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#41
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"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote...
SNIP The alternative is to spend a LOT of time training for dumb bomb deliveries that you'll probably never do: a waste to resources when you could be training for something more useful. Or not train for dumb bomb deliveries enough, and if you have to do it, not be competent enough which is a risk all it's own. SNIP I understand (never having flown the thing) an F16 with its ring laser gyro INS, laser/radar(?) ranging and continuous computing bomb computer can achieve quite amazing accuracy in dumb dive bombing, circa 10m accuracies. SNIP You're bringing back my A-6 memories. I have a lot of time on iron sights. Don't miss it. All valid points. Substantially less time training to dumb bomb deliveries when it's so easy to get a good hit. Since we have gotten to the time when aircraft systems are reliable enough to count on in the short hairs, you have a valid point. HOWEVER, I believe it is still a "good idea" for an air-to-mud pilot to understand the basic principles behind what the computer is doing for him. With about 1700 hours each in the A-4 and A-6, including an instructor tour in the A-4, I've seen a lot of reasons in the past for a pilot to be able to "feel" when the computer is about to do something bad -- like release a load of Mk 82s a mile short of the target. I got to be really good at dive bombing from the back seat of the TA-4, using the clock as a gunsight (no self-respecting SNA would DARE to NOT hit the pickle when I said "Pickle," even if it did cost him a beer). Later, when flying with newbie B/Ns (and an occasional weak "old guy") in the A-6, I could often sense well ahead of time when things weren't going quite right, and had to make use of the planned manual backup. Then there are the times when rolling in for a CCIP or General Boresight attack, a press on the Attack button decided to cause general hate & discontent in the computer, and a quick slap of the gunsight button to Manual allowed a good hit in spite of it. Then there's the case for "airmanship" and "air sense." Being proficient at manual bombing means a pilot is proficient at detecting and correcting for errors in real time, as well as getting himself to the proper point at the proper time in the first place. Also, while the computer may make up for a suboptimal delivery profile and get the bomb on target, it cannot make up for the loss of Pk when the impact angle is suboptimal in a delivery against a hard target. Some of these considerations are no longer totally relevant when dropping a JDAM from a Hornet, but when going back to CAS with dumb bombs, it's still "a good thing" to be able to support your Grunt buddies even if the computer craps out at the last minute. They may not have the luxury of waiting for the backup... |
#42
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John,
I second your point about needing to understand the basic principles. Later, when flying with newbie B/Ns (and an occasional weak "old guy") in the A-6, I could often sense well ahead of time when things weren't going quite right, and had to make use of the planned manual backup. Then there are the times when rolling in for a CCIP or General Boresight attack, a press on the Attack button decided to cause general hate & discontent in the computer, and a quick slap of the gunsight button to Manual allowed a good hit in spite of it. Brings back many memories of the A-6A and its squirrelly AN/ASQ-61 computer. In this machine that sense of "sense" you mentioned was often a lifesaver. An experienced and coordinated pilot-B/N crew could often tell pretty quickly how well the Q-61 was going to hold together, and (as you said) would have a backup for the all-too-frequent times when things turned to worms. (Most B/Ns of that era - myself included - had tighter degraded system CEPs than full-system ones.) The OB-16 low-level route (through the eastern Oregon canyons) was a good test of the team and machine. How you both felt about the "tightness" of the system determined how low into the canyons you went - if at all. Owl sends. -- Mike Kanze "Owl", B/N A-6A, A-6B (PAT ARM), KA-6D 436 Greenbrier Road Half Moon Bay, California 94019-2259 USA 650-726-7890 "Friends don't let friends take home ugly men." - Women's restroom, Starboard, Dewey Beach, DE, USA "Beauty is only a light switch away." - Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA "John R Weiss" wrote in message news:ZQemb.18835$Fm2.9908@attbi_s04... [snipped] |
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