Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?

ArtKramr wrote:

As far as I know no other squadron in the ETO in WW II could make that claim.
And it is a claim that I personally find meritorious. Can anyone find anyone
who flew bombers in WW II that finds the claim "Hollow"?

OK I guess I've used the wrong terminology, "hollow claim".

But...

Let's say some general felt lining everyone up, elbow to elbow,
and marching the unit in nice lines straight across the field at
the entrenched enemy (actually, that's exactly what was being
done through a good part of WWI, and that's pretty close to what
the heavy day bombers of WWII were doing) was a valid tactic.

Would having a unit claim to have the straightest marching
lines in the Army be something to be put down in the unit history?
During the Civil War, there *were* units well known for their smart
changes in formation and straight line advances (something useful
in maintaining frontal cohesion and hitting power against enemy over
broken ground). Of course totally inappropriate by WWI.

I know using such inappropriate tactics during WWII isn't the same
as sticking close to a bomber formation you have been tasked to
protect. But *if* such a method of bomber escort was "inappropriate",
then the usefulness of the unit in winning the war was reduced.

The bravery of the people involved isn't in question, nor lowered
because of the possible lack of validity of methods used.

Probably better to switch the focus of my question, as it seems
people are getting personally offended by some implications of my
wording.

Rephrased...

Was "going after the LW and destroying it" a known "better" tactic
in winning WWII in the air, than the previously implemented "stick
with the bombers" paradigm (for the 8th AF)?

If so, was this "correct tactic" recognized by leadership by 1944?

Why would this "correct tactic" not be universally applied to all
theaters of the ETO by 1944? (I'm assuming the distances to/from
targets aren't especially longer than from England, nor the supply
of escorts significantly different for Italian versus English
based AFs).


SMH

Hardly. You would be blaming a unit for decisions made at a higher level.
The Tuskeegee Airmen were following orders. If it was the wrong tactic then
15th AF was to blame.

Jimmy Doolittle, who changed the tactics in the 8th, pointed out in his
autobiography that he was willing to accept more bomber losses in the short
term for greater gains and lower losses in the long term. (Patton had the
same philosophy on the ground.) He was proven correct but it was a hard sell
to the bomber crews.

The ultimate goal was to destroy the enemy. One way was to ensure the
bombers made it through, using fighters to protect them. Another way was to
turn those escorting fighters into offensive weapons. The learning curve was
pretty steep at the time. Using single-seat single-engine fighters as an
offensive weapon in a strategic arena was still new. What works in one
theater at one time may not work in another.

Curt

"Stephen Harding" wrote in message
...
Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.

However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
"Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
doing by 1944.

History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?


SMH

Stephen Harding wrote:

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

None other than ace Robert S. Johnson spoke about how they
made sure they were not drawn away from escort position in order to
chase easy kills. In many instances the 56th FG would dispatch a
single squadron or pair of flights in order to engage targets of
opportunity (Luftwaffe fighters) while the rest of the group continued
escorting the bombers along their route.

The key is really not to get drawn away from the bombers you
are charged with escorting, since catching up is sometimes not
possible, and other times may be too late.

ONLY after significant numbers of long range fighters were
available were tactics changed to a roaming cover (Zemke fan, or
Roving High Cover are two of the names used for this technique). All
the first-hand accounts I have read stated that the suggestion was put
forth by squadrons & groups, but was made policy by the major AF
command. I don't know if their particular AF implemented it, or merely
the 8th AF.

I'd say that the Tuskeegee Airmen sacrificed their personal
scores (only one pilot made ace, IIRC) in order to protect the
bombers. Ultimately, it was the strategic bomber that made the
difference instead of the fighter escort mission.

I'd say it was the right move, although not a choice that was
correct by a huge and obvious margin. Credit to them for their
devotion.



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Subject: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
From: (John S. Shinal)
Date: 2/12/04 9:49 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

Stephen Harding wrote:

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

None other than ace Robert S. Johnson spoke about how they
made sure they were not drawn away from escort position in order to
chase easy kills. In many instances the 56th FG would dispatch a
single squadron or pair of flights in order to engage targets of
opportunity (Luftwaffe fighters) while the rest of the group continued
escorting the bombers along their route.

The key is really not to get drawn away from the bombers you
are charged with escorting, since catching up is sometimes not
possible, and other times may be too late.

ONLY after significant numbers of long range fighters were
available were tactics changed to a roaming cover (Zemke fan, or
Roving High Cover are two of the names used for this technique). All
the first-hand accounts I have read stated that the suggestion was put
forth by squadrons & groups, but was made policy by the major AF
command. I don't know if their particular AF implemented it, or merely
the 8th AF.

I'd say that the Tuskeegee Airmen sacrificed their personal
scores (only one pilot made ace, IIRC) in order to protect the
bombers. Ultimately, it was the strategic bomber that made the
difference instead of the fighter escort mission.

I'd say it was the right move, although not a choice that was
correct by a huge and obvious margin. Credit to them for their
devotion.


Ah a voice of reason at last. Thank you.
As Churchill said," The fighters are our salvation, but the bombers alone
provide the means of victory".


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

I think you'll find that all the groups did this, wether they were assigned
to escort, high cover, withdrawal support; an element would break away to
attack targets of opporchancity, some would even go straffing if there was
no show by the luftwaffe.
This as i have said before is a result of reading many books by many of the
guys who were there, i am in no way an expert.
"John S. Shinal" wrote in message
...
Stephen Harding wrote:

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

None other than ace Robert S. Johnson spoke about how they
made sure they were not drawn away from escort position in order to
chase easy kills. In many instances the 56th FG would dispatch a
single squadron or pair of flights in order to engage targets of
opportunity (Luftwaffe fighters) while the rest of the group continued
escorting the bombers along their route.

The key is really not to get drawn away from the bombers you
are charged with escorting, since catching up is sometimes not
possible, and other times may be too late.

ONLY after significant numbers of long range fighters were
available were tactics changed to a roaming cover (Zemke fan, or
Roving High Cover are two of the names used for this technique). All
the first-hand accounts I have read stated that the suggestion was put
forth by squadrons & groups, but was made policy by the major AF
command. I don't know if their particular AF implemented it, or merely
the 8th AF.

I'd say that the Tuskeegee Airmen sacrificed their personal
scores (only one pilot made ace, IIRC) in order to protect the
bombers. Ultimately, it was the strategic bomber that made the
difference instead of the fighter escort mission.

I'd say it was the right move, although not a choice that was
correct by a huge and obvious margin. Credit to them for their
devotion.



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John S. Shinal wrote:

Stephen Harding wrote:

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

None other than ace Robert S. Johnson spoke about how they
made sure they were not drawn away from escort position in order to
chase easy kills. In many instances the 56th FG would dispatch a
single squadron or pair of flights in order to engage targets of
opportunity (Luftwaffe fighters) while the rest of the group continued
escorting the bombers along their route.

This would have been before the loosening of regulations on escort
correct? At this time, the numbers of escorts available were still
small and the opposition fairly high (and skilled) in number. This
would also have been a shorter escort run, since Johnson was a P-47
pilot.

The key is really not to get drawn away from the bombers you
are charged with escorting, since catching up is sometimes not
possible, and other times may be too late.

ONLY after significant numbers of long range fighters were
available were tactics changed to a roaming cover (Zemke fan, or
Roving High Cover are two of the names used for this technique). All
the first-hand accounts I have read stated that the suggestion was put
forth by squadrons & groups, but was made policy by the major AF
command. I don't know if their particular AF implemented it, or merely
the 8th AF.

It has sometimes been said that the PTO was more a "fighter pilot's
war", meaning that groups were more free to improvise. Tactics
were discussed in more informal manner and less a "top down" command
type of approach.

Certainly in the Pacific, fighter groups were less tightly attached
to the bombers they were escorting, allowing for fighters roaming
ahead of the bomber formations in order to break up on coming enemy.

I understand at one point, the 8th AF dictated escorts be no farther
than about 100 feet of an escorted bomber! Don't know if that is
actually true, but I believe during 1943 and very, very early 1944,
the fighters were not allowed much leeway in how they did their escort.

I'd say that the Tuskeegee Airmen sacrificed their personal
scores (only one pilot made ace, IIRC) in order to protect the
bombers. Ultimately, it was the strategic bomber that made the
difference instead of the fighter escort mission.

I'd say it was the right move, although not a choice that was
correct by a huge and obvious margin. Credit to them for their
devotion.

Absolutely true, especially when one throws in what those fellows
had to endure just getting to the fight.


SMH

Stephen Harding wrote:
This would have been before the loosening of regulations on escort
correct? At this time, the numbers of escorts available were still
small and the opposition fairly high (and skilled) in number. This
would also have been a shorter escort run, since Johnson was a P-47
pilot.

Correct. It was not too long after the 56th FG became fully
operational. Johnson, Gabreski, Schilling and Zemke all had relatively
low scores at this point (compared to their later tallies).



It has sometimes been said that the PTO was more a "fighter pilot's
war", meaning that groups were more free to improvise. Tactics
were discussed in more informal manner and less a "top down" command
type of approach.

Absolutely. John Blackburn in VF-17 developed the Roving High
Cover tactic in the Solomons at a squadron meeting, and got approval
from their next higher command relatively quickly. It was pretty much
done on a handshake, and as long as it was successful, the brass were
willing to let them improvise with minor limitations (only the most
experienced pilots, no lower than a particular altitude, etc.).

I understand at one point, the 8th AF dictated escorts be no farther
than about 100 feet of an escorted bomber! Don't know if that is
actually true, but I believe during 1943 and very, very early 1944,
the fighters were not allowed much leeway in how they did their escort.

I've seen this described by members of the 95th BG and in
short stories about John Godfrey and Gabreski.




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Stephen Harding wrote in message ...
Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.

However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
"Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
doing by 1944.

History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

Is it a hollow accolade? No. Was their's the best tactics to use?
I'm sure the bomber crews thought so. IMO, it wasn't. The fighter
group that hunts down the enemy, shoots down 300-600 enemy aircraft,
and goes looking for more planes on the ground to shoot up does more
to win the war and protect bombers overall, than the group that sticks
with the bombers and shoots down 111 of the enemy. The Tuskegee
Airman would not have been successful with their tactics if the other
groups weren't out there seriously weakening the Luftwaffe.

~Michael

Michael wrote:

Stephen Harding wrote in message ...

Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.

However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
"Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
doing by 1944.

History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?


Is it a hollow accolade? No. Was their's the best tactics to use?
I'm sure the bomber crews thought so. IMO, it wasn't. The fighter
group that hunts down the enemy, shoots down 300-600 enemy aircraft,
and goes looking for more planes on the ground to shoot up does more
to win the war and protect bombers overall, than the group that sticks
with the bombers and shoots down 111 of the enemy. The Tuskegee
Airman would not have been successful with their tactics if the other
groups weren't out there seriously weakening the Luftwaffe.

I agree with you overall, but do not know that the other groups were
using any different tactics than the black fighter squadrons. It would
seem likely all the groups in the AF were told to do escort the same
way.


SMH

Stephen Harding wrote in message ...
Michael wrote:

Is it a hollow accolade? No. Was their's the best tactics to use?
I'm sure the bomber crews thought so. IMO, it wasn't. The fighter
group that hunts down the enemy, shoots down 300-600 enemy aircraft,
and goes looking for more planes on the ground to shoot up does more
to win the war and protect bombers overall, than the group that sticks
with the bombers and shoots down 111 of the enemy. The Tuskegee
Airman would not have been successful with their tactics if the other
groups weren't out there seriously weakening the Luftwaffe.

I agree with you overall, but do not know that the other groups were
using any different tactics than the black fighter squadrons.

Number of kills alone tells me they had to be. Let's compare them to
the 31st FG, another 15th AF P-51 unit; From June '44 to the end of
the war (the time I beleive the Tuskegee Airmen were in P-51s and in
the thick of air to air combat) the 31st FG claimed 226 EA shot down
(their total for the war was 570). The Tuskegee Airman's victories
claims for the entire war were 111. That tells me they were doing
things very differently when they were outscored by more than double
during the same time period (6-1-44 to 5-1-45).

It would seem likely all the groups in the AF were told to do escort the same
way.

While using overall similiar tactics, each group applied them their
own way and tried to improve upon things in their own way.

~Michael