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On Dec 22, 10:20*am, Mike wrote:
Chinese Land Attack Cruise Missile Developments and their Implications for the United States Publication: China Brief Chinese LACMs Much scholarly attention has been devoted to China’s rapidly growing ballistic missile force in recent years, but relatively little has been written on China’s development of its land attack cruise missile (LACM) capabilities. Considering the rapid increase in the number and sophistication of Chinese short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), the deployment of China’s DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and the development of conventionally- armed medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), including one intended to target aircraft carriers and perhaps other surface ships, it is understandable that Chinese LACM developments have been overshadowed to some extent by these impressive ballistic missile force modernization efforts. The development of Chinese LACM capabilities is clearly worthy of greater analytical attention, however, especially given its potential strategic implications for the United States. Drawing on a variety of sources, including Chinese scientific and technical journal articles, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) newspapers, and unclassified U.S. government reports on Chinese military modernization, this article examines Chinese writings on the advantages and disadvantages of LACMs and evaluates China’s evolving LACM capabilities. It also assesses some of the potential implications for U.S. defense planners and policymakers. Chinese Writings on the Employment of LACMs in Recent Conflicts Chinese analysts have studied recent U.S. military operations very closely and quite a few authors have published their views on the employment of land attack cruise missiles in recent conflicts. The employment of Tomahawk cruise missiles in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan has been of particular interest to Chinese writers, and they have noted what they see as both the advantages and the weaknesses of U.S. cruise missile capabilities. Many Chinese articles emphasize the importance of enhancing China’s ability to defend itself against cruise missile attacks, but some also discuss the use of cruise missiles more broadly, perhaps providing some hints as to how China would plan to employ its own cruise missiles in a regional conflict. Indeed, Chinese writings on the employment of Tomahawak cruise missiles by the United States in the Gulf War, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq not only reflect a deep interest in drawing on the “lessons learned” from these conflicts to improve the PLA’s ability to defend against cruise missile strikes, but also reveal that Chinese analysts have devoted considerable attention to analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of cruise missiles as precision strike weapons. Chinese Views on the Advantages of LACMs Chinese analysts highlight the long range, accuracy, multi-directional attack capabilities, and ability to launch from a variety of platforms as some of the key advantages of LACMs. Cruise missiles can be used to penetrate enemy air defense networks at low altitudes. They are highly accurate, highly maneuverable and can be used to attack a target from any direction [1]. Among the other stated advantages of cruise missiles are that they are often difficult to detect and track. Similarly, analysts from the PLA Air Force Engineering University highlight detection of enemy cruise missiles as one of the main challenges of cruise missile defense. In their words: “Detection by land-based radar is difficult because cruise missiles use low-altitude defense measures and stealth technology, and detection is affected by the curvature of the earth. *The effect of land and sea clutter is also an important factor in reducing the probability of detection and identification” [2]. In addition, Chinese analysts have also pointed out that cruise missiles (and ballistic missiles, for that matter) are relatively inexpensive, especially when compared to manned strike aircraft [3]. Chinese analysts conclude that these advantages make cruise missiles an ideal weapon for long-range precision strikes and that this is why the U.S. military has employed cruise missiles extensively to conduct such strikes in a number of recent conflicts, including the Gulf War, Desert Fox and Kosovo. Chinese writers have also noted that cruise missile strikes are often among the opening shots of a conflict. Another assessment that discusses the first strike role of cruise missiles points out that they are often use to enable follow-on strikes by manned aircraft, but may also be used on their own. “With development in modern air defense weapons,” according to the authors, “the traditional method of using aircraft to breach defense has been replaced by using cruise missiles to ‘clear the way’ first and then using aircraft and cruise missiles jointly to attack targets; sometimes, only cruise missiles are used to achieve air attack objectives” [4]. Chinese writers have also highlighted the employment of cruise missiles in Operation Desert Fox as a form of “non-contact warfare” [5]. *Overall, therefore, it is fair to say that the Tomahawk cruise missile generally receives high marks from Chinese writers. In the words of one Chinese analyst, for example, “The ‘Tomahawk’ cruise missiles on which the U.S. relied from the Gulf War and the war in Kosovo in the '90s to the recently-concluded war in Afghanistan can be said to have performed in a dazzling manner” [6]. Despite the attention devoted to the Tomahawk’s advantages and the favorable evaluations of its use in recent conflicts, however, Chinese authors also highlight some perceived weaknesses of cruise missiles. According to one source, “Developed in the 1970s, the U.S. ‘Tomahawk’ cruise missiles have displayed some vital weak points, including a low cruise speed, a small combat body, a large size, and so on. In all previous battles, the U.S. ‘Tomahawk’ cruise missiles had been shot down by the enemy” [7]. Similarly, other Chinese authors highlight the vulnerability of Tomahawk cruise missiles to “hard kill,” “soft kill,” and deception [8]. According to the authors of one article, “a ‘hard kill’ means using weapons such as SAM, air, and air-to-air missiles, or AAA and machine guns, for a fire intercept of a cruise missile [9]. A number of Chinese military analysts have stated that Tomahawk cruise missiles are vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire [10]. Chinese analysts also discuss “soft kill” methods, such as electronic jamming. According to one article, electronic jamming “keeps the cruise missile from receiving the GPS navigation signal, keeps it from exchanging guidance signals between launch platforms, and makes the missile radar guidance head and altimeter malfunction, making the Tomahawk ‘deaf’ and ‘blind,’ finally leaving it ‘deranged’” [11]. Denial and deception are also seen as potentially effective countermeasures [12]. Finally, Chinese analysts have noted that simply having deployed some cruise missiles is not enough to carry out long-range precision strikes effectively. They point out that there are many requirements beyond the missiles themselves. The strikes must be supported by effective intelligence collection and analysis and battle damage assessment capabilities. Indeed, Chinese analysts have highlighted the importance of timely and accurate intelligence information to effective targeting of cruise missile strikes [13]. This level of attention to the shortcomings and vulnerabilities of cruise missiles may be largely a function of China’s strong interest in improving its own cruise missile defense capabilities. *This is a high priority for the PLA given the threat of cruise missile attack against high-value targets by the United States or perhaps Taiwan in the event of a cross-Strait conflict. As the authors of one article published in Jeifangjun Bao put it, “Cruise missiles pose a serious threat to our important targets,” and cruise missile defense “is a critical issue with bearings on the overall operation” [14]. Nonetheless, Chinese writings that address the limitations of the Tomahawk and other cruise missiles suggest that these assessments of cruise missile vulnerabilities may also influence China’s plans for the employment of its own land-attack cruise missiles in future conflicts. For example, Chinese writers have clearly recognized that cruise missiles are much easier to intercept than ballistic missiles [15], suggesting that this would be taken into account in their planning for future military operations. Chinese Land Attack Cruise Missiles Not surprisingly, given that Chinese analysts view cruise missiles as very effective weapons, China is developing and deploying air- and ground-launched land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) to contribute to the enhancement of the PLA’s conventional long-range precision-strike capabilities. China’s current and emerging land attack cruise missile capabilities include ground-launched land attack cruise missiles and air-launched land attack cruise missiles. It is also possible that China will deploy nuclear-armed land attack cruise missiles. Ground-launched Cruise Missile Capabilities Ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) appear to form the cornerstone of China’s emerging LACM deployments. According to the 2008 Department of Defense report to Congress on Chinese military power, “The PLA is acquiring large numbers of highly accurate cruise missiles, such as the domestically produced ground-launched DH-10 land attack cruise missile (LACM)” [16]. Specifically, the 2008 Department of Defense report estimates that China has deployed 50-250 DH-10 LACMs and 20-30 launchers [17]. * In addition, the report states that the DH-10 has a range of at least 2,000 km [18]. Air-launched Cruise Missile Capabilities China is also developing air-launched cruise ... read more » They only have to get across the straits, not the entire Pacific... I imagine their doctrine states, "Ripple fire, in waves numbering in the hundeds, on a bearing of 090." Sucks to be Taiwan as I genuinely disbelieve that we can protect them indefinitely. v/r Gordon |
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