Larry Dighera wrote:
However, if you have, for example, an engine failure at 400' on
departure, the CAPS is not an option.

My point is, that CAPS is not an option at the times it's needed most:
below 920'. So to characterize the SR22 CAPS as a safety enhancement
(for other than spin recovery, and possibly a MAC, structural failure,
loss of control, and landing in inhospitable terrain, *if* they occur
above 920') is inappropriate.

The Nall Report (NR) indicates the phase of flight with the most fatal
pilot-caused accidents (~78% of all fatal accidents) is during what it
calls "maneuvering" (~23%). Since the NR categorizes descent/approach,
landing, go-around, and takeoff/climb distinct from maneuvering, the
maneuvering category would appear to encompass flight regimes presumably at
pattern and cruise altitudes. I would presume then that CAPS would be a
viable option in a large fraction of these cases.

Looking at the way the NR categorizes pilot caused fatal accidents, it
seems to me that about half the categories are such that the fatalities
could in theory have been prevented with CAPS. So CAPS might have been
potentually life-saving in about 0.78*0.5 = ~40% of all fatal GA accidents.

The non-pilot caused accidents allegedly accounted for ~22% of accidents,
but the fraction that happened at altitudes sufficient for effective CAPS
deployment is unknown. Assuming SWAG of ~50% of those 22% happened at
altitudes high enough for CAPS use, then CAPS would be potentially life-
saving in ~11%.

So in theory if all GA craft were equipped with CAPS and pilots were
trained in their effective use, they might cut the number of fatalities in
GA accidents by roughly half.