Cirrus Death Trap?

"Mxsmanic" wrote in message
What kind of plane do you suggest he should have been flying that would
have
made this accident less likely?

I don't have enough information to make a suggestion.

That never stopped you before.

If there's any increased overall risk in flying a Cirrus, it's the false
sense of security it may give some pilots flying IFR.

More generally, it's the the false sense of security it may give some
pilots.

Why is the sense of security false? Are you suggesting that glass cockpits
aren't a very good thing?

m

Happy Dog writes:

Why is the sense of security false?

Because the set of situations in which the gadgets actually increase
security is much smaller than the set of situations in which they
_appear_ increase security to the unsophisticated observer.

Are you suggesting that glass cockpits aren't a very good thing?

In theory, they are fine. In practice, I don't trust them. There are
extremely complex systems that are not adequately tested or debugged,
and they are backed by computers, which have catastrophic failure
modes that more traditional avionics systems do not share.

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"Mxsmanic" wrote in
Why is the sense of security false?

Because the set of situations in which the gadgets actually increase
security is much smaller than the set of situations in which they
_appear_ increase security to the unsophisticated observer.

Examples, please.

Are you suggesting that glass cockpits aren't a very good thing?

In theory, they are fine. In practice, I don't trust them. There are
extremely complex systems that are not adequately tested or debugged,
and they are backed by computers, which have catastrophic failure
modes that more traditional avionics systems do not share.

And these failures have resulted in how many accidents vs. those caused by
failures in old technology avionics?

moo

Happy Dog writes:

Examples, please.

Parachutes on Cirrus aircraft.

And these failures have resulted in how many accidents vs. those caused by
failures in old technology avionics?

They aren't widespread enough in most parts of the industry to be a
problem yet, and in any case, avionics failures are not a leading
cause of accidents, IIRC.

--
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On Fri, 13 Oct 2006 16:32:45 -0400, Happy Dog wrote:

Why is the sense of security false? Are you suggesting that glass
cockpits aren't a very good thing?

You didn't read about NW_Pilot's Atlantic Crossing?

- Andrew

On Fri, 13 Oct 2006 12:16:43 -0400, Peter R. wrote:

My recollection of these accidents is that at least two of those three
were a result of a mechanic incorrectly mounting the ailerons, not
inherent control system design flaws.

I don't know anything about these incidents. However, if I noted that the
number of "mechanic installed incorrectly" was unusually high for
something, I'd look for a problem which caused this. It could be
design...or perhaps documentation, training, or something else.

- Andrew

On Fri, 13 Oct 2006 09:23:46 -0700, cosmo_kramer1 wrote:

I think we can all agree on that!

Balloon?

- Andrew

Dylan Smith wrote:

On 2006-10-13, Mxsmanic wrote:

Also, it seems like the aircraft is actively marketed to precisely
this type of buyer, which makes things even worse. It looks like Carl
Lidle fell for it (in more ways than one).


The type of aircraft he was in was utterly irrelevant. Smashing into a
building in a Cessna 150 is just as fatal as hitting a building in a
Cirrus, or a Learjet, or an ultralight.


It is completely relevant. A Cessna 150 could make the turn much
tighter than could a Cirrus. They may well have missed the building
easily had they been in a slower airplane.


Matt

Dylan Smith wrote:

On 2006-10-13, Mike wrote:

The type of aircraft he was in was utterly irrelevant. Smashing into a
building in a Cessna 150 is just as fatal as hitting a building in a
Cirrus, or a Learjet, or an ultralight.


How do you know the aircraft is irrelevant? Please post your source.


F=ma (force = mass x acceleration). Or in this case, deceleration.

A 100kg human in an ultralight travelling at 25 metres/sec hitting a
building and decelerating to zero in 0.5 sec (entirely plausable) will
experience a force of 100 * 50 newtons (5,000 newtons) in the initial
impact. Not to mention the bits of the building which are likely to
shatter and pierce the body. But a force of 5,000 newtons against a
human body is usually enough to kill. So it's pretty irrelevant whether
a plane is a slow one or a fast one like a Cirrus - slamming (to use
Lune's favorite word) into the side of a building is usually not going
to be survivable.


You are making the flawed assumption that the type of airplane has no
bearing on whether the crash occurred. A slower airplane may well have
avoided the crash and thus your analysis above is irrelevant.


Matt

Jim Macklin wrote:

Thurman Munson also had a CFI with him too. A CFI who is
not experienced in the airspace, or airplane is a broken
crutch. A PIC accompanied by a CFI is not doing his command
job. Rules by the Yankee's organization to require a CFI
should require active crew resource management, planning and
dispatch by the CFI. Two pilots waiting for the other to
make a decision will have an accident sooner or later.
IMHO
http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/n...SB-AAR-80-2%22

The report you cite mentions that Munson's "instructor" was merely a passenger for the
flight. He had no flying experience in turbojet aircraft (I assume they mean as
pilot). The instructor in this accident apparently was well aquainted with the
aircraft type and provided instruction in that type. As for airspace awareness, that
may well be a factor and there is no subsitute for local experience. However the
airspace around Manhattan is not a secret and I would expect an instructor to be able
to obtain all of the information needed to safely pass through that airspace, from the
terminal chart, from talking to local pilots, and just mentally calculating the turn as
well as both pilots keeping their eyes outside the airplane.

Does anyone know at what elevation the impact took place? Were the pilots trying to
change the turn at the last minute if they suddenly saw the building, or is there
anything to suggest that they knew they were headed for the building but unable to
change course (mechanical malfunction), despite trying to do so? I'm very curious
about the time interval between when they first realized there could be a collision and
the impact.