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In article MtM2d.108280$3l3.81348@attbi_s03,
Mike Dargan writes: Tom Cervo wrote: The Pearl Harbor debacle is often blamed on lack of resources caused by inadequate support from the politicians. Wrong. Short and Kimmel had both quantitative and qualitative superiority but were hopelessly inept. Actually, they were probably quite able. They were simply expecting an attack in the Far East, and that PH might face sabotage or submarine attack as the base for the response for that attack. That remark (from Frank Knox?) about no, they must mean the Phillippines, shows that it didn't stop with them. And another thing, if they expected an attack in the Phillipines, why was the "American Caesar" caught thumbing his asshole while the Japs shot up his planes on the ground? Becasue of the weather over Formosa, the nearest Japanese air base, was lousy on the morning of December 8 (That International Date Line Thingy), the Japanese raids were delayed about 4 hours. Manila had heard of the events at Pearl Harbor, and went onto an alert footing, with fighters in the air. The weather delay paid off, since the fighters were on the ground refuelling after their initial patrols when the Japanese struck. That's not to say that there weren't screw-ups. There certainly were. MacArther's Aviation Commander wanted to use his B-17s to strike Formosa imeediately when they learned about Pearl Harbor. MacArthur shot that one down. The presence of Japanese fighters was unexpected, as well - No Carriers had been reported in the Philippine Archepelago, (which covers a lot of area), and the thought that a fighter could make the flight from Formosa was considered laughable. The Zero, however, could do that, and more. The lack of a warning and control network hamstrung the Americans, the Dutch in the East Indies, and the British in Singapore and Malaysia at the same time, as well. This meant that fighters protecting these locations didn't take off until teh raids were already in sight - just in time to have the fighter escorts drop on them like a bucket of rocks. That was a big difference wrt the P-40's performance in China, with the AVG, and their performance elsewhere at teh same time. Chennault had, as part of his setup, built up a network of agents and spotters to provide long-term warning of incoming Japanese raids. So, instead of the Japanese meeting fighters struggling to get their speed up and trying to climb to the bomber's altitude, the AVG was, for the most part, waiting for them, with an altitude and speed advantage. These days it would be called Energy Maneuverability. In WW 2 it was Hit and Run. In WW 1, it was The Hun in the Sun. In all cases, teh idea was to merge with the Bad Guys with a significant speed advantage, bust through in a single pass, without staying to turn, and, after blowing through, climb back to height and do it again. -- Pete Stickney A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many bad measures. -- Daniel Webster |
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