"sid" wrote in message
om...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
The fact that the USAF,USN, USA, etc., are not going to place those
assets
in a situation of undue risk is patently obvious. The fact that your
Russian
"super AAM" is nothing more than a concept at present does not change
that.

Gee, I thought that the ISR assets were expected to assist in the
conduct of a war.

On our terms.

Recent experiences aside, wars are slam full of
"undue risk".

Undue risk is what you avoid. Which is why they won't be sending ACS and the
E-10 into IADS environments.

Thats whole issue here, while SOF aircraft are thought of, and built
as, warplanes, the Boeings, Embraers, and Gulfstreams contemplated for
these roles have no such engineering.

Please point to the "special engineering" that sets an AFSOC CN 235/295
apart from one of those Gulfstreams.

Fact is they are very vulnerable platforms that are being considered
for vital missions and that potential adversaries are building weapons
to field against.

Big jump from that Russian firm "slowly" pursuing a very long range AAM
program to "are building".


Yet these aircraft will be expected to take part in warfare. As few
platforms that the ISR force has or will have, and as important as
they are to the conduct of contemporary and contemplated US military
ops, a capable opponent will find them juicy targets and he can buy
the equipment to do something about it.

Look, we are NOT sending them into contested airspace, OK? Period. Now, tell
me which foe these systems will be used against that we will not acheive air
superiority/dominance over in very short order?

A commander may well be forced to put these aircraft into areas of
"undue risk" to get the job done (as was done with the OP-2Es), or
risk not getting the job done at all.

There is that strange "OP-2E's" you keep ranting about... And again, we are
not going to send these assets in against "undue risk".


That some AF units seem to be exempt from the possibility of taking
enemy fire has been a long term inherent cultural issue apparently.
I'm not the only one to say it either:

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...jun/cahoon.htm
C-17 drivers just recently went through combat certification for the
first time. The question begs, why weren't they treated as warfighters
all along?

Meaningless. ACS and E-10 are not airlifters. Airlifters may indeed have to
drop down into a MANPADS/AAA threat environment to perform their
mission--ACS and the E-10 do not.


Sure, its not a real problem today, it won't be next year either, but
then again the ACS and E-10 won't be fielded until how many years down
the road? By the time they are operational, and S-400 s-300 equipped
opponent could well render them impotent.

Quick! Call the Pentagon and tell them you have discovered the flaw in the
plans that so many professionals have been developing for decades now!

This is not being planned for. Apparently you missed this part of this
"piece"?:
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/SIGINTWP.pdf
"ADA Susceptibility: GR/CS and ARL susceptibility to SA 10 and SA 12
threats was
the cornerstone of the argument to eliminate them from the system.
While it is true that they are susceptible to the threats, they are no
less so than many of the retained systems. Rivet Joint,EP3, ES3, all
retained by the study, fly at altitudes similar to Army systems. Their
survivability will require stand-off as well. GR/CS normally flies in
the same vicinity as JSTARS and AWACS, two targets an enemy would
likely pursue with more vigor than an RC12. Discussions
made it clear that the entire air campaign was not considered in the
analysis. In fact, constraints of the ADA threat were not uniformly
applied. Had it been so, many other platforms would have to become
HAPs as well (JSTARS, AWACS)."
As an FYI those SAM systems have advertised standoff ranges greater
than that of JSTARS and ACS.
I'm not the only one thinking of this either:
http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Articl...hiveIssueID=22

"For example, the standoff range for defending against SAMs
[surface-to-air missiles] is changing, and you will have to go to
space. Then you may want to move JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and Target
Attack Radar System] and AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System]
capabilities into space. So past elements that have given situational
awareness in the theater may involve trade-ups."

I don't know where you get these ideas, but the E-8 JSTARS surveillance
range reportedly reaches out to around 250 km--SA-10/12 manage what, maybe
90 km?


"In a risky bid to extend strike missions by making it easier for
planes to refuel, he ordered tanker aircraft -- which are relatively
vulnerable, because they lack their own warning radar and armaments --
to venture into Iraqi airspace, even though Iraq's dense air defense
network had not been eliminated."
Credible, yes. But what does he mean by "eliminated"? We know that they
continued to pop off MANPADS even as the troops and marines entered into
the
city--but again, those MANPADS were no threat to the tankers.

So why were they concerned. Obviously the longer range threat had not
been rendered below the "undue threat" threshold.

That is not what the evidence indicates. In fact, were any longer range
systems used to engage the KC's? Nope--the threat was ameliorated.


What vulnerabilities? The supposed vulnerability to a missile that has
yet
been built, guided by a system not yet developed, while engaging in
overflights through an IADS that just won't happen? Not much of a
"vulnerability" you have illustrated there.


You are wrong about this. Besides, you mean susceptability here??? My
beef is vulnerability issues, there is a difference.

Hint--vulnerability is not an issue if susceptability is controlled.

But to the point, the S-300 and S-400 are entirely capapble of
countering our ISR assets. Thats a fact.:
http://www.house.gov/pitts/initiativ...ew-brief-9.htm
(the google cached version works)
"The Russians sold the SA-10 (Russian designation S-300, NATO:Grumble)
to China, and recently agreed to sell them to Iran. The Russians are
aggressively marketing these systems and China may also build versions
for export, just as they did with the single digit SAMs. Several more
countries may acquire and field these systems within the next 10
years. The major factor preventing proliferation is the high price
tag of these systems. However, the Russians are also developing and
selling improvement kits to the single digit SAMs to provide near
double-digit SAMs performance at a fraction of the cost.'
'In short, the battlefield 10 years from now may be a far more
dangerous place than today, and it will take a toll on our pilots if
we do not act to mitigate the increased threat."

Sorry, not a "fact". Fact--SA-10 has a reported max range around 90 km, and
the E-8 can stand off well beyond that and map the terrain well beyond that
out-of-range S-300.


As an FYI the Navy is moving the P-3s away from the
overland tactical support role.
What?

Yes. P-3s(Not talking about EP-3s) and MMA will not be used in the
overland role due to vulenrability issues.
Did you miss this as well?
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/defense/111803ISR.pdf
"However, Navy leadership removing P-3 from overland missions in
hostile airspace due to survivability concerns."

Note the "in hostile airspace" bit. And BTW, we are not discussing P-3's or
MMA--we are discussing ACS and E-10, along with the K-767, right?


Gee, the VP-26 vet who wrote up the description I read must have had all
of
his facts wrong. He indicated that the engine was lost, and the fire was
in
that vicinity--whether or not it also involved the fuel tankage is a
moot
point.

Here's what it says. Note the "unclear" part:
"Several rounds ripped into the outer portion of their starboard wing,
knocking out #4 engine and starting a fire. They pulled the emergency
handle and succeeded in feathering the prop, but could not extinguish
the flames. It was unclear whether the fire originated from the engine
nacelle or from within the wing itself."
I will standby this statement.

Who cares what you are standing by? The guy who reported the incident did
not even know what the root cause (engine or wing/fuel tank fire) was, but
you do, huh?

The wing burned through as they were about to land.
Hydrodynamic ram killed that airplane and its crew.

FYI, *any* airplane with an uncontrolled fire in its engine/wing is
susceptable to subsequent structural failure. And you ignored the fact
that
aircraft designed exclusively for military use have also been lost to
..50
cal and below hits--so where is this much greater vulnerability of the
P-3
in view of that fact?

Any civil transport, such as this one was (before being modified), is
terribly vulnerable:
http://www.concordesst.com/accident/...es/flames1.jpg
But much can be done to mitigate the effects. And is being done on
"War"planes:
http://jas.jcs.mil/news/pdf/2003_fall.pdf
"When it comes to providing aircraft fuel system ballis-tic tolerance
capability, it is necessary to understand that protecting from a
catastrophic explosion in a fuel tank ullage cannot be accomplished
solely with self-sealing fuel cells. To provide the desired level of
ballistic tolerance requires a hand-in-hand compli-mentary approach
which incorpo-rates both self-sealing fuel cells and OBIGGS.
Ultimately, it is necessary to incorporate the appropriate fuel system
requirements verbiage requir-ing a self-sealing capability and that
damage from certain high explosive incendiary and/or armor piercing
incendiary rounds must not cause catastrophic explosion. This will
drive a solution, which provides the proper level of survivability
protec-tion for both permanently mounted and auxiliary internal fuel
cells."

Control the susceptability. I.e, the "L" in ARL-M...


I also note that in the first few sentences the authors identify the
difference between "susceptability" and "vulnerability"--the latter does
not
come into play if the former is controlled such that hits don't
occur--which
will be the predominant environment that the ACS and E-10 will operate
in.

Glad you found out the difference between the two. I think you fit
firmly in the camp described below. Its a very wrong and hubris filled
view, but I'll let some much more credible sources speak make the
case:
http://jas.jcs.mil/news/pdf/2003_fall.pdf

FYI, I stopped going to your sources shortly after determining that you were
twisting the position of the Lexington Institute in regards to the viability
of using commercial airframes in roles such as ACS and E-10.

snip

How can you be so verbose and still fail to answer the question regarding
what you think that "L" in ARL means?

Brooks