Friendly Fire Notebook

BUFDRVR wrote:

snip

They had previously been able to take strikes and bring their
significant manpower to bear in restoring operations in days or even
hours. With LB II, the round-the-clock intensity meant that couldn't
be done.

Ed, the railyard at Kihn No was still out of action from strikes in November,
same holds true for the Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant. I don't disagree that
some significant damage was inflicted, but it was not significant enough to
impact the political leadership in NVN. They returned to Paris because congress
never went into session (most likely because they had recessed for Christmas)

Correct. Nixon thought they would vote to deny funds as soon as they came back.

and voted to suspend military funding. The NVN looked out the window, heard the
air raid sirons and said; "we're not getting anything for this". They didn't
look out the window and say; "my God, the damage is so horrible if it continues
we'll be destroyed, we must stop it."

Right.

But, in LB II, we escalated to a previously unused level of force and
in a very short period restruck almost every significant target in the
area.

and struck them again and again and again....

I've got to state that while participation doesn't guarantee
understanding, it does provide insight and a level of detail that
can't be gleaned from poring through micro-fiche archives of op-rep 4s
and unit histories written by a squadron Lt as an additional duty.

How about most of the sources Michel used (I even included his work)? Michel
did the same thing I did (plus conduct interviews). Are you saying his work is
suspect or does he get a pass "because he was there"?

Ed seems to have a bit of a blind spot about this, even though you and I have given
him numerous contemporary sources involving the direct participants in the
negotiations, which he can check. Once again, I recommend a perusal of Nixon's
"No More Vietnams," as well as

The palace file / Nguyen Tien Hung and Jerrold L. Schecter. New York : Harper &
Row, c1986.

The former has Nixon's account of the negotiations and what he was trying to
accomplish (and what he felt he could), the latter contains the photostats of the
actual telegrams/letters Nixon was sending to Thieu throughout this period, as well
as Thieu's handwritten comments on them. Nixon just barely manages to maintain his
patience with Thieu as the latter keeps asking for changes (many for good reason),
but finally just loses his temper and almost in so many words, tells Thieu to sign
it or else. Thieu's delaying behavior continues up until well into January, and
IIRR even into June or so of 1973 (when the final accord was signed).

The deal was done in October 1972, Thieu's insisting on substantive changes
(especially withdrawal of PAVN troops from the south) which the U.S. (in this
context, Nixon and Kissinger) knew the DRVN would never accept, blew the deal,
especially as the latter thought they had a shot at getting it all by just sitting
back and waiting for congress to act, so they pulled out. Nixon started LB II
mainly to convince Thieu that the U.S. would back the RVN with bombing and other
support if the DRVN violated the accords (which Nixon fully expected would happen),
the DRVN agreed to essentially the same terms (with a few cosmetic changes in
wording) as they had agreed to in October, Nixon in effect then told Thieu he'd
better sign if he wanted US support, as we were going to sign regardless of whether
or not he did. Thieu signed, under protest, and did everything he could to hold up
the process, because he felt (rightly, as it turned out) that the RVN was
essentially being sold out.

There is absolutely no support in the historical record, none, for Ed's belief that
LB II somehow 'won' the war or even that it brought about significantly better
terms, or that Nixon and Kissinger were even trying to accomplish that. Both men
have denied that the final terms were substantially different from October's:

"On November 20th . . . Kissinger presented Thieu's proposed changes, as well as
some of our own . . . After several tough negotiating sessions , I concluded that
if we were to reach an agreement, we would have to abandon most of Thieu's major
demands. I instructed Kissinger to seek a settlement along the lines of the
October agreement."

Nixon, "No More Vietnams," pg. 156.

Both men are clear about the limited goals they had for LB II, and getting a
substantial improvement in the October terms wasn't one of them.. While neither of
them are exactly known for their veracity when discussing their own actions, the
paper record as well as the accounts of others (US, RVN and DRVN) who participated
in the negotiating process backs up their account. "The Palace File" telexes show
the various minor changes made in the terms throughout the negotiations, as Nixon
(or sometimes Kissinger or Haig) inform Thieu of them. The DRVN refused to give in
on the major changes that Thieu wanted, and as shown in the quote from Nixon above,
the US accepted that they would not agree to them, and negotiated accordingly.

Guy

Guy Alcala wrote:

There is absolutely no support in the historical record, none, for Ed's belief that
LB II somehow 'won' the war or even that it brought about significantly better
terms, or that Nixon and Kissinger were even trying to accomplish that.

Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
fact that LB II won the VN war: it - and it alone -
convinced the N. Vietnamese that the gloves were coming
off, for the very first time. They had a choice: return
to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
or return completely to the stone age at home.
For the very first time, the N. Vietnamese approached the
talks with something other than deceit and delay in mind:
their continued survival.

Academics can revise history as much as they want, as can
bureaucrats and politicians write books glorifying their
own involvement and marginalizing the contributions of
others (best recent example: Richard Clarke's shameless
book-marketing 09/11 committee) - but they cannot change
the actual events that occurred. Far too many direct
participants (and individuals extremely interested in
then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.

In fact, I was so impressed with the change in direction at
that time, I returned to active duty back then... and became
a "lifer".

Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
fact that LB II won the VN war

That same "historical record" says the 8th Air Force bombing missions into
Germany destroyed the Germans war making capability. That "fact" has been
disproven countless times.

They had a choice: return
to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
or return completely to the stone age at home.

You sound like LeMay. You do realize they already were in the stone age right?
Tell me, what critical infastructure did we destroy during LB II that wasn't
already operating at less than 25%?

For the very first time, the N. Vietnamese approached the
talks with something other than deceit and delay in mind:
their continued survival.

Wrong. They had already agreed to the same document in October '72 that they
did in January '73. Linebacker I and the Freedom Porch missions proved to the
NVN that ARVN ground forces and U.S. Air power could, quite effectively,
prevent their conquest of SVN. The solution; sign a Peace Accord removing the
U.S. from the picture, which they agreed to in October '72 and had it not been
for SVN President Nguyen Van Thieu's refusal to publicly "ok" the deal (I don't
believe he had to sign anything as SVN was not a participant in Paris), LB II
would never have been required. NVN was not fighting for their survival *ever*
during that conflict. Their industrial base was barely existant in 1964, they
counted on imports from China and the Soviet Union for everything except rice
and since we never took real measures to cut off their imports (mining of
Haiphong harbor in 1972 was like closing the barn door after the horses got
out), their existance was never threatened...even during LB II.

Academics can revise history as much as they want

There's no doubt that this does occur, but not in this case. You could prove
your point simply by providing some sort of proof that the bombing during LB II
was causing such damage that the NVN government feared they would be defeated
if it did not stop.

Far too many direct
participants (and individuals extremely interested in
then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.

While I was only 4 at the time, you can consider me one of your; "individuals
extremely interested in then-current events". In fact, nearly every one in the
USAF should be interested in getting the real scoop on LB II, because learning
the wrong lesson is often worse then not learning a lesson at all....


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On 17 Apr 2004 13:42:06 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
fact that LB II won the VN war

That same "historical record" says the 8th Air Force bombing missions into
Germany destroyed the Germans war making capability. That "fact" has been
disproven countless times.

There is history and there is history. A lot of history is
interpretive and some is even revisionist. You might say the 8th
didn't destroy German industry, but you could just as easily suggest
that lack of petroleum products, lack of precision machine tooling,
lack of ball-bearings, lack of a viable transportation network, etc.
won the war.

They had a choice: return
to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
or return completely to the stone age at home.

You sound like LeMay. You do realize they already were in the stone age right?
Tell me, what critical infastructure did we destroy during LB II that wasn't
already operating at less than 25%?

For a stone age country, the seemed to generate an incredible number
of electronic emissions, starting with the early warning radar that
would ping us on the tankers through the command/control that
integrated the MiGs, SAMs and AAA fire. Or maybe the transportation
that managed to ship arms and materiel to sustain the combat
operations in the south.

Academics can revise history as much as they want

There's no doubt that this does occur, but not in this case. You could prove
your point simply by providing some sort of proof that the bombing during LB II
was causing such damage that the NVN government feared they would be defeated
if it did not stop.

I think the simple cause/effect relationship of recalcitrance in
Nov-Dec, then in just eleven days an agreement is signed and within
six weeks C-141s are flying in and out of Gia Lam bringing the POWs
home is all the proof required.

Far too many direct
participants (and individuals extremely interested in
then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.

While I was only 4 at the time, you can consider me one of your; "individuals
extremely interested in then-current events". In fact, nearly every one in the
USAF should be interested in getting the real scoop on LB II, because learning
the wrong lesson is often worse then not learning a lesson at all....

Absolutely true, Santayna. The lesson of LB II taken in the context of
an eight year war against NVN is that the Powell/Bush doctrine is
correct---don't enter a war without a clear objective. Once committed,
win quickly with overwhelming force. When victory is achieved have a
defined exit strategy.

If you think the lesson of LB II is something different, you're in the
wrong business.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On 17 Apr 2004 13:42:06 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
fact that LB II won the VN war

That same "historical record" says the 8th Air Force bombing missions into
Germany destroyed the Germans war making capability. That "fact" has been
disproven countless times.

There is history and there is history. A lot of history is
interpretive and some is even revisionist. You might say the 8th
didn't destroy German industry, but you could just as easily suggest
that lack of petroleum products, lack of precision machine tooling,
lack of ball-bearings, lack of a viable transportation network, etc.
won the war.

You could say that. You could also say that the loss of their petroleum source
(Ploesti) to the Soviets on August 31st,1944, as well as the loss of the coke
supplies of France (Western allies, August-September; can't make steel without coke)
had more than a little to do with it. Oh, and the several million German military
casualties suffered on the Eastern Front might be due a little credit too, don't you
think? ;-)

They had a choice: return
to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
or return completely to the stone age at home.

You sound like LeMay. You do realize they already were in the stone age right?
Tell me, what critical infastructure did we destroy during LB II that wasn't
already operating at less than 25%?

For a stone age country, the seemed to generate an incredible number
of electronic emissions, starting with the early warning radar that
would ping us on the tankers through the command/control that
integrated the MiGs, SAMs and AAA fire.

Precisely how much of this did they make themselves, so that we could target the
production facilities? Zero.

Or maybe the transportation
that managed to ship arms and materiel to sustain the combat
operations in the south.

They did build bicycles themselves, I'll give you that. All other road/rail
vehicles came in from outside the country.


Academics can revise history as much as they want

There's no doubt that this does occur, but not in this case. You could prove
your point simply by providing some sort of proof that the bombing during LB II
was causing such damage that the NVN government feared they would be defeated
if it did not stop.

I think the simple cause/effect relationship of recalcitrance in
Nov-Dec, then in just eleven days an agreement is signed and within
six weeks C-141s are flying in and out of Gia Lam bringing the POWs
home is all the proof required.

Ed, the only problem is that you ignore all that had gone before and was still going
on throughout, none of which you were aware of at the time. See my other post.



Far too many direct
participants (and individuals extremely interested in
then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.

While I was only 4 at the time, you can consider me one of your; "individuals
extremely interested in then-current events". In fact, nearly every one in the
USAF should be interested in getting the real scoop on LB II, because learning
the wrong lesson is often worse then not learning a lesson at all....

Absolutely true, Santayna. The lesson of LB II taken in the context of
an eight year war against NVN is that the Powell/Bush doctrine is
correct---don't enter a war without a clear objective.

Once committed,
win quickly with overwhelming force. When victory is achieved have a
defined exit strategy.

And hope like hell that the other side's definition of losing is the opposite of
your definition of winning, and that they will accept and conform to your exit
strategy. Neither may be the case, especially in limited wars.

If you think the lesson of LB II is something different, you're in the
wrong business.

Actually, LB II did have a clear strategy, but it wasn't the one you state. It was
more "By bombing NVN before Congress comes back into session and cuts off all funds,
I can convince Thieu that we will continue to back him should the DRVN violate the
accords, while also convincing the DRVN that it's not worth it for them to hold out
for the whole loaf but accept the same offer they'd previously agreed to before
Thieu queered the deal, so we can get our PoWs back and get the hell out of there
with as much dignity as we can muster."

Nixon was successful on the first three counts, and the fourth was arguable.
"Winning the war" was never his goal with LB II; he knew that the war could only be
won in South Vietnam, unless we were prepared to obliterate North Vietnam and risk a
direct confrontation with the PRC and/or the USSR. Politically (and morally), that
wasn't an option, unless you feel that Nixon was willing and able to order the
AF/Navy to destroy the Chinese and Soviet factories that were producing virtually
all the north's war needs, along with the Eastern Bloc cargo ships that brought much
of it there, and the north's own food supplies? Or how about just nuking Hanoi,
Haiphong, and the Red River Delta in general?

Guy

On Sun, 18 Apr 2004 07:48:39 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On 17 Apr 2004 13:42:06 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

That same "historical record" says the 8th Air Force bombing missions into
Germany destroyed the Germans war making capability. That "fact" has been
disproven countless times.

There is history and there is history. A lot of history is
interpretive and some is even revisionist. You might say the 8th
didn't destroy German industry, but you could just as easily suggest
that lack of petroleum products, lack of precision machine tooling,
lack of ball-bearings, lack of a viable transportation network, etc.
won the war.

You could say that. You could also say that the loss of their petroleum source
(Ploesti) to the Soviets on August 31st,1944, as well as the loss of the coke
supplies of France (Western allies, August-September; can't make steel without coke)
had more than a little to do with it. Oh, and the several million German military
casualties suffered on the Eastern Front might be due a little credit too, don't you
think? ;-)

Which, I think, makes my point. The victory comes from a complex
intermix of events. To discount the impact of the 8th AF on Germany's
capability to continue is to grossly over-simplify.

It may be a return to the cliches of AF vs Army dialog in which the
regular repitition of "boots on the ground" or "a tank on the front
lawn of their O'club" is refuted by anecdotes of the rapid termination
of hostilities after Aug 6 & 9, 1945, or Dec 29, 1972, or or Desert
Storm's 100 day air/100 hour ground war.

They had a choice: return
to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
or return completely to the stone age at home.

You sound like LeMay. You do realize they already were in the stone age right?
Tell me, what critical infastructure did we destroy during LB II that wasn't
already operating at less than 25%?

For a stone age country, the seemed to generate an incredible number
of electronic emissions, starting with the early warning radar that
would ping us on the tankers through the command/control that
integrated the MiGs, SAMs and AAA fire.

Precisely how much of this did they make themselves, so that we could target the
production facilities? Zero.

Or maybe the transportation
that managed to ship arms and materiel to sustain the combat
operations in the south.

They did build bicycles themselves, I'll give you that. All other road/rail
vehicles came in from outside the country.

So, how did it get into the country and to the point of application if
as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
bridges, cranes, etc?


Academics can revise history as much as they want

There's no doubt that this does occur, but not in this case. You could prove
your point simply by providing some sort of proof that the bombing during LB II
was causing such damage that the NVN government feared they would be defeated
if it did not stop.

I think the simple cause/effect relationship of recalcitrance in
Nov-Dec, then in just eleven days an agreement is signed and within
six weeks C-141s are flying in and out of Gia Lam bringing the POWs
home is all the proof required.

Ed, the only problem is that you ignore all that had gone before and was still going
on throughout, none of which you were aware of at the time. See my other post.

Ahh, what a cruel accusation after all these years. Do you really
consider that I ignore all the history or that my perspective is so
narrow?


Far too many direct
participants (and individuals extremely interested in
then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.

While I was only 4 at the time, you can consider me one of your; "individuals
extremely interested in then-current events". In fact, nearly every one in the
USAF should be interested in getting the real scoop on LB II, because learning
the wrong lesson is often worse then not learning a lesson at all....

Absolutely true, Santayna. The lesson of LB II taken in the context of
an eight year war against NVN is that the Powell/Bush doctrine is
correct---don't enter a war without a clear objective.

Once committed,
win quickly with overwhelming force. When victory is achieved have a
defined exit strategy.

And hope like hell that the other side's definition of losing is the opposite of
your definition of winning, and that they will accept and conform to your exit
strategy. Neither may be the case, especially in limited wars.

If you think the lesson of LB II is something different, you're in the
wrong business.

Actually, LB II did have a clear strategy, but it wasn't the one you state. It was
more "By bombing NVN before Congress comes back into session and cuts off all funds,
I can convince Thieu that we will continue to back him should the DRVN violate the
accords, while also convincing the DRVN that it's not worth it for them to hold out
for the whole loaf but accept the same offer they'd previously agreed to before
Thieu queered the deal, so we can get our PoWs back and get the hell out of there
with as much dignity as we can muster."

Nixon was successful on the first three counts, and the fourth was arguable.
"Winning the war" was never his goal with LB II; he knew that the war could only be
won in South Vietnam, unless we were prepared to obliterate North Vietnam and risk a
direct confrontation with the PRC and/or the USSR.

You've said a mouthful, but unfortunately even those of us with the
largest orifice sometimes can't get the whole thing in. You might also
put it into the context of presidential politics. The Nixon policy of
Vietnamization that started in '68 had already been nearly completely
implemented. It was acknowledged at all levels that all we wanted was
a "withdrawal with honor" and release of the POWs.

Let's also acknowledge that the Oct termination of LB was just prior
to election and that both the Nixon administration and the NV/VC were
using it to their advantage. Once elected, and prior to inauguration
for his second term, with four years ahead of him, Nixon felt free to
flex our muscle to wrap things up quickly. He did.

The final point you make is a good one. The clear differences in ROE
between Rolling Thunder when we were decidedly tentative without a
clear knowledge that it was possible to keep the nuclear genie in the
bottle and the wider latitude for action in LB and finally LB II is
evidence. After eight years we had developed a much better picture of
the relationship between Vietnam and China, as well as the split
between the Soviets and Chinese. And, we knew that the Viets were
Soviet clients rather than Sino-proxies. Neither of the big players
were going to get confrontational and both benefited from our
political unrest.


Politically (and morally), that
wasn't an option, unless you feel that Nixon was willing and able to order the
AF/Navy to destroy the Chinese and Soviet factories that were producing virtually
all the north's war needs, along with the Eastern Bloc cargo ships that brought much
of it there, and the north's own food supplies? Or how about just nuking Hanoi,
Haiphong, and the Red River Delta in general?

Ahh, now there's a picture to contemplate.

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

So, how did it get into the country and to the point of application if
as BUFFDRVR contends there was no critical infrastructre left for LB
II to attack? Can you say harbors, marshalling areas, roads, rail,
bridges, cranes, etc?

The mining of Haiphong harbor was a great move, and had the plan been to
re-seed the minefield weekly (which is required to keep a minefield useful) and
keep Haiphong shutdown, perhaps in a month or two, frontline units would have
really felt a pinch. In fact, many frontline NVA units were already feeling a
pinch because the supply network, designed to supply VC and NVA regulars in SVN
with 34 tons of supplies/day (7 x 2 1/2 ton trucks worth) was unable to
adequately supply a 3 division force, even if it wasn't being hit from the air.
Linebacker I and the Freedom Porch missions "ended the war" (if we have to use
that term) by hitting those critical supply nodes. LB II simply hit them
again..and again..and again, but even before they were hit the first time
during LB II, most were already unsuitable for their designed task or able to
perform 25% or less of their designed task.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

You might say the 8th
didn't destroy German industry, but you could just as easily suggest
that lack of petroleum products, lack of precision machine tooling,
lack of ball-bearings, lack of a viable transportation network, etc.
won the war.

Except that the only real shortage they had that you listed was
petroleum....and eventually land as the Army rolled into Germany. The 8th AF
bombing campaign depleted POL stores and forced Germany to use men and
equipment to defend from air strikes that otherwise would have been used with
front line units. Except, at SOS and even ACSC you'll "learn" the 8th AF
bombing campaign "won the war in Europe".

For a stone age country, the seemed to generate an incredible number
of electronic emissions, starting with the early warning radar that
would ping us on the tankers through the command/control that
integrated the MiGs, SAMs and AAA fire.

Thanks to the Soviets and Chinese certain parts of their military were in the
20th Century, but most of their military (supplied via Schwinn bicycle) and the
infrastructure and population were not far removed from at least the Bronze
Age.

Or maybe the transportation
that managed to ship arms and materiel to sustain the combat
operations in the south.

Ed, that transportation network consisted of a hundred or so WW II era French
trucks and a few hundred bicycles. Hardly "hi-tech".

I think the simple cause/effect relationship of recalcitrance in
Nov-Dec, then in just eleven days an agreement is signed and within
six weeks C-141s are flying in and out of Gia Lam bringing the POWs
home is all the proof required.

That's simply wrong. Yes, LB II was a *part* of making the above happen, but to
claim it was the single reason, or even the main reason is wrong. If Nixon and
Kissenger had not stiff armed Thieu into blessing the already agreed upon peace
plan, LB II would have lasted until congress returned from break and voted to
suspend all funding for the war in SE Asia. You're trying to make a simple
cause-effect relationship out of a situation with more than two "moving parts".
However, what you say is also being taught in Air Force PME, which IMHO is
tragic.

Absolutely true, Santayna. The lesson of LB II taken in the context of
an eight year war against NVN is that the Powell/Bush doctrine is
correct---don't enter a war without a clear objective. Once committed,
win quickly with overwhelming force. When victory is achieved have a
defined exit strategy.

If you think the lesson of LB II is something different, you're in the
wrong business.

I'd say your first statement is the lesson learned from the entire conflict.
The lesson learned from LB II is that air power can be as much a political
weapon as a military one and used in conjunction with political forces can
allow the U.S. to achieve limited political objectives. The lesson being
taught, and the wrong one IMHO is; If we had just done LB II in 1965, the war
would have ended in 1966.Or; LB II ended the war because of the tremendous
damage we caused to the North Vietnamese, forcing them to sue for peace
(without admitting they had already agreed to it).


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

BUFDRVR wrote:

Thanks to the Soviets and Chinese certain parts of their military were in the
20th Century, but most of their military (supplied via Schwinn bicycle) and the
infrastructure and population were not far removed from at least the Bronze
Age.

Or maybe the transportation
that managed to ship arms and materiel to sustain the combat
operations in the south.

Ed, that transportation network consisted of a hundred or so WW II era French
trucks and a few hundred bicycles. Hardly "hi-tech".

Damn! I had no idea that the hundreds of NVN trucks
we destroyed in Laos during 1970/71 had left them with
so few vehicles at home, just a year or so later.

Damn! I had no idea that the hundreds of NVN trucks
we destroyed in Laos during 1970/71 had left them with
so few vehicles at home, just a year or so later.

First, the "hundred or so trucks" I referred to were the ones in use on the Ho
Chi Mihn trail, not delivering goods in downtown Hanoi. Secondly, throughout
the war, post-strike assesments of trucks destroyed was so overly inflated that
by late 1968, we had destroyed more trucks on the trail then North Vietnam had
in the entire country. The CIA doesn't have a very good reputation now, but
during Vietnam they were very accurate and routinely cut in half or even thirds
the reported destroyed vehicle reports. They also were very accurate in their
assesment of the effect we had on NVN POL stores.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"