Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?

Dav1936531 wrote:

You are using the incorrect "history" in your assessment. The tactics of the
Tuskeegee Airmen derived from their mission. And WHAT was their mission?

Their mission was no less then the beginning of the racial integration of the
US Armed Forces......no small feat considering the state of US race relations
in the 1940's (a mere 75 years after the end of the Civil War) and the amount
of inherent inertia in a bureaucracy the size of the US Department of Defense.

The group was formed at the behest of social progressive Eleanor Roosevelt,
IIRC. They were not tasked with winning THE WAR against the Germans.....they
were tasked with winning A BATTLE with the (then) current (sad) state of racial
affairs back in the US.

I think you're mixing two different contexts.

A political context, as defined and promoted by E. Roosevelt, and those
sympathetic to the cause, and a military context of winning WWII.

There is a transition of contexts somewhere in the upper military
command, where political goals translate into military ones, and
while Davis would be very well aware of the political pressures the
group would be under (as would the airmen themselves), he was primarily
concerned with implementation of the military objectives handed to him.

At the group level, military goals and objectives would have ruled.
At least, that's the way I would envision it being, not having been
there myself. Race politics certainly adds complications, as it does
to this day.

As I am sure any of them will tell you, everything about the Tuskeegee Airmen
must be viewed through the prism of the racial context of the
times......including their strict adherence to following military ORDERS
governing their tactics while escorting the bomber fleets and engaging any
attackers.

They didn't follow enemy fighters to the ground because they had strict orders
directing them to stay with the bomber groups.....and the white guys in the
bombers loved them for staying in position (although the black TA's couldn't
even have a drink in the white base officer's club.....ask Art K.).

They had strict orders from Davis, or he had strict orders from someone
higher?

If we want to play conspiracy games, we can claim the strict orders
came from some racist white commander *above* Davis who *knew* that
sticking close to bombers during escort, and not leaving the bombers
to follow enemy to shoot them down would result in lowered personal
(and Group) scores. As has been mentioned, there was only one TA ace.
The Machiavelian "higher up" would therefor have succeeded in making
the group look bad in that statistic, promoting his racist attitudes.

All this would seem a bit much to me, but the movie did show racist
white political leaders questioning the performance of the TA in
North Africa, only to find they didn't shoot down e/a because they
never, or rarely encountered them. They had been left in place while
all the other Groups had moved to Italy. An attempt to sabotage a
record?

So the simple question for me is, was the TA Group using tactics that
the other 12th AF Groups had abandoned by mid/late 1944 because of
lessons learned by the 8th/9th AF in deep penetration bomber escort?

If so, who is responsible? Or, is anyone really responsible? Is
this whole question a dead horse as has been suggested by another,
that the TA were simply using one of many tactics that were valid
at the time? No conspiracy to make someone look bad; no "incompetence"
by someone using outmoded, obsolete tactics.

Getting the white guys in the bombers to respect the black Tuskeegee Airmen,
and having the TA develop a reputation for being very predictable and
dependable in battle (i.e., this respect was not misplaced) was a major goal of
the whole operation and a crucial first step in integrating the Armed Forces.

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen in particular,

following the wrong tactic? Is the reputation of this fine group of fighter
pilots somewhat over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

Wrong questions. The Tuskeegee Airmen performed their assigned tasks in a
fashion consistent with high military discipline and efficiency and can be
proud of their service.

I have not claimed that TA individuals should be ashamed of their service.
Simply a question of whether tactics used were the best for ending the
war as quickly as possible, and wondering if the TA "should" have known
what those better tactics were by that time (assuming of course that
there actually were "better tactics", which is in question).

It is always difficult to speak words of criticism towards entities
that have gained somewhat legend status. It reminds me a little of
the AVG critiques on this NG that questioned shootdown scores or
whether the AVG ever actually shot down a "Zero".

It's difficult to critique/discuss and not come across as insulting,
especially when individuals "who were there" are involved, versus
individuals who were not.


SMH

Subject: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
From: Stephen Harding
Date: 2/13/04 3:59 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

ArtKramr wrote:

See "Fighter Cover RAF Style" on my website.

I think I've read all your stuff, but reread this article.

I wonder if the difference in escort "technique" reflected
the different escort experience of the two air forces?

The USAAF was flying deep escort and needed to have a looser
attachment to the bombers in order to maintain a tactical
edge as Emmanuel has described. This was "known" to the 8th
AF fighter command by early 1944 (and 9th AF as well).

The RAF didn't do deep penetration escort (the Spit didn't
have the range) and would be more inclined to stick close
to its escort charges. The fact that individuals would peel
off to go after AAA is probably a reflection of the confidence
of having air superiority and adequate numbers by mid/late '44.

I don't think the peel off would have been done in '43.

You're always a great read, even more than once!


SMH


Thanks. Glad you enjoyed it.



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Subject: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
From: Cub Driver
Date: 2/13/04 3:30 AM Pacific

That's what caused the Brits to adopt the strategy of
sending the Hurricanes after the bombers and the Spitfires after the
fighters.

Hurricanes were all in the MTO.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Ron wrote:
Your granddad was in the 64th TCGp....I was in the 4th TCSq, 62nd TCGp. Your
granddad's outfit was mostly involved in servicing the Yugoslav part of the
theater, whereas we mostly worked the NW part of Italy (up around Genoa and
Milan, etc.). The third TCGp (the 60th) was based around Naples and did
mostly
intra-theater stuff. Small world!

George Z.

He told me stories of being in Italy when Mussolini was killed and they drove
thru the city and saw the body hanging.

Another time they were flying some weapons to some partisans, and there was
not enough straight distance to land and take off because it was in a mountain
valley, even in the C-47, so the takeoff and landing was all done in a turn.


Ron
Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)

Ron wrote:
Your granddad was in the 64th TCGp....I was in the 4th TCSq, 62nd TCGp. Your
granddad's outfit was mostly involved in servicing the Yugoslav part of the
theater, whereas we mostly worked the NW part of Italy (up around Genoa and
Milan, etc.). The third TCGp (the 60th) was based around Naples and did
mostly
intra-theater stuff. Small world!

George Z.

He told me stories of being in Italy when Mussolini was killed and they drove
thru the city and saw the body hanging.

Some place in an old photo album, I have a 2-1/4 X 3-1/4 B&W snapshot of him and
his mistress, Clara Petacci, hanging by the heels like two sides of beef in a
gas station near Milano.

Another time they were flying some weapons to some partisans, and there was
not enough straight distance to land and take off because it was in a mountain
valley, even in the C-47, so the takeoff and landing was all done in a turn.

I always thought that the hairier stuff was flying to a DZ on radar following a
stream through a valley, which also bent and turned, with an solid overcast
above you and the mountain peaks on each side of you lost in the clouds. Well,
I guess it couldn't have been too bad, since I'm here to tell you about it.
(^-^)))

George Z.

Ron
Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)

Art wrote:
Hurricanes were all in the MTO.

NOT during the Battle off Britian, Art.

oxmoron1
CRS/CSS/MFE

Stephen Harding wrote in message ...
Michael wrote:

Is it a hollow accolade? No. Was their's the best tactics to use?
I'm sure the bomber crews thought so. IMO, it wasn't. The fighter
group that hunts down the enemy, shoots down 300-600 enemy aircraft,
and goes looking for more planes on the ground to shoot up does more
to win the war and protect bombers overall, than the group that sticks
with the bombers and shoots down 111 of the enemy. The Tuskegee
Airman would not have been successful with their tactics if the other
groups weren't out there seriously weakening the Luftwaffe.

I agree with you overall, but do not know that the other groups were
using any different tactics than the black fighter squadrons.

Number of kills alone tells me they had to be. Let's compare them to
the 31st FG, another 15th AF P-51 unit; From June '44 to the end of
the war (the time I beleive the Tuskegee Airmen were in P-51s and in
the thick of air to air combat) the 31st FG claimed 226 EA shot down
(their total for the war was 570). The Tuskegee Airman's victories
claims for the entire war were 111. That tells me they were doing
things very differently when they were outscored by more than double
during the same time period (6-1-44 to 5-1-45).

It would seem likely all the groups in the AF were told to do escort the same
way.

While using overall similiar tactics, each group applied them their
own way and tried to improve upon things in their own way.

~Michael

Subject: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
From: (OXMORON1)
Date: 2/13/04 6:39 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

Art wrote:
Hurricanes were all in the MTO.

NOT during the Battle off Britian, Art.

oxmoron1
CRS/CSS/MFE


I was responding to a broad general statement involving how escort fighters
operated. The statement should have pointed out that Hurricanes were shipped
off to the MTO shortly . after the B of B. To talk about Hurricanes without
pointing this out distorts the picture of fighter cover in the ETO. But maybe
the poster was unaware of these facts.



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Subject: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
From: Cub Driver
Date: 2/13/04 3:30 AM Pacific

That's what caused the Brits to adopt the strategy of
sending the Hurricanes after the bombers and the Spitfires after the
fighters.

Hurricanes were all in the MTO.


Not in 1940 they werent , they were in the skies over England
and there were 2 of them for every Spitfire available.

Keith

Cub Driver wrote in message . ..
On Thu, 12 Feb 2004 12:46:20 -0500, Stephen Harding
wrote:

It's not yet clear to me that the tactic of "sticking with
the bombers" was not known as the *wrong* tactic by early 1944.

As I recall the Battle of Britain, the German fighters were difficult
to cope with because they did *not* stick with the bombers --

As I understand it, they were most successful when they were permitted
a "frie jagd", where a gruppe would sweep out ahead of the bombers
they were escorting. The powers that be incorrectly thought close
support was the way to go and reined the fighters in, taking the
initiative and advantage away from them and helping the RAF.

~Michael