Angry

On Fri, 30 Dec 2005 11:35:36 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
::

Recently, Larry Dighera posted:

On Thu, 29 Dec 2005 18:10:26 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
: :

Why couldn't receipts be counted by hand? As a method of
verification, the task isn't all that large. Still, if the receipts
followed a standard layout, they could be counted by machine quite
easily.

What method would you employ to assure that the receipts are not
forgeries?

The same method that assures that paper ballots aren't forgeries. If you
go back a few messages, I suggested that *two* receipts would be printed &
verified by the voter; one would be given to the polling official, just as
paper ballots are handled now. Then, at least one machine selected at
random from each precinct would have its electronic tally audited against
the receipt. In the case of a discrepancy, a 100% audit would be performed
at that precinct.

Neil


That's a reasoned solution. Why do you feel it necessary to *add* a
receipt to be given to the voter? What would be the advantage of
electronic voting over the current *one* ballot system?

Personally, I think it's going to be nearly impossible to insure an
accurate electronic vote tally much as it was in the
paper-vote/voting-machine era. But here's an idea:

Provide a real-time running total of each ballot choice on the
voter's display screen, so that s/he can confirm their vote
incremented accurately. The real-time vote tally could be
continuously monitored by representatives of each party/candidate?
If a dispute should arise, the sealed camera that monitored the
running tally could be consulted. Under no circumstances should
anyone other than the voter be able to modify the running tally;
their must be no way for administrator intervention to modify the
running tally.

Everything occurs in real-time. The voter confirms his own vote.
There is no necessity to print anything. Of course, there's the issue
of how to Handel the situation when/if the voter sees his vote affect
the tally erroneously.

Provide a real-time running total of each ballot choice on the
voter's display screen, so that s/he can confirm their vote
incremented accurately.

And what detects whether =this= is rigged or not? Also, anybody else
watching the tally can figure out how you voted.

Jose
--
You can choose whom to befriend, but you cannot choose whom to love.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

On Fri, 30 Dec 2005 17:09:00 GMT, Jose
wrote in ::

Provide a real-time running total of each ballot choice on the
voter's display screen, so that s/he can confirm their vote
incremented accurately.

And what detects whether =this= is rigged or not?

I doubt there is any foolproof way to assure an accurate tally, but in
my scenario those monitoring the real-time tally would be charged with
assuring the validity.

Also, anybody else watching the tally can figure out how you voted.

If all that was visible were the various vote tallies and numerous
voters were casting their ballots simultaneously, how would they know
for sure?

Granted, there are some issues with my scenario.

If all that was visible were the various vote tallies and numerous
voters were casting their ballots simultaneously, how would they know
for sure?

In the smaller districts and towns, somebody observant enough could
probably figure out how each person voted. There are many cases where
votes are non-simultaneous. I've done something similar myself in a
different environment based simply on precise statistics after the fact;
doing it live would be trivial.

Jose
--
You can choose whom to befriend, but you cannot choose whom to love.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...
[...]
If all that was visible were the various vote tallies and numerous
voters were casting their ballots simultaneously, how would they know
for sure?

Um...maybe I'm missing something.

If votes are cast simultaneously (or nearly so), how does a voter know that
the change in the tally represents his vote? Or that the change in the
tally of a different candidate does NOT represent his vote?

Non-simultaneous voting has the entirely different problem already pointed
out.

There is of course the issue regarding vote tallys being known to voters
prior to the closing of the polls, a big no-no in practically every US
election I'm aware of.

Granted, there are some issues with my scenario.

Indeed.

Pete

On Fri, 30 Dec 2005 12:04:46 -0800, "Peter Duniho"
wrote in
::

If votes are cast simultaneously (or nearly so), how does a voter know that
the change in the tally represents his vote?

That's also a problem. Oh well...

Recently, Larry Dighera posted:

On Fri, 30 Dec 2005 11:35:36 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
::

What method would you employ to assure that the receipts are not
forgeries?

The same method that assures that paper ballots aren't forgeries. If
you go back a few messages, I suggested that *two* receipts would be
printed & verified by the voter; one would be given to the polling
official, just as paper ballots are handled now. Then, at least one
machine selected at random from each precinct would have its
electronic tally audited against the receipt. In the case of a
discrepancy, a 100% audit would be performed at that precinct.


That's a reasoned solution. Why do you feel it necessary to *add* a
receipt to be given to the voter? What would be the advantage of
electronic voting over the current *one* ballot system?

After thinking about it, there probably is no advantage to two printed
receipts. I know I wouldn't care to have one.

Personally, I think it's going to be nearly impossible to insure an
accurate electronic vote tally much as it was in the
paper-vote/voting-machine era. But here's an idea:

All voting methods have "issues", but I was only trying to suggest a
solution to a system that introduces a lot of new issues, and could be
very easily "rigged". The fact is, I'm not being paid to figure this out,
but many people are. What are *their* solutions to this problem?

Provide a real-time running total of each ballot choice on the
voter's display screen, so that s/he can confirm their vote
incremented accurately. The real-time vote tally could be
continuously monitored by representatives of each party/candidate?
If a dispute should arise, the sealed camera that monitored the
running tally could be consulted. Under no circumstances should
anyone other than the voter be able to modify the running tally;
their must be no way for administrator intervention to modify the
running tally.

I don't see much value in knowing how my vote tallied with previous votes,
and as others pointed out, that tally is likely to be changing so rapidly
it would be unreadable anyway.

Everything occurs in real-time. The voter confirms his own vote.
There is no necessity to print anything.

The idea of the printed receipt is to verify the accuracy of the machine.
If all you have is an on-screen display, there is no way to insure that
the data passed to the board of elections is a valid representation of the
actual votes, which I find to be an intolerable scenario. Why others
aren't bothered by it does puzzle me.

Neil

I've been voting since 1968 and have voted in every
election, from school board to Presidential. I have never
known positively that any of my ballots or votes was
actually counted. The candidates I voted for won a lot of
the time, but not always.

How does anybody know their vote was ever counted
accurately, whether a paper ballot with an X in the box, a
punch card or some electrical machine...all can be rigged,
spoiled, stuffed or otherwise invalidated.

Unless we give up the secret ballot, voter fraud will always
be possible and the possible happens.

Being a poll worker, like jury duty, is an essential public
service.



--
The people think the Constitution protects their rights;
But government sees it as an obstacle to be overcome.
some support
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/secondamendment2.htm
See http://www.fija.org/ more about your rights and duties.


"Neil Gould" wrote in message
. com...
| Recently, Larry Dighera posted:
|
| On Fri, 30 Dec 2005 11:35:36 GMT, "Neil Gould"
| wrote in
| ::
|
| What method would you employ to assure that the
receipts are not
| forgeries?
|
| The same method that assures that paper ballots aren't
forgeries. If
| you go back a few messages, I suggested that *two*
receipts would be
| printed & verified by the voter; one would be given to
the polling
| official, just as paper ballots are handled now. Then,
at least one
| machine selected at random from each precinct would
have its
| electronic tally audited against the receipt. In the
case of a
| discrepancy, a 100% audit would be performed at that
precinct.
|
|
| That's a reasoned solution. Why do you feel it
necessary to *add* a
| receipt to be given to the voter? What would be the
advantage of
| electronic voting over the current *one* ballot system?
|
| After thinking about it, there probably is no advantage to
two printed
| receipts. I know I wouldn't care to have one.
|
| Personally, I think it's going to be nearly impossible
to insure an
| accurate electronic vote tally much as it was in the
| paper-vote/voting-machine era. But here's an idea:
|
| All voting methods have "issues", but I was only trying to
suggest a
| solution to a system that introduces a lot of new issues,
and could be
| very easily "rigged". The fact is, I'm not being paid to
figure this out,
| but many people are. What are *their* solutions to this
problem?
|
| Provide a real-time running total of each ballot
choice on the
| voter's display screen, so that s/he can confirm
their vote
| incremented accurately. The real-time vote tally
could be
| continuously monitored by representatives of each
party/candidate?
| If a dispute should arise, the sealed camera that
monitored the
| running tally could be consulted. Under no
circumstances should
| anyone other than the voter be able to modify the
running tally;
| their must be no way for administrator intervention
to modify the
| running tally.
|
| I don't see much value in knowing how my vote tallied with
previous votes,
| and as others pointed out, that tally is likely to be
changing so rapidly
| it would be unreadable anyway.
|
| Everything occurs in real-time. The voter confirms his
own vote.
| There is no necessity to print anything.
|
| The idea of the printed receipt is to verify the accuracy
of the machine.
| If all you have is an on-screen display, there is no way
to insure that
| the data passed to the board of elections is a valid
representation of the
| actual votes, which I find to be an intolerable scenario.
Why others
| aren't bothered by it does puzzle me.
|
| Neil
|
|

The fact is, I'm not being paid to figure this out,
but many people are. What are *their* solutions to this problem?

That depends on who's paying them.

Jose
--
You can choose whom to befriend, but you cannot choose whom to love.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...
On Fri, 30 Dec 2005 11:35:36 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
::

Recently, Larry Dighera posted:

On Thu, 29 Dec 2005 18:10:26 GMT, "Neil Gould"
wrote in
: :

Why couldn't receipts be counted by hand? As a method of
verification, the task isn't all that large. Still, if the receipts
followed a standard layout, they could be counted by machine quite
easily.

What method would you employ to assure that the receipts are not
forgeries?

The same method that assures that paper ballots aren't forgeries. If you
go back a few messages, I suggested that *two* receipts would be printed &
verified by the voter; one would be given to the polling official, just as
paper ballots are handled now. Then, at least one machine selected at
random from each precinct would have its electronic tally audited against
the receipt. In the case of a discrepancy, a 100% audit would be performed
at that precinct.

Neil


That's a reasoned solution. Why do you feel it necessary to *add* a
receipt to be given to the voter? What would be the advantage of
electronic voting over the current *one* ballot system?

Personally, I think it's going to be nearly impossible to insure an
accurate electronic vote tally much as it was in the
paper-vote/voting-machine era. But here's an idea:

Provide a real-time running total of each ballot choice on the
voter's display screen, so that s/he can confirm their vote
incremented accurately. The real-time vote tally could be
continuously monitored by representatives of each party/candidate?
If a dispute should arise, the sealed camera that monitored the
running tally could be consulted. Under no circumstances should
anyone other than the voter be able to modify the running tally;
their must be no way for administrator intervention to modify the
running tally.

Everything occurs in real-time. The voter confirms his own vote.
There is no necessity to print anything. Of course, there's the issue
of how to Handel the situation when/if the voter sees his vote affect
the tally erroneously.

This is crazy, as the value of each vote changes over the time of the poll.
Why should a later voter be able to affect the poll more than an earlier
voter just because the know the running tally.

Have a simple paper ballot and count all the votes at the end of polling.