Future military fighters and guns - yes or no ?

steve gallacci wrote in
:
Ian wrote:

"Dweezil Dwarftosser" wrote in message
...
George wrote:

Cool... if (and only if):

- the laser has the same optical path as the video-
aiming device. (May be slaved to radar aim point,
but it is essential the trigger-puller be able to
SEE the effectiveness of the aim/shot).
- all battles are over a sunny, clear desert.
- there is no smoke from previous targets, ground or air.
- There is no "Interlocks out" switch in the cockpit, so
the pilot cannot short-cuircuit the mandatory charge time.
(prevents him from firing "blanks"...)

From what I've read, I'd say it is viable to do this, but
questions have been asked about the "recharge" time for the
laser?

While lasers could be cool, I have doubts about effectiveness,
especially once they become operational, as ablatives and other
protections/countermeasures could reduce them to little more
than over-built flashlights.

What about the heat generated by it? A 100KW laser means many
times that in generated electrical power. Where do you put it?


Regards...

(George) wrote in
om:

The US is looking at putting a 100kW laser on the JSF. Does
anyone
think this could supplant the gun? It is precise, effective
(when they get its power up), aimable (including well off
boresight), has a longer range than a gun, doesn't require ammo,
and if you aim it up, you don't have to worry about shells
splashing at the wrong place. The only disadvantage I can see is
charge time (a second shot could take a few seconds) and the
fact that the beam is invisible to the naked eye. Plus the laser
takes electricity from an engine-driven generator (slight fuel
efficiency loss). Any thoughts?

I think they should just build the X-Wing and be done with it.


Regards...

In message , Tony
Williams writes
This does not mean
that guns are useless for air-to-air work. They have a particular
value in modern 'policing' applications, as they enable warning shots
to be fired in front of suspect aircraft.

However, you have to load tracer for that: which reduces effectiveness
in combat.

They also provide an
economical way of engaging low-value targets such as unmanned
reconnaissance drones, transport and liaison aircraft, or
drug-smugglers.

"Economical" is extremely dependent on assumptions: while a burst of
cannon shells is cheaper than a missile, keeping your entire fighter
force trained and ready to be proficient in gun use is not cost-free.

In a 'hot' war they still have certain advantages in
close-quarter fighting, for example in 'picking off' an enemy
attacking a wingman, who may be too close for a safe missile shot.

Last time this occurred?

The
ability of modern fighters to adopt extreme attitudes, pointing well
away from the line of flight, significantly assists gun aiming in
dogfights.

Only if the extreme attitude can be sustained and controlled long enough
for a gun snapshot: meanwhile a less extreme diversion wastes less
energy yet still allows an off-boresight missile shot.

Cannon projectiles have a shorter flight time than a
missile, a significant advantage in a dogfight.

Can't miss fast enough to win: and it takes significantly longer to get
into guns parameters.

Finally, the gun provides a last-ditch capability if the missiles run
out,

If an infantryman runs out of ammunition, should he continue to close
with the enemy in hopes of getting into bayonet, buttstock, boots and
teeth range?

When you find yourself at a major disadvantage, it's rarely wise to
press on through the killing zone.

or are defeated by advanced countermeasures or simply by
circumstances.

The trouble is that gunsights require significant sensor input:
particularly if the aircraft is flying extreme manoeuvres to generate
snapshots. This means that an enemy able to deceive radar-guided
missiles is also generating miss distance for cannon rounds.

The 1991 Gulf War revealed the deficiencies of modern
IR-homing missiles when faced with trying to pick up a low-flying
target against a hot desert background (helicopters being in any case
difficult for IR seekers to lock on to from above). USAF A-10
aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and
550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to
lock on.

550 rounds is more than many fighters carry, even when using less potent
Gatling guns. Is the problem "only guns can kill low-flying
helicopters", or "there's a need to improve capability against
low-flying helicopters"?

Furthermore, the performance of even the best missiles cannot
always be guaranteed, for various reasons. In Kosovo, a US fighter
engaging a Serbian plane needed to fire three AMRAAMs to bring it
down.

How many cannon rounds were fired, out of interest?

In other engagements in the late 1990s, USAF and USN fighters
fired a total of seven Sparrows, AMRAAMs, and Phoenix missiles against
Iraqi MiG-25s without scoring a single hit (although the Phoenix shots
were taken at extreme range).

Again, how many gun shots were fired?

The Iraqi aircraft were evading at the edges of the missile envelope:
what improvements to the US aircraft's gunnery systems would have
changed the outcome?

Whatever the reason, this results in missiles being used
up at a high rate, making it more likely that they will run out during
a sortie. A cannon will typically carry enough ammunition for several
engagements, usefully increasing combat persistence at a minimal cost
in weight and performance.

Trouble is, just because _you_ are out of missiles doesn't mean the
enemy will chivalrously cease fi and it's much easier for the enemy
to get you into missile parameters, than for you to lure an enemy into a
guns shot. (Especially when you're having to break off your approaches
to evade enemy AAMs)

One curious aspect to the use of AAMs in combat is that of the
approximately 1,000 kills achieved between 1958 and 1991, only a
handful were scored beyond visual range, which does raise questions
about the significance of the very long ranges of which some missiles
are capable.

Restrictive ROE accounts for a great deal (Vietnam): limited conflict
area (Middle East); and weapon availability (Falklands).

Also, define "visual range". The definition usually cited is "within
five miles", which is well outside guns range and only useful for
head-on Sidewinder shots: "long-range" missiles may struggle to close
five miles of seperation in a low-altitude, co-speed tailchase.

There is a continual battle between missile sensor and countermeasure
technology.

And the gun is not immune, since it requires sensor input for any but
the crudest shot.

In the future, stealth technology applied to aircraft may
considerably shorten target acquisition and combat ranges, putting
into question the worth of modern BVR (beyond visual range) AAMs. The
possible future use of anti-radar missile guidance as a way of
overcoming stealth characteristics may force fighters to make minimal
use of their own radars, further reducing acquisition and combat
distances.

And making guns use equally problematic, as snapshots become much more
demanding and gyro gunsights demand tracking shots.

Of course, modern guns are usually aimed by the plane's radar which
could also be jammed (although less easily than the much smaller and
less powerful missile seekers) but laser rangefinders could make an
acceptable alternative in providing fire control data.

Only for range: not for angular rate.

If planes
eventually become 'laser-proof' as well, the possibility presumably
exists of linking variable magnification optical sights to a computer
which would be able to analyse the image, identify the plane,
calculate its distance, speed and heading and provide gunsight aiming
information accordingly, all without emitting any signals.

If you can do all this and compute a gunnery solution, why can you not
fly a much larger guided warhead into the target from greater range than
a cannon will allow?

However, not all conflicts involve front-line opposition; in fact,
armed forces are now commonly engaged on police work, frequently
dealing with guerrilla forces. In these circumstances, rockets and
missiles may represent an inappropriate degree of destruction, with a
high risk of collateral damage. The RAF was embarrassed during
operations against insurgents in Sierra Leone in 2000 to find that
they had no suitable weapon for their gunless Harrier GR.7 aircraft to
attack small groups of rebels operating close to innocent civilians.

Given the lack of air opposition, why not use Sea Harriers with their
reliable, proven 30mm ADENs for the role? It seems more is being made of
the story than might actually exist.

Another advantage of using cannon was demonstrated in the invasion of
Afghanistan in 2002. During an intense infantry battle at Takur Ghar
in late May, in which US forces were ambushed and in considerable
danger, air support was called for. The AC-130 was not permitted to
intervene in daylight due to its vulnerability, so USAF fighters were
sent to help. For a part of the battle the Afghan combatants were too
close to the Americans for rockets or bombs to be used, so the
fighters – F-16s and even F-15s – went in strafing with their 20 mm
cannon, as did the Navy's F-14s and F/A-18s on other occasions.

And, curiously, the ground troops reported how the enemy refused to be
suppressed, neutralised or destroyed by those strafing passes: though
PGMs dropped carefully in "danger close" proved effective.

Even
RAF Tornadoes were reported to have carried out gun strafing runs on
at least one occasion. It may logically be argued that it is foolish
to risk an extremely expensive aircraft, with its expensively trained
pilot, to being lost due to very low-tech ground fire, but sometimes
the risk needs to be taken to save friendly lives."

I'm automatically wary of this variation of "If it saves the life of
even one small child..."

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In message , Guy Alcala
writes
There have
been gun deletions (or de-emphasis) in the past, either in whole or in part --
the Tornado F.3 lost one BK 27 (space needed for Skyflash avionics, I think);

The Tornado GR.4 also loses one gun IIRC, and the recce GR.1A and
matching GR.4 version deleted the guns completely (as, from memory, did
the German ECR variant)

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

Guy Alcala wrote in message ...

I have seen no concrete evidence that it was a "purely economic" decision (but
see Tony Williams' post). I'm sure cost played a part, but I imagine there were
a multitude of factors involved. I don't doubt that a lot of RAF people
screamed at the idea, just as many people have screamed at virtually every
deletion of some weapon capability (or loss of their personal warm and fuzzy),
no matter how little utility it may have in changed circumstances. The
battleship people screamed too. Who's right in this instance has yet to be
proved. We all agree that there are some cases where a gun provides a useful
capability, but then so does a sword. As always, it's a question of tradeoffs.

Agree with the points you make, Guy. My argument would be that
although the gun is no longer of primary importance in a fighter, it
can fulfil a wide range of secondary roles (see my original post)
especially in situations short of a 'hot' war. The theorists have
frequently tried to keep their concepts 'clean' (what was the USAF
fighter whose development was said to include 'not one pound for air
to ground'?) but the even the most specialised interceptors have
frequently found themselves carrying bombs once combat required it.

I would argue that for the present at least, the small weight penalty
and cost of a gun (compared with the whole-life cost of the aircraft)
makes it worth keeping.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

In message , Guy Alcala
writes
There have
been gun deletions (or de-emphasis) in the past, either in whole or in part --
the Tornado F.3 lost one BK 27 (space needed for Skyflash avionics, I think);

The Tornado GR.4 also loses one gun IIRC, and the recce GR.1A and
matching GR.4 version deleted the guns completely (as, from memory, did
the German ECR variant)

Thanks. I couldn't remember for sure on any of them except the F.3.

Guy

Tony Williams wrote:

Guy Alcala wrote in message ...

I have seen no concrete evidence that it was a "purely economic" decision (but
see Tony Williams' post). I'm sure cost played a part, but I imagine there were
a multitude of factors involved. I don't doubt that a lot of RAF people
screamed at the idea, just as many people have screamed at virtually every
deletion of some weapon capability (or loss of their personal warm and fuzzy),
no matter how little utility it may have in changed circumstances. The
battleship people screamed too. Who's right in this instance has yet to be
proved. We all agree that there are some cases where a gun provides a useful
capability, but then so does a sword. As always, it's a question of tradeoffs.

Agree with the points you make, Guy. My argument would be that
although the gun is no longer of primary importance in a fighter, it
can fulfil a wide range of secondary roles (see my original post)
especially in situations short of a 'hot' war. The theorists have
frequently tried to keep their concepts 'clean' (what was the USAF
fighter whose development was said to include 'not one pound for air
to ground'?)

Of course, that wasn't true even at the time the claim was made, as a glance at a photo of the armament control panel and
Master Mode Switches of an F-15A will show.

but the even the most specialised interceptors have
frequently found themselves carrying bombs once combat required it.

Which is a question of adding a capability that has been routinely exercised by fighters in combat at least since they
dropped Cooper bombs in WW1, right up through the most recent conflicts, and which, in the context of the air supremacy the
US (at least) has enjoyed in our most recent wars, is more generally useful.

I would argue that for the present at least, the small weight penalty
and cost of a gun (compared with the whole-life cost of the aircraft)
makes it worth keeping.

And I am essentially agnostic on the matter, perhaps leaning slightly towards the gun pod solution for those "short of hot
war" situations. Kind of depends what makes it through the R&D pipeline. If, for example, the only place to put the black
boxes and/or the laser itself for an active laser missile defense system to protect the a/c against IR SAMs was where the
gun was, then it's probably bye-bye gun (depending on the delivery profile of the weapons and sensors of the a/c in
question). Data links, almost certainly. that's a question of retro-fitting a/c currently in service or soon to be. The
next generation, though, is another matter, as the tradeoff between potential airframe size and cost with/without a gun will
be more obvious than is the case with removing a gun from an a/c already sized to carry it. Personally, I'd think that
putting a gun (if necessary) on a long endurance UCAV along with various other weapons may be the way CAS will go, but
that's without knowing a whole lot about what's practical now.

Guy

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
In message , Tony
Williams writes

They also provide an
economical way of engaging low-value targets such as unmanned
reconnaissance drones, transport and liaison aircraft, or
drug-smugglers.

"Economical" is extremely dependent on assumptions: while a burst of
cannon shells is cheaper than a missile, keeping your entire fighter
force trained and ready to be proficient in gun use is not cost-free.

No it isn't - but UAVs/UCAVs are likely to proliferate rapidly, and
dealing with them is likely to shift up the scale of importance.

The 1991 Gulf War revealed the deficiencies of modern
IR-homing missiles when faced with trying to pick up a low-flying
target against a hot desert background (helicopters being in any case
difficult for IR seekers to lock on to from above). USAF A-10
aircraft achieved two helicopter kills with the GAU-8/A (using 275 and
550 rounds respectively) in one case when the IR missiles failed to
lock on.

550 rounds is more than many fighters carry, even when using less potent
Gatling guns. Is the problem "only guns can kill low-flying
helicopters", or "there's a need to improve capability against
low-flying helicopters"?

The A-10 was not equipped (nor are the pilots trained, AFAIK) for
air-to-air gunnery.

Furthermore, the performance of even the best missiles cannot
always be guaranteed, for various reasons. In Kosovo, a US fighter
engaging a Serbian plane needed to fire three AMRAAMs to bring it
down.

How many cannon rounds were fired, out of interest?

Irrelevant - the point I am making is that missiles run out very fast.


Trouble is, just because _you_ are out of missiles doesn't mean the
enemy will chivalrously cease fi and it's much easier for the enemy
to get you into missile parameters, than for you to lure an enemy into a
guns shot. (Especially when you're having to break off your approaches
to evade enemy AAMs)

The Iranian F-14s made good use of their Phoenix missiles, and
Sparrows, but still ended up in gunfights on occasions and even scored
kills with the gun. Nice theories about how engagements ought to go
tend to break down in real life.

If planes
eventually become 'laser-proof' as well, the possibility presumably
exists of linking variable magnification optical sights to a computer
which would be able to analyse the image, identify the plane,
calculate its distance, speed and heading and provide gunsight aiming
information accordingly, all without emitting any signals.

If you can do all this and compute a gunnery solution, why can you not
fly a much larger guided warhead into the target from greater range than
a cannon will allow?

Because an aircraft has far more space for sensors and computing
capacity than a missile does.

However, not all conflicts involve front-line opposition; in fact,
armed forces are now commonly engaged on police work, frequently
dealing with guerrilla forces. In these circumstances, rockets and
missiles may represent an inappropriate degree of destruction, with a
high risk of collateral damage. The RAF was embarrassed during
operations against insurgents in Sierra Leone in 2000 to find that
they had no suitable weapon for their gunless Harrier GR.7 aircraft to
attack small groups of rebels operating close to innocent civilians.

Given the lack of air opposition, why not use Sea Harriers with their
reliable, proven 30mm ADENs for the role? It seems more is being made of
the story than might actually exist.

The Sea Harriers have, what - two or three more years? Then what? Do
guns suddenly stop being useful for such purposes?

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
Tony Williams wrote:


I would argue that for the present at least, the small weight penalty
and cost of a gun (compared with the whole-life cost of the aircraft)
makes it worth keeping.

And I am essentially agnostic on the matter, perhaps leaning slightly towards the gun pod solution for those "short of hot
war" situations.

This is my comment on gunpods:

"Podded guns have the advantage that they don't need to be lugged
around unless the planes are in circumstances in which a gun is likely
to be needed. Like any other piece of hardware, they can be fitted
according to requirements. The downside of this is that you first have
to make sure that the gunpods are available when required, you have to
be psychic to determine when they might be useful, they use up a
hardpoint which would otherwise be available for fuel or other
weapons, they take some time to harmonise – and keep harmonised – when
fitted, and even then are less accurate than integral guns. Gunpods
generate more drag, usually affect handling and are also much less
"stealthy" than integral guns; a factor likely to be increasingly
important as stealth measures are leading to the internal carriage of
all weapons. This solution is therefore very much second best, but it
is better than nothing. The installation of weapons in
purpose-designed conformal pods fitted directly to the fuselage and
intended to be more or less permanent fixtures does reduce or avoid
some of the above problems."

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

In message , Tony
Williams writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
"Economical" is extremely dependent on assumptions: while a burst of
cannon shells is cheaper than a missile, keeping your entire fighter
force trained and ready to be proficient in gun use is not cost-free.

No it isn't - but UAVs/UCAVs are likely to proliferate rapidly, and
dealing with them is likely to shift up the scale of importance.

I'm still unconvinced that a gun (in its current incarnation) is the
best option, if that's a key driver.

550 rounds is more than many fighters carry, even when using less potent
Gatling guns. Is the problem "only guns can kill low-flying
helicopters", or "there's a need to improve capability against
low-flying helicopters"?

The A-10 was not equipped (nor are the pilots trained, AFAIK) for
air-to-air gunnery.

So? Helicopters are closer to air-to-ground strafing than air-to-air,
looking at the velocity and altitude differentials.

How many cannon rounds were fired, out of interest?

Irrelevant - the point I am making is that missiles run out very fast.

A few examples where this has befallen Western pilots would be handy. It
was a problem in Vietnam for the USAF, for example, where they were
plagued by poor reliability of the weapons and by doctrinal guidance to
volley every selected weapon at a target (so a F-4 Phantom effectively
had one Sidewinder shot and one Sparrow shot); the USN used different
doctrine based on single firings and got much better results.


A strong example for your case should be the Falklands, where the SHars
only had two AIM-9Ls apiece, yet it's an interesting commentary on
relative envelopes that there were very few (three IIRC) guns kills, one
a C-130 finished off with gunfire after Sidewinder hits and one Pucara:
though on several occasions the SHars emptied their guns at Argentine
aircraft without results (LCdrs Mike Blissett and 'Fred' Frederiksen,
and Lt. Clive Morell, all had this experience on the 21st May, for
instance: Sharkey Ward recalls firing on and missing a Turbo-Mentor, as
well as three SHars taking five firing passes to down a single Pucara;
Flight Lieutenant Dave Morgan scored two kills with two Sidewinders on
8th June, and shot his guns dry to no effect before his wingman got a
third kill with another Sidewinder...)

Having the guns along when the missiles were exhausted was no guarantee
of being able to get into range, let alone score disabling damage: with
hindsight, trading the gun pods for more fuel and twin-rail Sidewinder
launchers (giving four rather than two shots) would have been much more
effective.

Trouble is, just because _you_ are out of missiles doesn't mean the
enemy will chivalrously cease fi and it's much easier for the enemy
to get you into missile parameters, than for you to lure an enemy into a
guns shot. (Especially when you're having to break off your approaches
to evade enemy AAMs)

The Iranian F-14s made good use of their Phoenix missiles, and
Sparrows, but still ended up in gunfights on occasions and even scored
kills with the gun.

The Iranians also used human wave attacks against prepared defensive
positions, using unarmed schoolboys carrying plastic "keys to heaven" in
the first wave (they were expendable, available, and revealed the
locations of minefields and concealed bunkers for the armed fighters
following). I would be somewhat wary of taking a cue from Iranian
tactics without much more detail of the encounters involved.

Nice theories about how engagements ought to go
tend to break down in real life.

True: like the notion that any gunless fighter is doomed

If you can do all this and compute a gunnery solution, why can you not
fly a much larger guided warhead into the target from greater range than
a cannon will allow?

Because an aircraft has far more space for sensors and computing
capacity than a missile does.

But the gun is still a fixed installation and you have to point it at
where the target will be one time-of-flight after firing: and you have
to fly through the enemy's weapons envelope(s) to do so.

Given the lack of air opposition, why not use Sea Harriers with their
reliable, proven 30mm ADENs for the role? It seems more is being made of
the story than might actually exist.

The Sea Harriers have, what - two or three more years?

They were available, why weren't they used? Did nobody consider the
chances of a 'danger close'?

Then what? Do
guns suddenly stop being useful for such purposes?

They were available then - the story seems to have more agenda behind it
than it would like to admit.


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk