On Dec 22, 10:20*am, Mike wrote:
Chinese Land Attack Cruise Missile Developments and their Implications
for the United States

Publication: China Brief

Chinese LACMs
Much scholarly attention has been devoted to China’s rapidly growing
ballistic missile force in recent years, but relatively little has
been written on China’s development of its land attack cruise missile
(LACM) capabilities. Considering the rapid increase in the number and
sophistication of Chinese short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), the
deployment of China’s DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile inter-continental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and the development of conventionally-
armed medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), including one intended
to target aircraft carriers and perhaps other surface ships, it is
understandable that Chinese LACM developments have been overshadowed
to some extent by these impressive ballistic missile force
modernization efforts. The development of Chinese LACM capabilities is
clearly worthy of greater analytical attention, however, especially
given its potential strategic implications for the United States.
Drawing on a variety of sources, including Chinese scientific and
technical journal articles, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) newspapers,
and unclassified U.S. government reports on Chinese military
modernization, this article examines Chinese writings on the
advantages and disadvantages of LACMs and evaluates China’s evolving
LACM capabilities. It also assesses some of the potential implications
for U.S. defense planners and policymakers.

Chinese Writings on the Employment of LACMs in Recent Conflicts

Chinese analysts have studied recent U.S. military operations very
closely and quite a few authors have published their views on the
employment of land attack cruise missiles in recent conflicts. The
employment of Tomahawk cruise missiles in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan
has been of particular interest to Chinese writers, and they have
noted what they see as both the advantages and the weaknesses of U.S.
cruise missile capabilities. Many Chinese articles emphasize the
importance of enhancing China’s ability to defend itself against
cruise missile attacks, but some also discuss the use of cruise
missiles more broadly, perhaps providing some hints as to how China
would plan to employ its own cruise missiles in a regional conflict.
Indeed, Chinese writings on the employment of Tomahawak cruise
missiles by the United States in the Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and Iraq not only reflect a deep interest in drawing on the “lessons
learned” from these conflicts to improve the PLA’s ability to defend
against cruise missile strikes, but also reveal that Chinese analysts
have devoted considerable attention to analyzing the strengths and
weaknesses of cruise missiles as precision strike weapons.

Chinese Views on the Advantages of LACMs

Chinese analysts highlight the long range, accuracy, multi-directional
attack capabilities, and ability to launch from a variety of platforms
as some of the key advantages of LACMs. Cruise missiles can be used to
penetrate enemy air defense networks at low altitudes. They are highly
accurate, highly maneuverable and can be used to attack a target from
any direction [1]. Among the other stated advantages of cruise
missiles are that they are often difficult to detect and track.
Similarly, analysts from the PLA Air Force Engineering University
highlight detection of enemy cruise missiles as one of the main
challenges of cruise missile defense. In their words: “Detection by
land-based radar is difficult because cruise missiles use low-altitude
defense measures and stealth technology, and detection is affected by
the curvature of the earth. *The effect of land and sea clutter is
also an important factor in reducing the probability of detection and
identification” [2]. In addition, Chinese analysts have also pointed
out that cruise missiles (and ballistic missiles, for that matter) are
relatively inexpensive, especially when compared to manned strike
aircraft [3].

Chinese analysts conclude that these advantages make cruise missiles
an ideal weapon for long-range precision strikes and that this is why
the U.S. military has employed cruise missiles extensively to conduct
such strikes in a number of recent conflicts, including the Gulf War,
Desert Fox and Kosovo. Chinese writers have also noted that cruise
missile strikes are often among the opening shots of a conflict.
Another assessment that discusses the first strike role of cruise
missiles points out that they are often use to enable follow-on
strikes by manned aircraft, but may also be used on their own. “With
development in modern air defense weapons,” according to the authors,
“the traditional method of using aircraft to breach defense has been
replaced by using cruise missiles to ‘clear the way’ first and then
using aircraft and cruise missiles jointly to attack targets;
sometimes, only cruise missiles are used to achieve air attack
objectives” [4].

Chinese writers have also highlighted the employment of cruise
missiles in Operation Desert Fox as a form of “non-contact
warfare” [5]. *Overall, therefore, it is fair to say that the Tomahawk
cruise missile generally receives high marks from Chinese writers. In
the words of one Chinese analyst, for example, “The ‘Tomahawk’ cruise
missiles on which the U.S. relied from the Gulf War and the war in
Kosovo in the '90s to the recently-concluded war in Afghanistan can be
said to have performed in a dazzling manner” [6].

Despite the attention devoted to the Tomahawk’s advantages and the
favorable evaluations of its use in recent conflicts, however, Chinese
authors also highlight some perceived weaknesses of cruise missiles.
According to one source, “Developed in the 1970s, the U.S. ‘Tomahawk’
cruise missiles have displayed some vital weak points, including a low
cruise speed, a small combat body, a large size, and so on. In all
previous battles, the U.S. ‘Tomahawk’ cruise missiles had been shot
down by the enemy” [7]. Similarly, other Chinese authors highlight the
vulnerability of Tomahawk cruise missiles to “hard kill,” “soft kill,”
and deception [8].

According to the authors of one article, “a ‘hard kill’ means using
weapons such as SAM, air, and air-to-air missiles, or AAA and machine
guns, for a fire intercept of a cruise missile [9]. A number of
Chinese military analysts have stated that Tomahawk cruise missiles
are vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire [10]. Chinese analysts also
discuss “soft kill” methods, such as electronic jamming. According to
one article, electronic jamming “keeps the cruise missile from
receiving the GPS navigation signal, keeps it from exchanging guidance
signals between launch platforms, and makes the missile radar guidance
head and altimeter malfunction, making the Tomahawk ‘deaf’ and
‘blind,’ finally leaving it ‘deranged’” [11]. Denial and deception are
also seen as potentially effective countermeasures [12].

Finally, Chinese analysts have noted that simply having deployed some
cruise missiles is not enough to carry out long-range precision
strikes effectively. They point out that there are many requirements
beyond the missiles themselves. The strikes must be supported by
effective intelligence collection and analysis and battle damage
assessment capabilities. Indeed, Chinese analysts have highlighted the
importance of timely and accurate intelligence information to
effective targeting of cruise missile strikes [13].

This level of attention to the shortcomings and vulnerabilities of
cruise missiles may be largely a function of China’s strong interest
in improving its own cruise missile defense capabilities. *This is a
high priority for the PLA given the threat of cruise missile attack
against high-value targets by the United States or perhaps Taiwan in
the event of a cross-Strait conflict. As the authors of one article
published in Jeifangjun Bao put it, “Cruise missiles pose a serious
threat to our important targets,” and cruise missile defense “is a
critical issue with bearings on the overall operation” [14].

Nonetheless, Chinese writings that address the limitations of the
Tomahawk and other cruise missiles suggest that these assessments of
cruise missile vulnerabilities may also influence China’s plans for
the employment of its own land-attack cruise missiles in future
conflicts. For example, Chinese writers have clearly recognized that
cruise missiles are much easier to intercept than ballistic missiles
[15], suggesting that this would be taken into account in their
planning for future military operations.

Chinese Land Attack Cruise Missiles

Not surprisingly, given that Chinese analysts view cruise missiles as
very effective weapons, China is developing and deploying air- and
ground-launched land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) to contribute to
the enhancement of the PLA’s conventional long-range precision-strike
capabilities. China’s current and emerging land attack cruise missile
capabilities include ground-launched land attack cruise missiles and
air-launched land attack cruise missiles. It is also possible that
China will deploy nuclear-armed land attack cruise missiles.

Ground-launched Cruise Missile Capabilities

Ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) appear to form the cornerstone
of China’s emerging LACM deployments. According to the 2008 Department
of Defense report to Congress on Chinese military power, “The PLA is
acquiring large numbers of highly accurate cruise missiles, such as
the domestically produced ground-launched DH-10 land attack cruise
missile (LACM)” [16]. Specifically, the 2008 Department of Defense
report estimates that China has deployed 50-250 DH-10 LACMs and 20-30
launchers [17]. * In addition, the report states that the DH-10 has a
range of at least 2,000 km [18].

Air-launched Cruise Missile Capabilities

China is also developing air-launched cruise ...

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They only have to get across the straits, not the entire Pacific... I
imagine their doctrine states, "Ripple fire, in waves numbering in the
hundeds, on a bearing of 090." Sucks to be Taiwan as I genuinely
disbelieve that we can protect them indefinitely.

v/r Gordon