Why was the Fokker D VII A Good Plane?

Yet even before that date the RAF were fully operational
In April 1944 Bomber command flew 9700 sorties with
a loss rate of 2.7%.

After losing almost 100 aircraft in the Nuremburg raid of 3/31/44.

It was only being put onto invasion related targets that saved Bomber Command
from the perception of visible and humiliating defeat, and only "the favorable
situation created by the Americans", that allowed Harris to make the rubble
jump in German cities later in the war.

Now, the Americans had a similar situation. After 10/14/43, it was
conclusively shown that the unescorted bomber boxes couldn't operate over
German targets without prohibitive loss. The Americans were able to interject
a technological antidote -- the Mustang.

Due to the nature of the British techniques and the unsuitability of their
aircraft to being escorted the way the Americans could, the Brits could only
get back over German targets after the Americans deprived the German air force
of fuel. And I remind you that Galland said that deliveries of aviation fuel
were inadequate before the RAF flew one sortie in the "Oil Campaign", and I
further remind you that Harris sloughed off boming Oil targets as much as he
dared.

Walt

The USAAF started out with an obsession about "pinipoint:" bombing,
"putting the bomb in the pickle barrel from 20,000 feet."

They ultimately made it work, too.

"From Spaatz's point of view, the results of the May attacks on oil
were outstanding. The Luftwaffe came up in strength, and Eisenhower soon got
feedback through ULTRA that the effects on tlie Germans were dramatic. The
military leaders of the Reich reacted immediately. They redeployed antiaircraft
defenses hurriedly from the aircraft factories to these synthetic plants that
had not yet been bombed. In addition, they changed the training programs of
some of the ground units to conserve fuel and modified additional vehicles to.
wood-burning propulsion systems. Though USSTAF could not at that moment be
relieved of its responsibilities in the preparatory phases of OVERLORD, the
combination of effects seems to have so impressed Eisenhower'that later in the
summer he permitted additional oil attacks."

--"Master of Airpower", David R. Mets.

"The USSTAF and Bomber Command at last combined their offensives, the Eighth
and Fifteenth Air Forces hitting synthetic oil plants while Bomber Command
hammered targets in the Ruhr, where benzol was derived as a by-product of the
coke ovens. In the process, an argument that had by now become academic was
settled: precision bombing using the Norden bombsight could do more damage
with 250 tons of bombs than could an attack using radar with 1,000 tons."

-- "Clash of Wings" p. 346, by Walter J. Boyne

"Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all the
hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and industrial
workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the soldiers at the front--it
was not,as we have seen, area bombing by night that struck the vital blow at
German survival.
This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the selective and
precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in daylight. By careful
choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks of armaments production,
and finally brought the whole German war machine to a standstill."

Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker

"After a survey of of Luftwaffe officers for "American Heritage", Carl
Sulzberger found agreement with one German flying officer that "There is no
doubt that the Americans harmed us most. The Russians were negligible as far
as the home front was concerned, and we could have stood the British attacks
on our cities. But the American devastation of our airfields, factories, and
oil depots made it impossible for us to keep going."

"A Wing and a Prayer", p. 384 by Harry Crosby.

"In the course of the year 1943 the accent of the Reich defense shifted more
and more toward action against daylight raiders. Even though numerically the
British were still stronger than the Americans and were undoubtedly a great
trial for for the civilian population, the American precision raids were of
greater consequence to the war industry. They received priority attention
over the British raids on our towns."

"The First and the Last" p. 178, Adolf Galland

Walt

Do you
realize that during the BoB, Bomber Command lost more men attacking
continental targets, including Germany, than Fighter Command lost?

Not a very stirring testimony.

But it explains that the RAF was committed to bombing the Reich years before
the US left its shores to join the party. Losses notwithstanding, Bomber
Command was never turning back. Harris made a great statement when it was
first suggested that they had "lost" the night battle - can't quote, but
essentially, he said, "What we are doing amounts to the ONLY Allied offensive
operation against Germany at this time." From June 1940 to June 1944, Bomber
Command was the only Allied force in constant combat over the Reich, drawing
resources away from Germany's countless other campaigns.

The context of my note, which perhaps you
just
skimmed, or maybe I wasn't clear enough, was in the period following the
invasion.

Before during and after the invasion, Bomber Command was striking Germany. No
heavy bomber raid was ever turned back, day or night, due to enemy action -
yes, that includes the RAF. As for the Commonwealthians being unable to
continue bombing, Portal never said that - he said it was *possible* that the
situation would have gotten to that point; even as he wrote that, British
bombers were in combat. And his statement ignores the mounting Mosquito raids
that were by then causing the German leadership to remove large chunks of hair
from their own heads... The Allied bombing campaign took on several facets and
Portal's perhaps out of context or otherwise incomplete comments don't
accurately reflect the reality that American air armadas required X amount of
German assets to combat, while the night campaign required X amount as well -
often it meant they could react to a daylight threat only by taking assets from
the night war, and vice versa. The RAF suffered greatly but didn't quit -
almost a mirror of the situation to when the Regensburg/Schweinfurt missions
made it tactically impractical for the US to continue with large scale daylight
penetrations without escorts. Allied bombing (not American, nor British)
accomplished the deed of forcing the Luftwaffe to its knees, by continually
rocking the old warrior with an indefensible combination of punches. No reason
to try to demean the accomplishments of one force to raise up the other - they
were fists wielded by the same boxer.

v/r
Gordon

Subject: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
From: (WalterM140)
Date: 4/19/04 6:40 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

The USAAF started out with an obsession about "pinipoint:" bombing,
"putting the bomb in the pickle barrel from 20,000 feet."

They ultimately made it work, too.

"From Spaatz's point of view, the results of the May attacks on oil
were outstanding. The Luftwaffe came up in strength, and Eisenhower soon got
feedback through ULTRA that the effects on tlie Germans were dramatic. The
military leaders of the Reich reacted immediately. They redeployed
antiaircraft
defenses hurriedly from the aircraft factories to these synthetic plants that
had not yet been bombed. In addition, they changed the training programs of
some of the ground units to conserve fuel and modified additional vehicles
to.
wood-burning propulsion systems. Though USSTAF could not at that moment be
relieved of its responsibilities in the preparatory phases of OVERLORD, the
combination of effects seems to have so impressed Eisenhower'that later in
the
summer he permitted additional oil attacks."

--"Master of Airpower", David R. Mets.

"The USSTAF and Bomber Command at last combined their offensives, the Eighth
and Fifteenth Air Forces hitting synthetic oil plants while Bomber Command
hammered targets in the Ruhr, where benzol was derived as a by-product of the
coke ovens. In the process, an argument that had by now become academic was
settled: precision bombing using the Norden bombsight could do more damage
with 250 tons of bombs than could an attack using radar with 1,000 tons."

-- "Clash of Wings" p. 346, by Walter J. Boyne

"Despite all the terrible destruction of German cities, despite all the
hardship and death it brought to the civilian population and industrial
workers--whose ordeal was now often worse than the soldiers at the front--it
was not,as we have seen, area bombing by night that struck the vital blow at
German survival.
This mission was accomplished to a far greater extent by the selective and
precision bombing of the American Eighth Air Force in daylight. By careful
choice of target, this first blocked the bottle-necks of armaments
production,
and finally brought the whole German war machine to a standstill."

Luftwaffe War Diaries, p.340 by Cajus Bekker

"After a survey of of Luftwaffe officers for "American Heritage", Carl
Sulzberger found agreement with one German flying officer that "There is no
doubt that the Americans harmed us most. The Russians were negligible as far
as the home front was concerned, and we could have stood the British attacks
on our cities. But the American devastation of our airfields, factories, and
oil depots made it impossible for us to keep going."

"A Wing and a Prayer", p. 384 by Harry Crosby.

"In the course of the year 1943 the accent of the Reich defense shifted more
and more toward action against daylight raiders. Even though numerically the
British were still stronger than the Americans and were undoubtedly a great
trial for for the civilian population, the American precision raids were of
greater consequence to the war industry. They received priority attention
over the British raids on our towns."

"The First and the Last" p. 178, Adolf Galland

Walt

Those of us who flew missions with the Norden knew that all the time.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

But it explains that the RAF was committed to bombing the Reich years before
the US left its shores to join the party.

Exactly.

And the Germans are clear that the Americans hurt them much worse than the
British did.

Walt

"What we are doing amounts to the ONLY Allied offensive
operation against Germany at this time."

Harris almost immolated his own force. He had a World War One mindset.

But he -was- a 'Butcher' alright -- of his own men.

Walt

From June 1940 to June 1944, Bomber
Command was the only Allied force in constant combat over the Reich, drawing
resources away from Germany's countless other campaigns.

You're on a roll.

The effort the Germans had to expend to combat Bomber Command in no way
strained them the way it strained the British to support Bomber Command. The
Germans had boys, foreign soldiers, even women in their flak defenses. The
British had hundreds of very very expensive aircraft and their finest young men
involved. And the Germans defeated Bomber Command.

Walt

The context of my note, which perhaps you
just
skimmed, or maybe I wasn't clear enough, was in the period following the
invasion.

Before during and after the invasion, Bomber Command was striking Germany.

After the Invasion, BC could only strike Germany because of the situation
brought on by the Americans.

No
heavy bomber raid was ever turned back, day or night, due to enemy action -
yes, that includes the RAF.

So what?

The British had to install cameras on their bombers to make sure the crews were
not dropping their heavier bombs into the North Sea.


As for the Commonwealthians being unable to
continue bombing, Portal never said that - he said it was *possible* that the
situation would have gotten to that point; even as he wrote that, British
bombers were in combat. And his statement ignores the mounting Mosquito
raids
that were by then causing the German leadership to remove large chunks of
hair
from their own heads...

You can't gansay Portal.

Mosquito raids, right.


The Allied bombing campaign took on several facets
and
Portal's perhaps out of context or otherwise incomplete comments

You're welcome to show that.

don't
accurately reflect the reality that American air armadas required X amount of
German assets to combat, while the night campaign required X amount as well -
often it meant they could react to a daylight threat only by taking assets
from
the night war, and vice versa.

You could argue that both the daylight and night raids expended much more in
the way of blood and treasure than they returned. But the Germans are clear
that the USAAF hurt them far worse than the RAF and they began redeploying the
day fighter force back to Germay at a time when the average USAAF raid was only
a few dozen heavy bombers and only striking in visual conditions.

The RAF suffered greatly but didn't quit -
almost a mirror of the situation to when the Regensburg/Schweinfurt missions
made it tactically impractical for the US to continue with large scale
daylight
penetrations without escorts.

The difference is that the Americans had a technological injection they could
make -- the Mustang. Due to the nature of its aircraft and techniques and
equipment, the RAF had no such fix.

Allied bombing (not American, nor British)
accomplished the deed of forcing the Luftwaffe to its knees,

The effect on the Luftwaffe by the RAF during the run-up to the invasion was
negligible.


by continually
rocking the old warrior with an indefensible combination of punches. No
reason
to try to demean the accomplishments of one force to raise up the other -
they
were fists wielded by the same boxer.

Arthur Harris kept one hand tied behind the back of Bomber Command. it could
have been much more effective under another leader.


Walt


v/r
Gordon

The
Germans had boys, foreign soldiers, even women in their flak defenses.

An 88mm set up to defend the Zeiss optics works is one that would not be
available to the invasion front. Multiply that by thousands of 88s and every
other caliber - these were being set up around various military targets in
1940-42, long before the stars and bars arrived overhead. The flakhelferrinnen
did indeed include boys and women - although women usually served in other
roles and boys were physically unable to lift and load an 88mm shell, so men
were used that would otherwise be employed in the war effort elsewhere.

The
British had hundreds of very very expensive aircraft and their finest young
men
involved. And the Germans defeated Bomber Command.

Just as the IJN defeated the USN at Pearl Harbor. Within a few months, the USN
carried the fight right back to the heart of the enemy - I think that is the
same situation at the RAF's costly, though short-term, loss against the
Luftwaffe over Germany's cities.

v/r
Gordon-
====(A+C====
USN SAR

Its always better to lose AN engine, than THE engine.

"What we are doing amounts to the ONLY Allied offensive
operation against Germany at this time."

Harris almost immolated his own force. He had a World War One mindset.

The 'chop rate' varied quite a bit throughout the night war, but Harris didn't
do anything any differently than Nimitz, Halsey, or dozens of other Allied
commanders: get in front of the enemy and prove you could outlast him.

But he -was- a 'Butcher' alright -- of his own men.

He traded the lives of 50,000 of his own men in order to keep Britain on
offense, at a time when he was the only man in a position to do so. I'd agree
with the title "butcher", however, I would say he and his force kept hundreds
of thousands of flak, fighter, and support troops tied up before the first
Boeing arrived. He had a bloody, ugly job to do and was rightly dispised for
doing it his own way. Not a guy I'd ever want to work for - I think a
personality like Bennett or Embry could have rallied the force to greater
accomplishments.

v/r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR

Its always better to lose AN engine, than THE engine.