A aviation & planes forum. AviationBanter

If this is your first visit, be sure to check out the FAQ by clicking the link above. You may have to register before you can post: click the register link above to proceed. To start viewing messages, select the forum that you want to visit from the selection below.

Go Back   Home » AviationBanter forum » rec.aviation newsgroups » Military Aviation
Site Map Home Register Authors List Search Today's Posts Mark Forums Read Web Partners

Area bombing is not a dirty word.



 
 
Thread Tools Display Modes
  #1  
Old January 1st 04, 11:14 PM
Kevin Brooks
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"B2431" wrote in message
...

snip

You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would

have
lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther the

war
would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole

primary
targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and flack.


I think you'd have to toss transportation into the mix right after the
petroleum industry. IMO the biggest positive effects of the combined bombing
offensive were in the end (1) tying up German manpower and resources in the
defense effort, (2) drastic reduction in German petroleum production
(belated effort, but still effective in the end), and (3) making
transportation even less effective (given the impact of #2) through
disruption of their rail and (less so) road nets, and severely disrupting
transport capability during the critical period leading to and immediately
after D-Day. As to airfields--I doubt there was as much value for the
heavies in that arena, as any flat cow pasture could serve as a fighter
strip in those days (and often did), making the finding of them a bit
difficult. Flak is a non-starter, at least for the level bombers, as the
bombing accuracy of the day just could not ensure taking out individual flak
positions--when your CEP is approaching a mile or more, SEAD just is not a
realistic mission, especilayy when viewed against other targets that could
be effectively engaged (industrial).

Brooks


Dan, U. S. Air Force, retired



  #2  
Old January 2nd 04, 05:26 AM
Charles Gray
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

One thing that is often levied agaionst the bombing campaigns is the
fact that German production increased as the war came to an end (at
least until the last few days when industry was being overrun).
But, the reality is not so clear. WE need to realize that Germany
did not go to a full wartime production footing until 1943-44, and as
such, there wsa a great deal of "fat" in the industry that could be
cut-- in other words, while bombing did not stop the increase of
production, that was also due to the fact that the germans were only
beginning to introduce the wartime production measures that had been
par for the course in the U.S. and England from 1939 (england) and
1941 (US) on.
The German industrial expansion was dramatically slowed by the
bombing campaign, as many, many books I have on German air projects
contian notes like " The project was abandoned after the
prototype/engines/airframe/fill in the blank was destroyed by U.s.
bombing.

  #4  
Old January 2nd 04, 10:56 PM
BUFDRVR
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

The reason German production increased is because we stopped bombing
production
facilites and switched to oil knowing that they could make all they wanted
to,but without oil could never use any of it.


Well...kind of. Ike wanted to drastically reduce German mobility once Allied
ground forces were on the continent, so he urged the elevation in priority of
POL targets in late 1943. It obviously turned out to have a greater strategic
value, but many historians believe that had Ike not asked Hap Arnold to elevate
the priority of POL, it may not have been done. Ike was thinking tactically,
but the results were on the strategic level.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"
  #9  
Old January 4th 04, 02:28 AM
Peter Stickney
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

In article ,
"Kevin Brooks" writes:

"B2431" wrote in message
...

snip

You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would

have
lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther the

war
would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole

primary
targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and flack.


I think you'd have to toss transportation into the mix right after the
petroleum industry.


Let's not forget training, either. Yes, there was a tremendous spurt
in production numbers in 1944, but what use was it when there were no
pilots to fly the airplanes, or crew the submarines or tanks?
What new pilots, or sub crews, or soldiers that could be trained, went
to their units with no operational training whatsoever. Survival at
that point was a matter of luck - they never got the chance to develop
skill.
The German Armed Forces going into 1945 were like an M&M. (Smartie,
for you Brits) A thin, hard shell of veterans surrounding a soft
innter layer.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster
  #10  
Old January 4th 04, 04:03 AM
Kevin Brooks
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"Peter Stickney" wrote in message
...
In article ,
"Kevin Brooks" writes:

"B2431" wrote in message
...

snip

You can see where I am going with this. I wonder how many airmen would

have
lived if the Allies changed their methods. I wonder how much shorther

the
war
would have been if oil production and distribution alone were the sole

primary
targets early in the war. Secondary targets would be airfields and

flack.

I think you'd have to toss transportation into the mix right after the
petroleum industry.


Let's not forget training, either. Yes, there was a tremendous spurt
in production numbers in 1944, but what use was it when there were no
pilots to fly the airplanes, or crew the submarines or tanks?
What new pilots, or sub crews, or soldiers that could be trained, went
to their units with no operational training whatsoever. Survival at
that point was a matter of luck - they never got the chance to develop
skill.
The German Armed Forces going into 1945 were like an M&M. (Smartie,
for you Brits) A thin, hard shell of veterans surrounding a soft
innter layer.


True, but the bombing campaign did not target "training", per se. Its effect
on the petroleum situation adversely impacted training, and the attrition of
Luftwaffe pilots defending against the campaign applied additional stress to
the training pipeline. But it would have been very hard to set forth a
bombing campaign during WWII with an objective of degrading the Germans'
ability to train.

Brooks


--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster



 




Thread Tools
Display Modes

Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

vB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is On
HTML code is Off
Forum Jump

Similar Threads
Thread Thread Starter Forum Replies Last Post
AOPA Sells-Out California Pilots in Military Airspace Grab? Larry Dighera Instrument Flight Rules 12 April 26th 04 06:12 PM
ILS Critical Area signage: Localizer or Glideslope? Adam K. Instrument Flight Rules 4 October 30th 03 10:09 PM
Soviet Submarines Losses - WWII Mike Yared Military Aviation 4 October 30th 03 03:09 AM
USAF = US Amphetamine Fools RT Military Aviation 104 September 25th 03 03:17 PM
Patrick AFB Area Log, Monday 30 June 2003 AllanStern Military Aviation 0 July 1st 03 06:37 AM


All times are GMT +1. The time now is 03:57 AM.


Powered by vBulletin® Version 3.6.4
Copyright ©2000 - 2025, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.
Copyright ©2004-2025 AviationBanter.
The comments are property of their posters.