#1 piston fighter?

On Mon, 16 Jun 2003 22:53:22 -0400, "Lawrence Dillard"
wrote:


The German system allowed Hartmann, Marseilles, Roedel and company to run up
some admirable individual scores (and more power to them). However, the
efforts of none of these experten was of much use to the Reich.

Now you only have to prove these "experts" were somehow responsible
for Reich's ultimate failure.


The major question, to my mind, when assessing fighter aircraft and "Aces"
is: what contribution did their collective (as opposed to individual)
successes or failures make toward the achievment of their nation's war
aims?

I'd say you fail to asses how much Germany's war aims were realistic
or feasible before proclaiming German "aces" as noworthy.

When it came to crunch time, the Allies (albeit at times barely) almost
always seemed to marshall their fighter forces in such a way as to achieve
their goals, despite not having a Barkhorn or Sakai amongst them, while
frustrating the Axis' aims at practically every turn.

Probably because Allies had a whole lot more of them. Something that
German aces can hardly be blamed for.

Something basic was faulty about the manner in which the Axis fielded their
forces:

Which, of course, has nothing to do with the individual pilot's combat
performance. I guess, an NBA players like Malone or Barkley who never
won the NBA championship were worse than some obscure guys who
happened to share the lockroom with Jordan.

1) The Germans could not gain air superiority over Great Britain, despite
investing considerable resources, including the most modern of fighters.
Hence, no invasion, despite ballyhooed aces.

These same aces handled RAF pretty roughly over France. In order for
Sea Lion to succeed, Luftwaffe needed much more than well trained
fighter pilots. The problem with your argument is that you already
know why Luftwaffe could not create preconditions for successful Sea
Lion and you also know German aces could not win that battle.

2) The Germans could not sustain air superiority over the Soviets despite
investment of considerable resources and the creation of several ballyhooed
aces flying a/c deemed to be "superior" to the opposition.

Luftwaffe sustained air superiority over Soviet Union long enough for
Heer to lose every chance of winning. You also know how Soviets
outproduced Germans, you know the story about the Lend Lease, you know
about the growing Luftwaffe commitments outside Soviet Union, so I ask
why are you deliberately blame combat pilots for unrealistic goals of
German leadership?

3) The Germans could not gain air superiority over the DAF and later over
the Allied air forces over N Africa and the Med, despite investment of
considerable resources and astonishing individual aerial victory claims.
Hence a sad end to operations, with the Tunisian surrender.

Because British deployed more aircraft to the theatre. That's why.

4) The Germans could not hold air superiority over the continent in the face
of escorted daylight raids, despite investment of considerable resources and
the inevitable presence of the vaunted experten. On D-Day, the Germans
managed maybe a couple hundred sorties, while the Allies managed thousands
of sorties from dawn to dusk. The beginning of the end.

See above, but include Americans as well.

One link between all the above is that even as the Reich was producing
prodigies in terms of fighter aces, in not one instance did the successes of
the various aces have a jot to do with abetting the achievment of the
Reich's aims or with frustrating the Allies from achieving their objectives.
In every instance, the Luftwaffe found itself face to face with a task for
which it had neither adequate planning nor adequate means with which to
successfully compete.

Than why did you start this post with a diatribe against combat
pilots? They were not to blame for idiotic politics of their civil and
military leadership. These young men joined Luftwaffe for the same
reason young men are becoming fighter pilots today.


Drax

Hartmann, Marseilles, Roedel and company to run up
some admirable individual scores (and more power to them).

Roedel? Whoinheckizat? Do you mean Rudel, the Stuka pilot?

However, the
efforts of none of these experten was of much use to the Reich.

Rudel destroyed over 500 Soviet tanks. How "much use" is one soldier supposed
to be to his country? Hartmann and Marseille destroyed the equivelent of an
enemy fighter wing between them. That's "some use" at least.

The major question, to my mind, when assessing fighter aircraft and "Aces"
is: what contribution did their collective (as opposed to individual)
successes or failures make toward the achievment of their nation's war
aims?

All fighter pilots are tactical assets and by nature will have few
opportunities to turn the course of the war by themselves.

despite not having a Barkhorn or Sakai amongst them, while
frustrating the Axis' aims at practically every turn.

You're for forgetting Basil Embry and Col Don Blakeslee, among MANY others,
that at least matched or exceeded the combat /leadership abilities of the two
fine aviators that you mention.

v.r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR Aircrew

"Got anything on your radar, SENSO?"
"Nothing but my forehead, sir."

Drax, we have a small problem in communication. See below.
"Drazen Kramaric" wrote in message
...
On Mon, 16 Jun 2003 22:53:22 -0400, "Lawrence Dillard"
wrote:


The German system allowed Hartmann, Marseilles, Roedel and company to run
up
some admirable individual scores (and more power to them). However, the
efforts of none of these experten was of much use to the Reich.

Now you only have to prove these "experts" were somehow responsible
for Reich's ultimate failure.

NO, I do not. That was not my intention or the point I am making. I do not
contend that the "experts" were responsible for the Reich's ultimate
military failure. Instead, I contend that in despite of the undeniable
accomplishments of the very succesful airmen, their efforts went to
waste--not because their prowess was somehow nugatory, but because the
SYSTEM which allowed their success failed to allow their successes to have a
real impact on the course of operations.

The major question, to my mind, when assessing fighter aircraft and
"Aces"
is: what contribution did their collective (as opposed to individual)
successes or failures make toward the achievment of their nation's war
aims?

I'd say you fail to asses how much Germany's war aims were realistic
or feasible before proclaiming German "aces" as noworthy.

Not at all. I hoped that that very assessment was implicit in my discussion.
If I gave any other impression, I apologize to the ng and to you.

When it came to crunch time, the Allies (albeit at times barely) almost
always seemed to marshall their fighter forces in such a way as to
achieve
their goals, despite not having a Barkhorn or Sakai amongst them, while
frustrating the Axis' aims at practically every turn.

Probably because Allies had a whole lot more of them. Something that
German aces can hardly be blamed for.

I assign no blame to the German aces for the failure of the Reich's military
endeavors. I am concerned in that DESPITE having such exemplars, no real
advantage ever obtained to the Reich as a consequence. As I wrote
immediately below:
Something basic was faulty about the manner in which the Axis fielded
their
forces:

Which, of course, has nothing to do with the individual pilot's combat
performance.

Precisely. Somehow, the Reich failed to lucratively exploit the successes of
those extraordinary performers.

I guess, an NBA players like Malone or Barkley who never
won the NBA championship were worse than some obscure guys who
happened to share the lockroom with Jordan.

Not at all, of course; BUT if Malone or Barkley is not supported by or
properly exploited by his organization, neither he nor his organization will
obtain the Glittering Prizes. That's what seemed to have happened with the
German superstars.


1) The Germans could not gain air superiority over Great Britain, despite
investing considerable resources, including the most modern of fighters.
Hence, no invasion, despite ballyhooed aces.

These same aces handled RAF pretty roughly over France. In order for
Sea Lion to succeed, Luftwaffe needed much more than well trained
fighter pilots. The problem with your argument is that you already
know why Luftwaffe could not create preconditions for successful Sea
Lion and you also know German aces could not win that battle.

Uh, uh. But I am left at a loss to understand how, given the availability of
such superstars, success was not achieved. I am leaning toward assigning the
responsibility for this to the system, not to the pilots. In GB at the time,
the situation was regarded as most serious; there were moments of doubt
during the BoB. It simply was not known whether the Luftwaffe would or could
generate a campaign which could exploit Britain's weaknesses and set the
stage for an invasion.

2) The Germans could not sustain air superiority over the Soviets despite

investment of considerable resources and the creation of several
ballyhooed
aces flying a/c deemed to be "superior" to the opposition.

Luftwaffe sustained air superiority over Soviet Union long enough for
Heer to lose every chance of winning. You also know how Soviets
outproduced Germans, you know the story about the Lend Lease, you know
about the growing Luftwaffe commitments outside Soviet Union, so I ask
why are you deliberately blame combat pilots for unrealistic goals of
German leadership?

I don't do that. But I do question the utility to the Reich's military
efforts in laying the groundwork for such spectacular successes and then
being unable to reap the expected rewards thereform.


3) The Germans could not gain air superiority over the DAF and later over
the Allied air forces over N Africa and the Med, despite investment of
considerable resources and astonishing individual aerial victory claims.
Hence a sad end to operations, with the Tunisian surrender.

Because British deployed more aircraft to the theatre. That's why.

That certainly didn't hurt. However, I do believe that ultimaely Lord Tedder
and his US counterparts organized or designed their forces' performance so
as to help their nations attain the goals sought. For whatever reasons,
however, the Reich could not do so, despite having certain human materiel
who performed to a quite high standard. German successes in fighter vs
fighter combat somehow did not translate into victory.


4) The Germans could not hold air superiority over the continent in the
face
of escorted daylight raids, despite investment of considerable resources
and
the inevitable presence of the vaunted experten. On D-Day, the Germans
managed maybe a couple hundred sorties, while the Allies managed
thousands
of sorties from dawn to dusk. The beginning of the end.

See above, but include Americans as well.



One link between all the above is that even as the Reich was producing
prodigies in terms of fighter aces, in not one instance did the successes
of
the various aces have a jot to do with abetting the achievment of the
Reich's aims or with frustrating the Allies from achieving their
objectives.
In every instance, the Luftwaffe found itself face to face with a task
for
which it had neither adequate planning nor adequate means with which to
successfully compete.

Than why did you start this post with a diatribe against combat
pilots?

I don't believe that I did. I have, in fact, a sneaking admiration for many
of the German experts. I find them to be impressive. But I can find no
evidence that their extraordinary accomplishments had any real impact of the
outcomes of many an operation. And, to me, at least, a soldier at war is
there in the first place to see to the accomplishment of his commanders'
objectives. A system which cannot capitalize on Marseilles' talents and
success, for example, did not garner the Glittering Prizes, which was all
that truly mattered.

They were not to blame for idiotic politics of their civil and
military leadership. These young men joined Luftwaffe for the same
reason young men are becoming fighter pilots today.

I suppose so. I personally lay no blame at their doorsteps. But I am
inclined to believe, still, that their efforts were wasted. Impressive, yes,
but not decisive. Their impresive efforts had no leavening effect on their
cohorts' performances, and were not decisive in their impact on operations,
as in general, the Allies were able to impose their will over the
battlefields.