On Fri, 30 Dec 2005 11:35:36 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
::

Recently, Larry Dighera posted:

On Thu, 29 Dec 2005 18:10:26 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
: :

Why couldn't receipts be counted by hand? As a method of
verification, the task isn't all that large. Still, if the receipts
followed a standard layout, they could be counted by machine quite
easily.

What method would you employ to assure that the receipts are not
forgeries?

The same method that assures that paper ballots aren't forgeries. If you
go back a few messages, I suggested that *two* receipts would be printed &
verified by the voter; one would be given to the polling official, just as
paper ballots are handled now. Then, at least one machine selected at
random from each precinct would have its electronic tally audited against
the receipt. In the case of a discrepancy, a 100% audit would be performed
at that precinct.

Neil


That's a reasoned solution. Why do you feel it necessary to *add* a
receipt to be given to the voter? What would be the advantage of
electronic voting over the current *one* ballot system?

Personally, I think it's going to be nearly impossible to insure an
accurate electronic vote tally much as it was in the
paper-vote/voting-machine era. But here's an idea:

Provide a real-time running total of each ballot choice on the
voter's display screen, so that s/he can confirm their vote
incremented accurately. The real-time vote tally could be
continuously monitored by representatives of each party/candidate?
If a dispute should arise, the sealed camera that monitored the
running tally could be consulted. Under no circumstances should
anyone other than the voter be able to modify the running tally;
their must be no way for administrator intervention to modify the
running tally.

Everything occurs in real-time. The voter confirms his own vote.
There is no necessity to print anything. Of course, there's the issue
of how to Handel the situation when/if the voter sees his vote affect
the tally erroneously.