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On Sun, 18 Jan 2004 02:01:50 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote: If we use a SWAG of eight men per heavy gun and four per lighter gun, and maybe four per searchlight, that gives you some 125,000 personnel *just in the weapons crews themselves*. Even if you assume that the Flak units required less service support committment than frontline combat units (where the teeth-to-tail ratio was probably in the five or six-to-one range at best) and assumed a one-to-one ratio, you are talking another 125K personnel right there. That is already 250K personnel tied up in the defense effort without even starting to consider the Luftwaffe flying assets. I'd be very surprised if the total number of German personnel tied to the defense effort against the CBO was not well in excess of 500K personnel...at a time when Wehrmacht units were furiously disbanding some units in a vain effort to keep others in a fill-status that *remotely* resembled their TO&E requirements. The real question is where would the personelly otherwise tied up in the AA defense be more useful to the German war effort. Most of the crews were not fit to serve in the front line units either because they were in the wrong age or sex group. Some of them weren't even Germans. Against one eight man gun crew you'd have one ten man B-17 crew. Which crew costs its parent country more to sustain in the combat? Which brings us to the second point--the allies could *afford* to dedicate personnel and resources to the CBO because we had an over-abundance of manpower and equipment resources. We were challenged to support the scope of the force that we DID have fighting on the continent--tossing more manpower into the equation would just exacerbate the support constraints. OTOH, the Germans were already short manpower and equipment almost across the board--keeping tank strength in their panzer units up to minimal levels was a nightmare, and they were lacking infantry and artillerymen as well. Their tactical air support efforts were seriously hampered by the need to continue the defense effort back home. So in the end the CBO, if it accomplished nothing else, applied additional pressure to the German manning and equipment shortfalls affecting their frontline units that would not have been present had the CBO not occured. This point is valid, with some limits. Indeed, Allies could afford to send their best human material into strategic bombing. The question is whether this human material who flew and supported strategic bombing offensive could have been used more efficiently. It shouldn't be forgotten that half of the bombs dropped by CBO on German controlled territory was dropped after September 1944 when German army and air force were thoroughly defeated and were unlikely to survive 1945 campaign season even if CBO completely stopped then. CBO was a consequence of Germany being fully engaged in Soviet Union with Allies reluctant to risk their ground troops until they became sure in the victory. If it weren't for collapse of France in 1940, I doubt British would choose to build Bomber Command on the expense of increased BEF. They did? And what were they? The PIAT? They had antitank guns too. Not too many, but on the other hand, II SS Panzer corps didn't have that many tanks either. You are dreaming here--they faced those panzers, and they did NOT hold out "for a long time". They were expected to hold for 48 hours. They held out for nine days and their opponents weren't limited to II SS panzerkorps. Their AT capabilities were ABYSMAL. And you have again ignored the REAL problems with Market Garden--the poor and limited capacity axis of advnace given to XXX Corps, the lack of decent DZ's around Arnhem close enough to the targets, and that great unknown--the weather. Allies had a capability to make two drops on the first day. They chose not to exercise it. It was a mistake. If there were more troops at Arnhem, Urquhart would have had enough troops to attack towards the bridge and hold the DZs. With only one drop, he deemed capture of the bridge more important and sent troops there hoping that XXX corps would establish the land supply line. Drax remove NOSPAM for reply |
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