Why not use the F-22 to replace the F/A-18 and F-14?

Doug \"Woody\" and Erin Beal wrote:

On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
SNIP
The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just "nice to
have".


CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because it is
on some Harrier or STOVL F-35 that's on a mesh field getting fueled and
loaded. It is a function of proper planning, sufficient numbers of
aircraft, and a good DASC.

That also assumes that sufficient numbers of tankers and sufficient bed-down
space for them will be available, both of which were in short supply last year.
In 1991, because we had access to Saudi and Turkish bases, the USAF was able to
put 350 tankers on just 5 airbases. Last year, they only had 200 tankers (plus
100 for the airbridge; others were supporting ops in Afghanistan and the Horn of
Africa), and had to scatter them on 15 airbases. Because of the lack of ramp
space, the marines graded a FOB in the northern Kuwaiti desert with a parallel
pair of 6,000 foot dirt runways, where they based many of their KC-130s and
helos. In addition, they offloaded the helos, men and equipment from two
LHA/LHDs, operating each of them with a full AV-8B squadron, just so they
wouldn't take up space on an airfield in Kuwait that was needed by the CTOL
aircraft.

The USAF weren't the only ones with tanker problems. From an article in the
April 14th, 2003 AvLeak, "Lessons Learned", pg. 26, by AvLeak's correspondent at
a Marine airbase in Kuwait:

"Its air campaign has been shaped to a large extent by the fact that the service
has only 24 KC-130 tankers in the region, a relatively small number compared with
the number of strike aircraft it has assembled. What further complicated the
tanker issue is that most KC-130 sorties were dedicated to transporting fuel for
helicopters, as well as tanks and other ground vehicles, to forward areas. It is
a "rare occurence" for a Marine F/A-18 or AV-8B to be refueled in the air, said a
senior Marine Air Group 13 representative, who described the tanker shortage as
'huge'. Problems the USAF has had with its own tankers -- such as poor
availability because of the age of the KC-135s -- have exacerbated the dilemma,
Marine Corps officials asserted. 'Tanking was very limited,' one Royal Air Force
Harrier pilot noted . . . .

"Without refueling, fixed-wing a/c operating from here can only fly over Baghdad
or points north for a few minutes before having to return to base. Pilots from
Harrier squadron VMA-214 noted that without aerial refueling, they had little
time to find targets in the 30 x 30-mi. 'kill boxes' set up around Baghdad.

"The Marines hope to mitigate the problem by establishing forward operating bases
for AV-8Bs and potential F/A-18s. For its helicopter force, the Marines have
already built an extensive series of [FARPs]. So far, the Marines have built
more than 10 FARPs and have even closed down the first few that are no longer
tactically relevant."

They definitely established a Harrier FARP and were sitting ground alert and/or
turning AV-8Bs at an airfield east of the Euphrates that the marines had captured
on their way to Baghdad. I don't know which airfield, because the AvLeak guy
wasn't allowed to identify it during the war, but I suspect it was around al-Kut.

Which is why the V/STOL F-35 is unnecessary.

Logic fault. You are claiming that because it was allegedly not required in
this instance, it will never be required. Kind of hard to support that kind
of argument. Given a scenario like Afghanistan, where the CAS assets had to
transit great distances to and from the required area of operations, the
ability to get STOVL assets into the A/O early in the campaign could be a
big advantage, and reduces the load on the other assets (like those F-15E's
and F-16's transiting out of the Gulf area). If it is unnecessary, why is
the USAF now joining the STOVL bandwagon--merely to make nice with their
USMC brethren?

Precisely... With one important distinction they're more than likely hoping
to take their USMC brethren's place and to keep unit costs down by ensuring
that the STOVL version doesn't get axed.

And you don't think the fact that they were turning A-10s at an FOB in Iraq (a
somewhat worse for wear Tallil airbase, IIRR) to avoid the extra 100-130 mile
one-way trip back to Kuwait, played any part in their deciding that being able to
operate out of austere forward locations (by buying some F-35Bs) might be a good
thing?

I doubt that. Is STVL the way to go for all TACAIR? Of course
not. But eliminating it just reduces your own versatility, and that would
not be a wise move in the current environment of uncertainty (as regards
where/when/how we'll have to fight).

Brooks


What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for that
cost.

And let's not forget how dangerous that helo VTOL technology is, so let's get rid
of the helos while we're at it. Hell, those things have been dropping like
flies.

Guy

On 2/28/04 11:06 PM, in article
, "Guy Alcala"
wrote:

Doug \"Woody\" and Erin Beal wrote:

On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
SNIP
The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just "nice to
have".


CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because it is
on some Harrier or STOVL F-35 that's on a mesh field getting fueled and
loaded. It is a function of proper planning, sufficient numbers of
aircraft, and a good DASC.

That also assumes that sufficient numbers of tankers and sufficient bed-down
SNIPPAGE... Lots of tanker stats
on their way to Baghdad. I don't know which airfield, because the AvLeak guy
wasn't allowed to identify it during the war, but I suspect it was around
al-Kut.

There's a shortage of USAF tankers in EVERY conflict--especially since the
demise of the A-6 and proliferation of the Hornet. Citing AV-8B ops in OIF
is only slightly relevant. Of course, if you have STOVL capability, use it
(OIF)--providing the threat will permit it. You've already sunk the blood
sweat and tears into it. My point is, the excessive risk in peace time and
the reduction in payload/range isn't worth the small war time advantage, and
the outcome of OIF would not have changed significantly had the Harriers not
been around to help out.

Yes, it's romantic to operate from austere bases in country... Leap-frogging
your way to Bagdad. No, it's not worth the risk/hassle.

SNIP
And you don't think the fact that they were turning A-10s at an FOB in Iraq (a
somewhat worse for wear Tallil airbase, IIRR) to avoid the extra 100-130 mile
one-way trip back to Kuwait, played any part in their deciding that being able
to operate out of austere forward locations (by buying some F-35Bs) might be a
good thing?

Given the timeline, I don¹t think that particular example is why there's a
STOVL F-35 being built. Although I'm fairly certain this is why the USAF is
jumping on the STOVL bandwagon. Frankly, I think the A-10 (or some other
low/slow/straight-wing design) is a better platform for what we're talking
about.

SNIP
What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for that
cost.

And let's not forget how dangerous that helo VTOL technology is, so let's get
rid of the helos while we're at it. Hell, those things have been dropping
like flies.

Guy

Guy, that's just ridiculous. Helos actually have a bona fide mission--and
can auto-rotate. Why would you want to get rid of them?

--Woody

Given the timeline, I don¹t think that particular example is why there's a
STOVL F-35 being built. Although I'm fairly certain this is why the USAF
is
jumping on the STOVL bandwagon. Frankly, I think the A-10 (or some other
low/slow/straight-wing design) is a better platform for what we're talking
about.

Couldn't agree more. The STOVL F-35 is a fact of life. The RN needs them to
mantain a fixed wing naval aviation component, the same will apply, in a far
smaller scale, to Spain, Italy and Thailand. Japan is almost certain to buy
them for their "open deck transports" or whatever PC term they are now using
for their carriers in construction. The RAF *thinks* they need'em, and it is
hard to argue with them.

I may understand why the Marines want some fixed wing capability on their
assault ships, although the plan to replace their Hornets with the STOVL
rather than the CTOL F-35 is looking dumber by the minute.

Now the USAF wanting some STOVLs... I can only reason that some political
generals are bowing to the pressure of some politicos that want a larger
numbers of the jumpers to decrease the unit price the UK and others will
have to cough. A CAS F-35? All that costly stealth platform carrying a bunch
of stuff under the wings and looking like the Statue of Liberty on the radar
on account of that, and with a questionable ability to take punishment from
bellow and still be useful on its original role?

Build some new A-10s with state of the art avionics and new engines. I know
that's not going to happen, but indeed it would make perfect fighting sense.
I still look in wonder at the costly "stealth" features incorporated into
the Rhino, and then you load the poor thing over with a bunch of
hanging-ons, canted outwards, that make it look like a Xmas tree on any
half-decent scope...
_____________
José Herculano

José Herculano wrote:
Couldn't agree more. The STOVL F-35 is a fact of life. The RN needs them to
mantain a fixed wing naval aviation component, the same will apply, in a far
smaller scale, to Spain, Italy and Thailand. Japan is almost certain to buy
them for their "open deck transports" or whatever PC term they are now using
for their carriers in construction. The RAF *thinks* they need'em, and it is
hard to argue with them.

http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/asi...237523,00.html
'I Love Japan, I Love Peace. The Maritime Self-Defence Force,' says a
voice-over at the end.

They just need a class of Lending Humanitarian Assistance ships
operating Justice Support Friendship aircraft.

-HJC

"José Herculano" wrote:

snip

I may understand why the Marines want some fixed wing capability on their
assault ships, although the plan to replace their Hornets with the STOVL
rather than the CTOL F-35 is looking dumber by the minute.

Why? The F-35s have considerably better range than their F-18A/Cs, and
apparently equal or better range than the F-18E/Fs.

Now the USAF wanting some STOVLs... I can only reason that some political
generals are bowing to the pressure of some politicos that want a larger
numbers of the jumpers to decrease the unit price the UK and others will
have to cough. A CAS F-35? All that costly stealth platform carrying a bunch
of stuff under the wings and looking like the Statue of Liberty on the radar
on account of that, and with a questionable ability to take punishment from
bellow and still be useful on its original role?

snip

As was mentioned in the Comanche decision briefing, when doing CAS (at least
recently), RCS has been irrelevant. IR, visual and aural signatures are far
more important, along with sensors and weapons. The F-35 has all of those, PLUS
radar stealth for those first night of the war missions. And for BAI, INT, OCA,
DCA, etc.

Guy

Woody says, "...the outcome of OIF would not have changed significantly had
the Harriers not
been around to help out..."

There's a stronger case for the Harriers in OIF than there is for a CV Navy
that arrives in the stack with no time-on-station and an understanding of
air support that consists of "gimme a 6-digit grid."

Woody further states "Guy, that's just ridiculous. Helos actually have a
bona fide mission--and
can auto-rotate."

Who's being ridiculous? I guess it doesn't count as bona fide mission
unless it's launched from a CV eh? .



"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...
On 2/28/04 11:06 PM, in article
, "Guy Alcala"
wrote:

Doug \"Woody\" and Erin Beal wrote:

On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article ,
"Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in
message
SNIP
The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an
asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just
"nice to
have".


CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because
it is
on some Harrier or STOVL F-35 that's on a mesh field getting fueled and
loaded. It is a function of proper planning, sufficient numbers of
aircraft, and a good DASC.

That also assumes that sufficient numbers of tankers and sufficient
bed-down
SNIPPAGE... Lots of tanker stats
on their way to Baghdad. I don't know which airfield, because the
AvLeak guy
wasn't allowed to identify it during the war, but I suspect it was
around
al-Kut.

There's a shortage of USAF tankers in EVERY conflict--especially since the
demise of the A-6 and proliferation of the Hornet. Citing AV-8B ops in
OIF
is only slightly relevant. Of course, if you have STOVL capability, use
it
(OIF)--providing the threat will permit it. You've already sunk the blood
sweat and tears into it. My point is, the excessive risk in peace time
and
the reduction in payload/range isn't worth the small war time advantage,
and
the outcome of OIF would not have changed significantly had the Harriers
not
been around to help out.

Yes, it's romantic to operate from austere bases in country...
Leap-frogging
your way to Bagdad. No, it's not worth the risk/hassle.

SNIP
And you don't think the fact that they were turning A-10s at an FOB in
Iraq (a
somewhat worse for wear Tallil airbase, IIRR) to avoid the extra 100-130
mile
one-way trip back to Kuwait, played any part in their deciding that
being able
to operate out of austere forward locations (by buying some F-35Bs)
might be a
good thing?

Given the timeline, I don¹t think that particular example is why there's a
STOVL F-35 being built. Although I'm fairly certain this is why the USAF
is
jumping on the STOVL bandwagon. Frankly, I think the A-10 (or some other
low/slow/straight-wing design) is a better platform for what we're talking
about.

SNIP
What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills
too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for
that
cost.

And let's not forget how dangerous that helo VTOL technology is, so
let's get
rid of the helos while we're at it. Hell, those things have been
dropping
like flies.

Guy

Guy, that's just ridiculous. Helos actually have a bona fide mission--and
can auto-rotate. Why would you want to get rid of them?

--Woody

Doug \"Woody\" and Erin Beal wrote:

On 2/28/04 11:06 PM, in article
, "Guy Alcala"
wrote:

Doug \"Woody\" and Erin Beal wrote:

On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article , "Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
SNIP
The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just "nice to
have".


CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because it is
on some Harrier or STOVL F-35 that's on a mesh field getting fueled and
loaded. It is a function of proper planning, sufficient numbers of
aircraft, and a good DASC.

That also assumes that sufficient numbers of tankers and sufficient bed-down
SNIPPAGE... Lots of tanker stats
on their way to Baghdad. I don't know which airfield, because the AvLeak guy
wasn't allowed to identify it during the war, but I suspect it was around
al-Kut.

There's a shortage of USAF tankers in EVERY conflict--especially since the
demise of the A-6 and proliferation of the Hornet. Citing AV-8B ops in OIF
is only slightly relevant. Of course, if you have STOVL capability, use it
(OIF)--providing the threat will permit it. You've already sunk the blood
sweat and tears into it. My point is, the excessive risk in peace time and
the reduction in payload/range isn't worth the small war time advantage, and
the outcome of OIF would not have changed significantly had the Harriers not
been around to help out.

Yes, it's romantic to operate from austere bases in country... Leap-frogging
your way to Bagdad. No, it's not worth the risk/hassle.

Tell it to the attack helo guys, who leap-frogged their way to Baghdad. Is there
some reason why FARPS for helos to avoid the round trip to Kuwait make sense, but
doesn't for STOVL fixed-wing a/c? The benefits are the same, a mix of more time on
station/shorter cycle time/fewer hours on the airframe/less fuel wasted in transit.

SNIP
And you don't think the fact that they were turning A-10s at an FOB in Iraq (a
somewhat worse for wear Tallil airbase, IIRR) to avoid the extra 100-130 mile
one-way trip back to Kuwait, played any part in their deciding that being able
to operate out of austere forward locations (by buying some F-35Bs) might be a
good thing?

Given the timeline, I don¹t think that particular example is why there's a
STOVL F-35 being built.

That and the fact that (AFAIK) the A-10s have been the only (USAF) attack a/c based
in Afghanistan since OEF. Along with the Harriers.

Although I'm fairly certain this is why the USAF is
jumping on the STOVL bandwagon. Frankly, I think the A-10 (or some other
low/slow/straight-wing design) is a better platform for what we're talking
about.

If you've got at least 3-4,000 feet of usable runway, it might be. Anything less
and it's just as useless as all the other conventional fixed-wing strikers.



SNIP
What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for that
cost.

And let's not forget how dangerous that helo VTOL technology is, so let's get
rid of the helos while we're at it. Hell, those things have been dropping
like flies.

Guy

Guy, that's just ridiculous. Helos actually have a bona fide mission--and
can auto-rotate. Why would you want to get rid of them?

Because they're more dangerous than pure fixed-wing a/c, of course. The same
justification you use for saying that STOVL isn't worthwhile. As to auto-rotation
ability, that doesn't seem to have kept the helo crew/pax casualty count down very
much in the current war. Damaging/destroying the tail rotor, its controls or the
drive shaft makes auto-rotations rather difficult.

Guy

Navy opposition to STOVL is about SHIPS not aircraft. They oppose the
concept because they think it threatens 95,000 ton carriers. It is clever
sophistry to argue against STOVL JSF on the basis of the performance of the
Harrier and, Woody, you know that shipmate. The Harrier uses an entirely
different lift/propulsion system, the technology of which is fundamentally
unchanged from the introduction of the AV-8A in the early 70s. While later
models (Night and Radar/Night) added up-to-date avionics and defensive
systems, the lift/propulsion system is little changed. As a consequnce, its
accident rate is similar to the jets of the era in which it was designed --
F-4, F-14 etc. The design suffers from maintainability issues similar to
aircraft of its design era also. $$ for materiel issues have long been a
problem, but as materiel problems have been fixed (like the #3 bearing),
accident numbers have gone down. STOVL JSF is an entirely different animal.
It is simple to fly -- even fighter guys can do it on the first try (and you
don't take it to "near stall" to transition to the landing configuration
anymore than you do a conventional aircraft). For STOVL JSF to transition
to the SDD phase, the technology issues had to be assessed by the government
as "low risk." It is predicted to meet the performance KPPs even at its
current weight.

On the warfighting side, if fighting an air war was simply a matter of
stacking jets somewhere, we could cover the entire battlespace with B-1s or
B-2s. (A trivia question -- how many CV sorties does it take to cover the
same number of DMPIs that ONE B-1 with a full load of SDBs can cover?) And
if tanking isn't an "issue," what's up with all the bragging about what a
great tanking capability the Navy's brand new STRIKE aircraft provides...?

45% of Marine CAS sorties during OIF were flown by Harriers -- that's hardly
a trivial number, particularly if you're on the ground getting shot at, or
facing the prospect of having to deal with massed armor and indirect fires.
IIRC, about 1500 strike sorties were flown off L-class ships, principally
Bataan and BHR which each operated 20-25 jets. A couple hundred were flown
from a "recovered" airfield within 10 minutes of Baghdad. An additional
500+ sorties by the one land based squadron in Kuwait. At one point last
year, 100-ish of the roughly 110 fleet AV-8s were deployed in real-world
events somewhere in the world -- that total included a Det of land-based
AV-8s supporting the Army and SOF bubbas in Afghanistan for a year.

"Too little benefit..."?? I think not.

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Doug \"Woody\" and Erin Beal wrote:

On 2/28/04 1:54 PM, in article ,
"Kevin
Brooks" wrote:


"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in
message
SNIP
The groundpounder who wants responsive CAS available *immediately*
throughout an operation would differ with you as to whether having an
asset
capable of hitting a FARP and returning quickly to station is just
"nice to
have".


CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because
it is
on some Harrier or STOVL F-35 that's on a mesh field getting fueled and
loaded. It is a function of proper planning, sufficient numbers of
aircraft, and a good DASC.

That also assumes that sufficient numbers of tankers and sufficient
bed-down
space for them will be available, both of which were in short supply last
year.
In 1991, because we had access to Saudi and Turkish bases, the USAF was
able to
put 350 tankers on just 5 airbases. Last year, they only had 200 tankers
(plus
100 for the airbridge; others were supporting ops in Afghanistan and the
Horn of
Africa), and had to scatter them on 15 airbases. Because of the lack of
ramp
space, the marines graded a FOB in the northern Kuwaiti desert with a
parallel
pair of 6,000 foot dirt runways, where they based many of their KC-130s
and
helos. In addition, they offloaded the helos, men and equipment from two
LHA/LHDs, operating each of them with a full AV-8B squadron, just so they
wouldn't take up space on an airfield in Kuwait that was needed by the
CTOL
aircraft.

The USAF weren't the only ones with tanker problems. From an article in
the
April 14th, 2003 AvLeak, "Lessons Learned", pg. 26, by AvLeak's
correspondent at
a Marine airbase in Kuwait:

"Its air campaign has been shaped to a large extent by the fact that the
service
has only 24 KC-130 tankers in the region, a relatively small number
compared with
the number of strike aircraft it has assembled. What further complicated
the
tanker issue is that most KC-130 sorties were dedicated to transporting
fuel for
helicopters, as well as tanks and other ground vehicles, to forward areas.
It is
a "rare occurence" for a Marine F/A-18 or AV-8B to be refueled in the air,
said a
senior Marine Air Group 13 representative, who described the tanker
shortage as
'huge'. Problems the USAF has had with its own tankers -- such as poor
availability because of the age of the KC-135s -- have exacerbated the
dilemma,
Marine Corps officials asserted. 'Tanking was very limited,' one Royal
Air Force
Harrier pilot noted . . . .

"Without refueling, fixed-wing a/c operating from here can only fly over
Baghdad
or points north for a few minutes before having to return to base. Pilots
from
Harrier squadron VMA-214 noted that without aerial refueling, they had
little
time to find targets in the 30 x 30-mi. 'kill boxes' set up around
Baghdad.

"The Marines hope to mitigate the problem by establishing forward
operating bases
for AV-8Bs and potential F/A-18s. For its helicopter force, the Marines
have
already built an extensive series of [FARPs]. So far, the Marines have
built
more than 10 FARPs and have even closed down the first few that are no
longer
tactically relevant."

They definitely established a Harrier FARP and were sitting ground alert
and/or
turning AV-8Bs at an airfield east of the Euphrates that the marines had
captured
on their way to Baghdad. I don't know which airfield, because the AvLeak
guy
wasn't allowed to identify it during the war, but I suspect it was around
al-Kut.

Which is why the V/STOL F-35 is unnecessary.

Logic fault. You are claiming that because it was allegedly not
required in
this instance, it will never be required. Kind of hard to support that
kind
of argument. Given a scenario like Afghanistan, where the CAS assets
had to
transit great distances to and from the required area of operations,
the
ability to get STOVL assets into the A/O early in the campaign could
be a
big advantage, and reduces the load on the other assets (like those
F-15E's
and F-16's transiting out of the Gulf area). If it is unnecessary, why
is
the USAF now joining the STOVL bandwagon--merely to make nice with
their
USMC brethren?

Precisely... With one important distinction they're more than likely
hoping
to take their USMC brethren's place and to keep unit costs down by
ensuring
that the STOVL version doesn't get axed.

And you don't think the fact that they were turning A-10s at an FOB in
Iraq (a
somewhat worse for wear Tallil airbase, IIRR) to avoid the extra 100-130
mile
one-way trip back to Kuwait, played any part in their deciding that being
able to
operate out of austere forward locations (by buying some F-35Bs) might be
a good
thing?

I doubt that. Is STVL the way to go for all TACAIR? Of course
not. But eliminating it just reduces your own versatility, and that
would
not be a wise move in the current environment of uncertainty (as
regards
where/when/how we'll have to fight).

Brooks


What I'm claiming is that STOVL is still risky technology that kills too
many pilots in peace time and offers too little benefit in war time for
that
cost.

And let's not forget how dangerous that helo VTOL technology is, so let's
get rid
of the helos while we're at it. Hell, those things have been dropping
like
flies.

Guy

Frijoles wrote:

snip

On the warfighting side, if fighting an air war was simply a matter of
stacking jets somewhere, we could cover the entire battlespace with B-1s or
B-2s. (A trivia question -- how many CV sorties does it take to cover the
same number of DMPIs that ONE B-1 with a full load of SDBs can cover?) And
if tanking isn't an "issue," what's up with all the bragging about what a
great tanking capability the Navy's brand new STRIKE aircraft provides...?

Especially since they had to send four more F-18Es to the theater during the
war, to boost the navy's own tanker assets (and of course, taking away airbridge
tanker assets from other jobs, to get them there).

45% of Marine CAS sorties during OIF were flown by Harriers -- that's hardly
a trivial number, particularly if you're on the ground getting shot at, or
facing the prospect of having to deal with massed armor and indirect fires.
IIRC, about 1500 strike sorties were flown off L-class ships, principally
Bataan and BHR which each operated 20-25 jets. A couple hundred were flown
from a "recovered" airfield within 10 minutes of Baghdad.

snip

Would you happen to know which airfield? I've found one source that says it was
"60nm south" of Baghdad, but no other details. Looking at a map,

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middl...print_2003.jpg

Shayka Mazhar and Al Iskandariyah New appear to be too close to the city, Salman
Pak East is too close and too far east (although the Marines did go by there
IIRR). An Najaf New is due south of Baghdad and about the right distance, but
AFAIK the marines weren't near there in any strength, having crossed the
Euphrates at Nasiriya before heading up between the rivers towards Baghdad. The
Shaykh Hantush Highway Strip seems to be the closest match for distance and
direction, but the marines also went through al Kut, which puts An Numaniyah (I
know they took that) or Al Jarrah in the picture (although they're more SE than
S), and possibly the fields south and/or east of Al Kut, altough they're a bit
far and definitely southeast.

Guy

Which airfield? Sorry, I don't have the reference here at home. Its the
same place where the Army POWs were transferred to the KC-130 on TV.

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
.. .
Frijoles wrote:

snip

On the warfighting side, if fighting an air war was simply a matter of
stacking jets somewhere, we could cover the entire battlespace with B-1s
or
B-2s. (A trivia question -- how many CV sorties does it take to cover
the
same number of DMPIs that ONE B-1 with a full load of SDBs can cover?)
And
if tanking isn't an "issue," what's up with all the bragging about what
a
great tanking capability the Navy's brand new STRIKE aircraft
provides...?

Especially since they had to send four more F-18Es to the theater during
the
war, to boost the navy's own tanker assets (and of course, taking away
airbridge
tanker assets from other jobs, to get them there).

45% of Marine CAS sorties during OIF were flown by Harriers -- that's
hardly
a trivial number, particularly if you're on the ground getting shot at,
or
facing the prospect of having to deal with massed armor and indirect
fires.
IIRC, about 1500 strike sorties were flown off L-class ships,
principally
Bataan and BHR which each operated 20-25 jets. A couple hundred were
flown
from a "recovered" airfield within 10 minutes of Baghdad.

snip

Would you happen to know which airfield? I've found one source that says
it was
"60nm south" of Baghdad, but no other details. Looking at a map,


http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middl...print_2003.jpg

Shayka Mazhar and Al Iskandariyah New appear to be too close to the city,
Salman
Pak East is too close and too far east (although the Marines did go by
there
IIRR). An Najaf New is due south of Baghdad and about the right distance,
but
AFAIK the marines weren't near there in any strength, having crossed the
Euphrates at Nasiriya before heading up between the rivers towards
Baghdad. The
Shaykh Hantush Highway Strip seems to be the closest match for distance
and
direction, but the marines also went through al Kut, which puts An
Numaniyah (I
know they took that) or Al Jarrah in the picture (although they're more SE
than
S), and possibly the fields south and/or east of Al Kut, altough they're a
bit
far and definitely southeast.

Guy