes, etc.) seem to have dropped since they got rid of the original training organization and started stressing speed and landing attitude control more. The situation is not static by any means. If the problem is indeed personality, perhaps they are selling the planes to the wrong people. I would not necessarily disagree that this is the case except to point out that they are not changing their sales practices and other than looking at experience levels what are you going to do anyway. I don't think either of us have any facts as to whether or not Cirrus is changing their sales practices. And as you note, it's also not clear how a sales rep is supposed to determine whether a customer is a "wrong person" or not; they're not psychologists or mind readers, so short of someone's experience level (or at least how they represent it, as they're not getting a background investigation) there's not much to go on, and it's unclear that overall experience levels correlate with the accidents in any case. Cirrus could get some good PR by simply dropping the SRV idea, and requiring a high level of hours to buy their SR20 and SR22. I don't see this happening, so I guess we will have a bunch more Thurman Munson Jr.'s. It's unclear that this would actually help. One could make a case that an SR20 or SRV would be an excellent aircraft in which to take primary and instrument training, assuming that the pilot understands that the process will take longer than it would in a 152. Typical trainers are more forgiving, but after the first ten hours I'd argue that this is a detriment, as it allows all kinds of bad habits (like the 50' AGL roundout) to develop. Teaching speed discipline on landing, and getting early and thorough exposure to the avionics, could well make them better pilots. There are a fair number of pilots who bought an SR20 to learn in, and so far as I know, none of them have come to a tragic end. As such, their statistics look excellent, for what that's worth. The SR22 is arguably too much of a handful as a primary trainer, though a few people have done it. The insurance people are the main gatekeepers in this case. The number of low-total-time pilots flying SR22s is probably quite small. |
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