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On Feb 19, 4:43*pm, Darryl Ramm wrote:
On Feb 19, 12:02*pm, Ramy wrote: On Feb 19, 7:44*am, Andy wrote: The following references are provided, without my comment, for those interested in the subject of stall recognition and recovery. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1234...?mod=djemalert... reports on the referenced fatal accident: http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...05MA003&rpt=fa http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2007/AAR0701.pdf Andy I simply don't buy it. How any pilot with even basic experience, not to mention thousands of hours, will react to a stall warning by pulling on the stick/yoke?? and "pitched up to a 31-degree angle" ?? It's not like they were so close to the ground that they had to pullup to clear it. As usual, the NTSB rather put the blame on the pilots... Ramy What you think the pilots should not be blamed becasue they could not possibly be so incompetent to conduct the amazing list of bad decisions and errors that made? That's an interesting defense. Well if that accident chain does not deserve to be blamed on the pilots I don't know what does. Lets see, lets climb the sucker to FL410, with the AP in rate mode so is really slow when we get there, lets not monitor airspeed during this (even though we know are pushing the envelope). Lets not follow engine failure checklists properly, lets not pitch over and correctly do a windmills start, etc. (I can't recall if it as established how much they knew about core lock if at all, but they failed to execute basic restart procedure). Lets not declare our emergency and try to cover up for a while hoping we can get ourselves out of this hole. Lets not fly the sucker when all else goes wrong and maintain glide to any of several airports etc. etc. etc. This flight crew deserved evey bit of cricism they got. Some aspects of training programs and the core lock on the GE engines etc. need to be addressed but are very distant factors in my opinion. And dude if that does ### convince you these folks were an accident waiting to happen read ### cockpit transcript. Dude. Most commentators came down hard on the pilots as well, including several magazine articles. There are multiple fatal accidents where things as "simple" as misunderstanding stick shaker/pusher vs. Mach buffeting, obstructed pitot/static systems (and fighting the stick pusher thinking it was Mach induced, etc. etc.). However none of those are even close to *the chain of events this flight crew managed to accomplish. Darryl- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - I don't think we are talking about the same accidents Darryl. I was referring to the recent one in the article. And I don't say pilots should not be blamed for many possible mistakes they do. All I say is that I don't buy the claim that experience pilot purposely pulled the yoke and piched up to 31 degree angle without recognizing he is stalling the aircraft. Unless I missread the article this is a complete BS. Ramy |
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