Doug \"Woody\" and Erin Beal wrote:

On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
SNIP
The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just "nice to
have".


CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because it is
on some Harrier or STOVL F-35 that's on a mesh field getting fueled and
loaded. It is a function of proper planning, sufficient numbers of
aircraft, and a good DASC.

That also assumes that sufficient numbers of tankers and sufficient bed-down
space for them will be available, both of which were in short supply last year.
In 1991, because we had access to Saudi and Turkish bases, the USAF was able to
put 350 tankers on just 5 airbases. Last year, they only had 200 tankers (plus
100 for the airbridge; others were supporting ops in Afghanistan and the Horn of
Africa), and had to scatter them on 15 airbases. Because of the lack of ramp
space, the marines graded a FOB in the northern Kuwaiti desert with a parallel
pair of 6,000 foot dirt runways, where they based many of their KC-130s and
helos. In addition, they offloaded the helos, men and equipment from two
LHA/LHDs, operating each of them with a full AV-8B squadron, just so they
wouldn't take up space on an airfield in Kuwait that was needed by the CTOL
aircraft.

The USAF weren't the only ones with tanker problems. From an article in the
April 14th, 2003 AvLeak, "Lessons Learned", pg. 26, by AvLeak's correspondent at
a Marine airbase in Kuwait:

"Its air campaign has been shaped to a large extent by the fact that the service
has only 24 KC-130 tankers in the region, a relatively small number compared with
the number of strike aircraft it has assembled. What further complicated the
tanker issue is that most KC-130 sorties were dedicated to transporting fuel for
helicopters, as well as tanks and other ground vehicles, to forward areas. It is
a "rare occurence" for a Marine F/A-18 or AV-8B to be refueled in the air, said a
senior Marine Air Group 13 representative, who described the tanker shortage as
'huge'. Problems the USAF has had with its own tankers -- such as poor
availability because of the age of the KC-135s -- have exacerbated the dilemma,
Marine Corps officials asserted. 'Tanking was very limited,' one Royal Air Force
Harrier pilot noted . . . .

"Without refueling, fixed-wing a/c operating from here can only fly over Baghdad
or points north for a few minutes before having to return to base. Pilots from
Harrier squadron VMA-214 noted that without aerial refueling, they had little
time to find targets in the 30 x 30-mi. 'kill boxes' set up around Baghdad.

"The Marines hope to mitigate the problem by establishing forward operating bases
for AV-8Bs and potential F/A-18s. For its helicopter force, the Marines have
already built an extensive series of [FARPs]. So far, the Marines have built
more than 10 FARPs and have even closed down the first few that are no longer
tactically relevant."

They definitely established a Harrier FARP and were sitting ground alert and/or
turning AV-8Bs at an airfield east of the Euphrates that the marines had captured
on their way to Baghdad. I don't know which airfield, because the AvLeak guy
wasn't allowed to identify it during the war, but I suspect it was around al-Kut.

Which is why the V/STOL F-35 is unnecessary.

Logic fault. You are claiming that because it was allegedly not required in
this instance, it will never be required. Kind of hard to support that kind
of argument. Given a scenario like Afghanistan, where the CAS assets had to
transit great distances to and from the required area of operations, the
ability to get STOVL assets into the A/O early in the campaign could be a
big advantage, and reduces the load on the other assets (like those F-15E's
and F-16's transiting out of the Gulf area). If it is unnecessary, why is
the USAF now joining the STOVL bandwagon--merely to make nice with their
USMC brethren?

Precisely... With one important distinction they're more than likely hoping
to take their USMC brethren's place and to keep unit costs down by ensuring
that the STOVL version doesn't get axed.

And you don't think the fact that they were turning A-10s at an FOB in Iraq (a
somewhat worse for wear Tallil airbase, IIRR) to avoid the extra 100-130 mile
one-way trip back to Kuwait, played any part in their deciding that being able to
operate out of austere forward locations (by buying some F-35Bs) might be a good
thing?

I doubt that. Is STVL the way to go for all TACAIR? Of course
not. But eliminating it just reduces your own versatility, and that would
not be a wise move in the current environment of uncertainty (as regards
where/when/how we'll have to fight).

Brooks


What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for that
cost.

And let's not forget how dangerous that helo VTOL technology is, so let's get rid
of the helos while we're at it. Hell, those things have been dropping like
flies.

Guy