On Mon, 16 Jun 2003 22:53:22 -0400, "Lawrence Dillard"
wrote:


The German system allowed Hartmann, Marseilles, Roedel and company to run up
some admirable individual scores (and more power to them). However, the
efforts of none of these experten was of much use to the Reich.

Now you only have to prove these "experts" were somehow responsible
for Reich's ultimate failure.


The major question, to my mind, when assessing fighter aircraft and "Aces"
is: what contribution did their collective (as opposed to individual)
successes or failures make toward the achievment of their nation's war
aims?

I'd say you fail to asses how much Germany's war aims were realistic
or feasible before proclaiming German "aces" as noworthy.

When it came to crunch time, the Allies (albeit at times barely) almost
always seemed to marshall their fighter forces in such a way as to achieve
their goals, despite not having a Barkhorn or Sakai amongst them, while
frustrating the Axis' aims at practically every turn.

Probably because Allies had a whole lot more of them. Something that
German aces can hardly be blamed for.

Something basic was faulty about the manner in which the Axis fielded their
forces:

Which, of course, has nothing to do with the individual pilot's combat
performance. I guess, an NBA players like Malone or Barkley who never
won the NBA championship were worse than some obscure guys who
happened to share the lockroom with Jordan.

1) The Germans could not gain air superiority over Great Britain, despite
investing considerable resources, including the most modern of fighters.
Hence, no invasion, despite ballyhooed aces.

These same aces handled RAF pretty roughly over France. In order for
Sea Lion to succeed, Luftwaffe needed much more than well trained
fighter pilots. The problem with your argument is that you already
know why Luftwaffe could not create preconditions for successful Sea
Lion and you also know German aces could not win that battle.

2) The Germans could not sustain air superiority over the Soviets despite
investment of considerable resources and the creation of several ballyhooed
aces flying a/c deemed to be "superior" to the opposition.

Luftwaffe sustained air superiority over Soviet Union long enough for
Heer to lose every chance of winning. You also know how Soviets
outproduced Germans, you know the story about the Lend Lease, you know
about the growing Luftwaffe commitments outside Soviet Union, so I ask
why are you deliberately blame combat pilots for unrealistic goals of
German leadership?

3) The Germans could not gain air superiority over the DAF and later over
the Allied air forces over N Africa and the Med, despite investment of
considerable resources and astonishing individual aerial victory claims.
Hence a sad end to operations, with the Tunisian surrender.

Because British deployed more aircraft to the theatre. That's why.

4) The Germans could not hold air superiority over the continent in the face
of escorted daylight raids, despite investment of considerable resources and
the inevitable presence of the vaunted experten. On D-Day, the Germans
managed maybe a couple hundred sorties, while the Allies managed thousands
of sorties from dawn to dusk. The beginning of the end.

See above, but include Americans as well.

One link between all the above is that even as the Reich was producing
prodigies in terms of fighter aces, in not one instance did the successes of
the various aces have a jot to do with abetting the achievment of the
Reich's aims or with frustrating the Allies from achieving their objectives.
In every instance, the Luftwaffe found itself face to face with a task for
which it had neither adequate planning nor adequate means with which to
successfully compete.

Than why did you start this post with a diatribe against combat
pilots? They were not to blame for idiotic politics of their civil and
military leadership. These young men joined Luftwaffe for the same
reason young men are becoming fighter pilots today.


Drax