Dan Luke wrote:

It would surprise me to learn that the Soviets were terrified of a
weapon based on the thoroughly discredited idea that heavily armed,
unescorted strategic bombers could fight their way deep into enemy
territory with acceptable losses.

You mean like the losses the B-29s took bombing Japan? Of course, the losses to
the B-17s against Germany were worse. Lets take the worst case there. We lost
something over 60% of the planes that flew the Schweinfurt "Black Thursday" raid
and over half the planes made it to the target. At one time, we could have
launched over 30 B-36s at any given moment. So only 10 of them reach their
targets. Stalin isn't going to be upset at the prospect of losing 10 major
production centers? He would certainly be worried about the fact that the odds
were good that he'd be in one of them.

The B-36 always struck me as a flying
porkbarrel project propelled by Curtis LeMay's ego.

The B-36 project was started prior to America's entry into WWII. Roosevelt was
afraid that Britain would be lost and that the U.S. would have to enter the war
against Germany without being able to base bombers in the British Isles. It was
planned that we would use it for a conventional bombing campaign against Germany
operating from bases in the U.S. Postwar development was a case basically of the
only game in town. It was the only plane capable of carrying nuclear weapons into
the USSR that could possibly reach production in a few years. It was a stopgap
measure, but it worked until we could get something better in place.

George Patterson
Great discoveries are not announced with "Eureka!". What's usually said is
"Hummmmm... That's interesting...."