BUFDRVR wrote:

snip

They had previously been able to take strikes and bring their
significant manpower to bear in restoring operations in days or even
hours. With LB II, the round-the-clock intensity meant that couldn't
be done.

Ed, the railyard at Kihn No was still out of action from strikes in November,
same holds true for the Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant. I don't disagree that
some significant damage was inflicted, but it was not significant enough to
impact the political leadership in NVN. They returned to Paris because congress
never went into session (most likely because they had recessed for Christmas)

Correct. Nixon thought they would vote to deny funds as soon as they came back.

and voted to suspend military funding. The NVN looked out the window, heard the
air raid sirons and said; "we're not getting anything for this". They didn't
look out the window and say; "my God, the damage is so horrible if it continues
we'll be destroyed, we must stop it."

Right.

But, in LB II, we escalated to a previously unused level of force and
in a very short period restruck almost every significant target in the
area.

and struck them again and again and again....

I've got to state that while participation doesn't guarantee
understanding, it does provide insight and a level of detail that
can't be gleaned from poring through micro-fiche archives of op-rep 4s
and unit histories written by a squadron Lt as an additional duty.

How about most of the sources Michel used (I even included his work)? Michel
did the same thing I did (plus conduct interviews). Are you saying his work is
suspect or does he get a pass "because he was there"?

Ed seems to have a bit of a blind spot about this, even though you and I have given
him numerous contemporary sources involving the direct participants in the
negotiations, which he can check. Once again, I recommend a perusal of Nixon's
"No More Vietnams," as well as

The palace file / Nguyen Tien Hung and Jerrold L. Schecter. New York : Harper &
Row, c1986.

The former has Nixon's account of the negotiations and what he was trying to
accomplish (and what he felt he could), the latter contains the photostats of the
actual telegrams/letters Nixon was sending to Thieu throughout this period, as well
as Thieu's handwritten comments on them. Nixon just barely manages to maintain his
patience with Thieu as the latter keeps asking for changes (many for good reason),
but finally just loses his temper and almost in so many words, tells Thieu to sign
it or else. Thieu's delaying behavior continues up until well into January, and
IIRR even into June or so of 1973 (when the final accord was signed).

The deal was done in October 1972, Thieu's insisting on substantive changes
(especially withdrawal of PAVN troops from the south) which the U.S. (in this
context, Nixon and Kissinger) knew the DRVN would never accept, blew the deal,
especially as the latter thought they had a shot at getting it all by just sitting
back and waiting for congress to act, so they pulled out. Nixon started LB II
mainly to convince Thieu that the U.S. would back the RVN with bombing and other
support if the DRVN violated the accords (which Nixon fully expected would happen),
the DRVN agreed to essentially the same terms (with a few cosmetic changes in
wording) as they had agreed to in October, Nixon in effect then told Thieu he'd
better sign if he wanted US support, as we were going to sign regardless of whether
or not he did. Thieu signed, under protest, and did everything he could to hold up
the process, because he felt (rightly, as it turned out) that the RVN was
essentially being sold out.

There is absolutely no support in the historical record, none, for Ed's belief that
LB II somehow 'won' the war or even that it brought about significantly better
terms, or that Nixon and Kissinger were even trying to accomplish that. Both men
have denied that the final terms were substantially different from October's:

"On November 20th . . . Kissinger presented Thieu's proposed changes, as well as
some of our own . . . After several tough negotiating sessions , I concluded that
if we were to reach an agreement, we would have to abandon most of Thieu's major
demands. I instructed Kissinger to seek a settlement along the lines of the
October agreement."

Nixon, "No More Vietnams," pg. 156.

Both men are clear about the limited goals they had for LB II, and getting a
substantial improvement in the October terms wasn't one of them.. While neither of
them are exactly known for their veracity when discussing their own actions, the
paper record as well as the accounts of others (US, RVN and DRVN) who participated
in the negotiating process backs up their account. "The Palace File" telexes show
the various minor changes made in the terms throughout the negotiations, as Nixon
(or sometimes Kissinger or Haig) inform Thieu of them. The DRVN refused to give in
on the major changes that Thieu wanted, and as shown in the quote from Nixon above,
the US accepted that they would not agree to them, and negotiated accordingly.

Guy