The end of the Naval Air Reserves???

Mr. Kambic makes some good points below, and the first paragraph of his I
left below is very true. The Navy has never quite seemed to been able to
integrate its reserve forces in the manner that the USAF has, even with the
drawdown after Desert Storm, when the reserves became a greater percentage
of the total force. The last USNR squadron I was in had spent the last few
years conducting 6 month deployments aboard ship. Unheard of not long
before.

What are some advantages of a robust reserve force? A typical RESFORON is
manned by aviators with an average of ten or more years of experience. These
aviators come at a cost of about 1/3 of their active duty counterparts. They
leave active duty for a variety of reasons, but allowing them to continue to
serve in a reserve capacity enables the Navy to retain experienced people at
a low cost. People who can be mobilized in time of national crisis. It's a
face card in the back pocket of the leadership.

I think someone made a statement that getting rid of some of the RESFORONS
will free up airframes for active duty squadrons.To me, that reasoning
sounds like a poor Band-Aid for an airframe availability problem. The
airframes the reserves get are usually the beaters and cast-offs from the
active duty. (It took a good deal of scraping to find FOUR airframes to
stand up HSL-60, all of which were put through rework before being sent to
the squadron.) Decimating reserve squadrons is not going to solve the woes
of the active duty side of nav air. As Mr. Kambic alluded to in his second
paragraph below, it may, in fact, lead to other problems in the future. If
getting rid of RESFORONS, hardware, and people, is seen as a solution to
budget problems, I think there may some more serious, underlying issues at
work.

Is there waste in the Naval Reserve? A certain amount exists on both sides
of the fence, and it becomes a matter of where you want to shine the
spotlight, your point of view, and your ability to spin.

One plan I have heard suggested is that reserve aircrews become part of
"augment units" that support active duty squadrons. This raised a few
questions, and I don't recall if they were really answered. How are the
reserve aircrews funded? Who will manage their continued training and
operating within the active duty squadrons? Could such a plan work? I think
so, but only if the active duty squadrons see the reserves as a benefit to
them.

Of course, as with any plan, the one that started this whole thread could
change by next week. In the end we shall see what we shall see.

Just my 2 cents.

Eric Scheie


"Bill Kambic" wrote in message
...

More to the point, loss of an internal Reserve hardware capability is
unlikely to EVER return. The RESFORONS have always been "poor relations"
but made do with what they had and sometimes embarassed Active Duty types
in
head to head competition. The Active Duty types have, in my personal
presence, often noted the vast "wastage" of funds on the Reserve hardware
units. (To be completely fair, a fair number have also "looked behind the
curtain" and seen the reasons why hardware units are a Very Good Thing.)

The likelyhood of facing the hords of the Red Army (or the late,
unlamented
Soviet Navy) is very small. But there are still places where you can lose
a
bunch of aircraft and people in a hurry and have to replace them the same
way (a "dust up" in North Korea comes to mind). The complexity of modern
aircraft means that the "WWII Approach" of 90 day wonder to Fleet Fighter
Pilot in a year (or so) is unlikely to EVER be seen again. This means
that
you have to have a "well" of trained people to draw on in time of crisis.
The REFORON/SRU hardware units filled that need. When they "go away" so
will a cheap solution to an expensive problem.

Bill Kambic

Formerly of VS-73 (the SRU part whose numbers escape me) and VP-93
(ditto),
NAF Detroit, 1974-1978

"Eric Scheie" wrote in message
. net...
Mr. Kambic makes some good points below, and the first paragraph of his I
left below is very true. The Navy has never quite seemed to been able to
integrate its reserve forces in the manner that the USAF has, even with
the
drawdown after Desert Storm, when the reserves became a greater percentage
of the total force. The last USNR squadron I was in had spent the last few
years conducting 6 month deployments aboard ship. Unheard of not long
before.

What are some advantages of a robust reserve force? A typical RESFORON is
manned by aviators with an average of ten or more years of experience.
These
aviators come at a cost of about 1/3 of their active duty counterparts.
They
leave active duty for a variety of reasons, but allowing them to continue
to
serve in a reserve capacity enables the Navy to retain experienced people
at
a low cost. People who can be mobilized in time of national crisis. It's a
face card in the back pocket of the leadership.

I doubt any here question their value. I don't.

I think someone made a statement that getting rid of some of the RESFORONS
will free up airframes for active duty squadrons.To me, that reasoning
sounds like a poor Band-Aid for an airframe availability problem. The
airframes the reserves get are usually the beaters and cast-offs from the
active duty. (It took a good deal of scraping to find FOUR airframes to
stand up HSL-60, all of which were put through rework before being sent to
the squadron.) Decimating reserve squadrons is not going to solve the woes
of the active duty side of nav air. As Mr. Kambic alluded to in his second
paragraph below, it may, in fact, lead to other problems in the future. If
getting rid of RESFORONS, hardware, and people, is seen as a solution to
budget problems, I think there may some more serious, underlying issues at
work.

At one time this was true. Currently, many of the Reserve's airframes have
less
hours on them. Will getting these airframes fix the problem? No, but it
may
keep us alive until the fix (new airframes) reaches us. The fact is that in
the
next few years squadrons will be decommissioned. What we're discussing
is who should lose those squadrons. Navair or Navairres.

Is there waste in the Naval Reserve? A certain amount exists on both sides
of the fence, and it becomes a matter of where you want to shine the
spotlight, your point of view, and your ability to spin.

One plan I have heard suggested is that reserve aircrews become part of
"augment units" that support active duty squadrons. This raised a few
questions, and I don't recall if they were really answered. How are the
reserve aircrews funded? Who will manage their continued training and
operating within the active duty squadrons? Could such a plan work? I
think
so, but only if the active duty squadrons see the reserves as a benefit to
them.

It worked in the 80's. I spent 4.5 years as a Selres in an SAU, VP-0545.
I enjoyed acdutras with VP-45 in both Rota and Bermuda and got some
quality onsta time. We seem to have forgotten the value of the SAU's.

Giz

On 7/4/03 3:52 PM, in article ,
"Giz" wrote:



Is there waste in the Naval Reserve? A certain amount exists on both sides
of the fence, and it becomes a matter of where you want to shine the
spotlight, your point of view, and your ability to spin.

One plan I have heard suggested is that reserve aircrews become part of
"augment units" that support active duty squadrons. This raised a few
questions, and I don't recall if they were really answered. How are the
reserve aircrews funded? Who will manage their continued training and
operating within the active duty squadrons? Could such a plan work? I
think
so, but only if the active duty squadrons see the reserves as a benefit to
them.

It worked in the 80's. I spent 4.5 years as a Selres in an SAU, VP-0545.
I enjoyed acdutras with VP-45 in both Rota and Bermuda and got some
quality onsta time. We seem to have forgotten the value of the SAU's.

Giz


SAU is a program that works in FRS's and deployed VP units but not in
reserve VF's or VFA's.

A single-seat pilot especially would have some major trouble working up for,
traveling to, and flying his ACDUTRA in a deployed CVW for two weeks for a
variety of reasons.

Likewise, the VFA's are not having the airframe problems that the VP's are
having.

What I'm saying is keep the reserve VFA status quo. Consider SAU-ing
reserves into the active duty VP's.

--Woody

"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...
On 7/4/03 3:52 PM, in article ,
"Giz" wrote:



Is there waste in the Naval Reserve? A certain amount exists on both
sides
of the fence, and it becomes a matter of where you want to shine the
spotlight, your point of view, and your ability to spin.

One plan I have heard suggested is that reserve aircrews become part of
"augment units" that support active duty squadrons. This raised a few
questions, and I don't recall if they were really answered. How are the
reserve aircrews funded? Who will manage their continued training and
operating within the active duty squadrons? Could such a plan work? I
think
so, but only if the active duty squadrons see the reserves as a benefit
to
them.

It worked in the 80's. I spent 4.5 years as a Selres in an SAU,
VP-0545.
I enjoyed acdutras with VP-45 in both Rota and Bermuda and got some
quality onsta time. We seem to have forgotten the value of the SAU's.

Giz


SAU is a program that works in FRS's and deployed VP units but not in
reserve VF's or VFA's.

A single-seat pilot especially would have some major trouble working up
for,
traveling to, and flying his ACDUTRA in a deployed CVW for two weeks for a
variety of reasons.

It would be difficult. There are FRS's for the VF/VFA communities. That
may
be one answer. It would definitely be far from ideal.

Likewise, the VFA's are not having the airframe problems that the VP's are
having.

No? The airframe transfer shellgame between deploying squadrons and those
just returning has ended? No sarcasm there. If that has ended, then the
VFA's
are doing well, but the last I heard was that returning squadrons were being
picked
apart to bring the deployers up to full strength.

What I'm saying is keep the reserve VFA status quo. Consider SAU-ing
reserves into the active duty VP's.

I agree that we should SAU all communities that need it. If that allows VFA
and/or
VF to remain as Reserve Squadrons great, but we do need to end the cycle of
aircraft transfers.

Giz

On 7/4/03 8:43 PM, in article ,
"Giz" wrote:


No? The airframe transfer shellgame between deploying squadrons and those
just returning has ended? No sarcasm there. If that has ended, then the
VFA's
are doing well, but the last I heard was that returning squadrons were being
picked
apart to bring the deployers up to full strength.
I agree that we should SAU all communities that need it. If that allows VFA
and/or
VF to remain as Reserve Squadrons great, but we do need to end the cycle of
aircraft transfers.

Giz


From an idealist's standpoint, I agree with you... but after 17 years of
experience in Naval Air, I've observed that post-deployment airframe
transfers are the norm. More commonly, a squadron would put their jets into
preservation for 1-2 months after coming back from deployment and lose parts
support. In Hornet squadrons (because each squadron typically flies only 1
or 2 lots of jets (e.g. mine flies 8's and 9's) preservation is more common
than transfers. What I'm saying is that in the TACAIR communities,
airframe transfers are not necessarily a gauge of health because Naval Air
has been unhealthy from a parts and airframes standpoint ever since I was an
Ensign.

A better indicator might be the number of airplanes air wings deploy with.
On my first cruise, an air wing had 90 aircraft. My most recent cruise:
70. That's all funding-driven. Sure we still have 46-50 bomb-droppers, but
we could have more (i.e. an even better tooth-to-tail) if the budget would
allow it. The leadership has allowed (even promoted) the decrease to keep
aircraft carrier decks filled and because it looks more efficient. So we're
agreed that Naval Aviation could be healthier--just not what the indicators
of health are.

What's the cure? Certainly not shutting down the reserve hardware units.
The defense budget has been decreasing as a percentage of the total federal
budget for a long time and there's no reason to suspect that it won't
continue to decrease. Even if the money from the reserves is absorbed into
the active duty coffers, it will only serve as a band aid fix. And without
extra capability to fund, congress will continue to shave off dollars in the
years ahead because they will have no reason not to.

The net result will be
(a) "Termination" of the Navy's "insurance policy" (such as VFA-201 provided
for CVW-8 this year) and
(b) Loss of 60% of the Navy's adversary players (all reserve squadrons right
now).

Because of the lack of adversary units, (and the fact that in the last 3
"wars" that there was no credible air-to-air threat) the case will be made
that air-to-air training syllabi can be decreased and/or civilian units
flying CAT III aircraft will be brought in to augment the VFC's. This "cart
before the horse" mentality will certainly work in the short term, but will
leave Naval aviators ill-prepared for conflicts involving better equipped
and more serious forces.

Sounds a lot like "the sky is falling." It's not, but it's getting a whole
lot darker.

--Woody

"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...
On 7/4/03 8:43 PM, in article ,
"Giz" wrote:


No? The airframe transfer shellgame between deploying squadrons and
those
just returning has ended? No sarcasm there. If that has ended, then
the
VFA's
are doing well, but the last I heard was that returning squadrons were
being
picked
apart to bring the deployers up to full strength.
I agree that we should SAU all communities that need it. If that allows
VFA
and/or
VF to remain as Reserve Squadrons great, but we do need to end the cycle
of
aircraft transfers.

Giz


From an idealist's standpoint, I agree with you... but after 17 years of
experience in Naval Air, I've observed that post-deployment airframe
transfers are the norm. More commonly, a squadron would put their jets
into
preservation for 1-2 months after coming back from deployment and lose
parts
support. In Hornet squadrons (because each squadron typically flies only
1
or 2 lots of jets (e.g. mine flies 8's and 9's) preservation is more
common
than transfers. What I'm saying is that in the TACAIR communities,
airframe transfers are not necessarily a gauge of health because Naval Air
has been unhealthy from a parts and airframes standpoint ever since I was
an
Ensign.

It may not mean as much as it did in my community. At one time each
squadron
"pretty much" owned their planes. Transfers were infrequent. The upkeep
these
planes got was great. As we lost airframes to hours or mods the transfer
game
began. Rarely did you get another squadron's gem. A lot of maint hours
went
into bringing those planes up to a true FMC status. They were transferred
up,
but you know, kind of up. As I look back, that time was the first signal
that we
were headed for trouble. That I believe is the cause of my prejudice
against a
policy of transfers. There's nothing like ownership to encourage upkeep.
That's
more of a motivator than any CO could come up with. I know that this thread
is about the possibility of losing that ownership in Navairres. I guess
each side
will be arguing that they should be the "haves" and not the "have nots". I
hope
the right choice is made, and I'm glad I don't have to make it.

Giz

A better indicator might be the number of airplanes air wings deploy with.
On my first cruise, an air wing had 90 aircraft. My most recent cruise:
70. That's all funding-driven. Sure we still have 46-50 bomb-droppers,
but
we could have more (i.e. an even better tooth-to-tail) if the budget would
allow it. The leadership has allowed (even promoted) the decrease to keep
aircraft carrier decks filled and because it looks more efficient. So
we're
agreed that Naval Aviation could be healthier--just not what the
indicators
of health are.

What's the cure? Certainly not shutting down the reserve hardware units.
The defense budget has been decreasing as a percentage of the total
federal
budget for a long time and there's no reason to suspect that it won't
continue to decrease. Even if the money from the reserves is absorbed
into
the active duty coffers, it will only serve as a band aid fix. And
without
extra capability to fund, congress will continue to shave off dollars in
the
years ahead because they will have no reason not to.

The net result will be
(a) "Termination" of the Navy's "insurance policy" (such as VFA-201
provided
for CVW-8 this year) and
(b) Loss of 60% of the Navy's adversary players (all reserve squadrons
right
now).

Because of the lack of adversary units, (and the fact that in the last 3
"wars" that there was no credible air-to-air threat) the case will be made
that air-to-air training syllabi can be decreased and/or civilian units
flying CAT III aircraft will be brought in to augment the VFC's. This "ca
rt
before the horse" mentality will certainly work in the short term, but
will
leave Naval aviators ill-prepared for conflicts involving better equipped
and more serious forces.

Sounds a lot like "the sky is falling." It's not, but it's getting a
whole
lot darker.

--Woody

Excellent point about ownership, and a good lesson in leadership.


"Giz" wrote in message
...


It may not mean as much as it did in my community. At one time each
squadron
"pretty much" owned their planes. Transfers were infrequent. The upkeep
these
planes got was great. As we lost airframes to hours or mods the transfer
game
began. Rarely did you get another squadron's gem. A lot of maint hours
went
into bringing those planes up to a true FMC status. They were transferred
up,
but you know, kind of up. As I look back, that time was the first signal
that we
were headed for trouble. That I believe is the cause of my prejudice
against a
policy of transfers. There's nothing like ownership to encourage upkeep.
That's
more of a motivator than any CO could come up with. .

Because of the lack of adversary units, (and the fact that in the last 3
"wars" that there was no credible air-to-air threat) the case will be made
that air-to-air training syllabi can be decreased and/or civilian units
flying CAT III aircraft will be brought in to augment the VFC's. This
"cart
before the horse" mentality will certainly work in the short term, but
will
leave Naval aviators ill-prepared for conflicts involving better equipped
and more serious forces.

From my amateur perspective, I'd say you nailed it elegantly and eloquently.
Some guys at the top seem to be suffering from the delusion that these
latest wars were high-intensity conflicts. Certainly, as you know infinitely
better than I do, there were a huge number of sorties and flight hours, but
I fear that the next one might be quite different.

I'd say high-intensity would be when you have a foe really trying to get his
fangs in your throat, when the planning and scenarios last about half an
hour before you get into crisis management (and stay there till the very
end), and you start getting some punches back. And it does not even need to
be more than what geopolitically amounts to a skirmish.

Lets say that something starts some serious exchange of fire in the Taiwan
straits. The CV battle group that's never far from there may be caught in
that for a few days while some serious worldwide diplomacy unravels it. And
the state and score of the disengaging CV will have monumental political
repercussions both in there and back at home.

For me, professional, in-house adversary work always meant you will fight
the way you train, and if you train really seriously, you'll be prepared.
Otherwise you'll have to get over the learning curve amidst the bullets and
the rockets, which a) takes time and b) is bloody. And you may very well not
have the a), and b) might be more than we can manage in the practical world.
Can the USN take a couple of Silkworms on a couple of CVs, and have them
limp home with some serious CVW losses and still be in a situation where it
is able to function? And I'm talking about the homefront in here, not about
the courage and dedication of the service members.

To have people train with "amateurs" for Gulf War III, makes me very
uneasy...
_____________
José Herculano

"Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message
...


A better indicator might be the number of airplanes air wings deploy with.
On my first cruise, an air wing had 90 aircraft. My most recent cruise:
70. That's all funding-driven. Sure we still have 46-50 bomb-droppers,
but
we could have more (i.e. an even better tooth-to-tail) if the budget would
allow it. The leadership has allowed (even promoted) the decrease to keep
aircraft carrier decks filled and because it looks more efficient.

To key on the last sentence here - I wonder if the cuts that have been
proposed are an effort to create a perceived decrease in cost and increase
in efficiency. Even flag officers have people above them they have to answer
to. Unfortunately, short term challenges may be met with short term
solutions which may create long term problems.


[snipped bits here]


The net result will be
(a) "Termination" of the Navy's "insurance policy" (such as VFA-201
provided
for CVW-8 this year) and
(b) Loss of 60% of the Navy's adversary players (all reserve squadrons
right
now).

Because of the lack of adversary units, (and the fact that in the last 3
"wars" that there was no credible air-to-air threat) the case will be made
that air-to-air training syllabi can be decreased and/or civilian units
flying CAT III aircraft will be brought in to augment the VFC's. This
"cart
before the horse" mentality will certainly work in the short term, but
will
leave Naval aviators ill-prepared for conflicts involving better equipped
and more serious forces.


I recall hearing about a company in Florida that advertised adversary
services ( http://www.aerogroupinc.com/welcome.html ). Good, bad, or ugly, I
can't say. Could such a company step in and effectively fill the need for
adversary training? Perhaps. Might this be what the leadership is looking at
when they consider disestablishing reserve squadrons currently filling that
role? Would this create a perception of budget savings - would it "look more
efficient"? The question of whether a private company can fill this roll is
interesting. Contractors may have a somewhat checkered reputation, though
such a contractor would have to hire the same kind of people who would have
manned a reserve squadron.

Issues this raises are -

1. The loss of corporate knowledge for the strike community.
2. Can a civilian company hire and retain quality people and ensure the
training provided will meet the needs of the fleet?

Regarding the strike community, I think the loss of "corporate knowledge"
and effective training is a serious issue. While diminishing this capability
may save a few dollars in the short term, my feeling is that the bill will
come due in the long term. This bill will likely be paid in blood.

In the face of proposed cuts, this thread has identified a number of
problems. I'll venture some ideas for some solutions: (when the term
"reserve" is used, assume it includes the guard as well, when applicable.)

1. War fighters (NOT exclusively strike). Keep the reserves alive. Retain
good people and hard earned corporate knowledge in a robust environment
where it can be applied and the people in the fleet can reap the benefits of
training from experienced, motivated peers.

2. Logistics can be contracted to civilian companies. "Ash and trash" is not
a war-fighting specialty, and there are plenty of companies in business
right now that can provide aerial logistics capability. This would eliminate
the need for NAVAIRES C-9 and C-130 squadrons. How much money would be saved
if the replacement of C-9s with 737s was scrapped? Reserve C-12s and the
Gulfstream squadron in DC could be disestablished and their roles be
outsourced as well.

3. VP, HS, HSL. There are missions close to home, homeland security being a
new priority, that these communities can support, especially now with many
of our active (and reserve!!) forces deployed. A revised mission statement,
along with revised funding priorities would make these units invaluable
assets for homeland and western hemisphere tasking - an ideal role for
reserve assets. If HS and HSL still have to be eliminated, send the budget
savings to the Coast Guard.

The revised mission statement: decreased emphasis on ASW and an increased
emphasis on patrol, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

4. Create (and support!!) reserve units of experienced reserve personnel who
can be utilized in the training and operational augmentation of active
units.

5. All service branches get together to determine how their respective
reserve resources can be best coordinated and utilized to create a more
comprehensive and effective supporting force structure.

My 2 cents.....OK, maybe more than 2 cents, how about 2 bits?

Eric Scheie

Well done. Very well written post.

The loss of Naval Air Reserve hardware units would be a tragedy. It is a
short-sighted move initiated not by the politicians (like GWB as has been
suggested) but by the active duty Flag Officers.

Unfortunately, the casualty will be the cost-effective "insurance policy"
and professional adversary elements of Naval Aviation. Don't think for a
moment that the VFC's can handle all of the commitments. VFC's cover
SFARP's, but the FRS's have relied heavily on the reserve VFA's to be their
bogies.

By the way, this is no surprise to those of us in the reserves. Ever since
the separate appropriation line for the Naval Reserves was melded into the
active duty's line, this has only been a matter of time. For the last two
years, they've been trying to write VFA-203 out of the budget and in the
short term, this year, it looks as if they've succeeded.

The only thing that will keep USNR air alive will be heavy congressional
involvement.

--Woody

On 7/4/03 3:07 PM, in article
, "Eric Scheie"
wrote:

Mr. Kambic makes some good points below, and the first paragraph of his I
left below is very true. The Navy has never quite seemed to been able to
integrate its reserve forces in the manner that the USAF has, even with the
drawdown after Desert Storm, when the reserves became a greater percentage
of the total force. The last USNR squadron I was in had spent the last few
years conducting 6 month deployments aboard ship. Unheard of not long
before.

What are some advantages of a robust reserve force? A typical RESFORON is
manned by aviators with an average of ten or more years of experience. These
aviators come at a cost of about 1/3 of their active duty counterparts. They
leave active duty for a variety of reasons, but allowing them to continue to
serve in a reserve capacity enables the Navy to retain experienced people at
a low cost. People who can be mobilized in time of national crisis. It's a
face card in the back pocket of the leadership.

I think someone made a statement that getting rid of some of the RESFORONS
will free up airframes for active duty squadrons.To me, that reasoning
sounds like a poor Band-Aid for an airframe availability problem. The
airframes the reserves get are usually the beaters and cast-offs from the
active duty. (It took a good deal of scraping to find FOUR airframes to
stand up HSL-60, all of which were put through rework before being sent to
the squadron.) Decimating reserve squadrons is not going to solve the woes
of the active duty side of nav air. As Mr. Kambic alluded to in his second
paragraph below, it may, in fact, lead to other problems in the future. If
getting rid of RESFORONS, hardware, and people, is seen as a solution to
budget problems, I think there may some more serious, underlying issues at
work.

Is there waste in the Naval Reserve? A certain amount exists on both sides
of the fence, and it becomes a matter of where you want to shine the
spotlight, your point of view, and your ability to spin.

One plan I have heard suggested is that reserve aircrews become part of
"augment units" that support active duty squadrons. This raised a few
questions, and I don't recall if they were really answered. How are the
reserve aircrews funded? Who will manage their continued training and
operating within the active duty squadrons? Could such a plan work? I think
so, but only if the active duty squadrons see the reserves as a benefit to
them.

Of course, as with any plan, the one that started this whole thread could
change by next week. In the end we shall see what we shall see.

Just my 2 cents.

Eric Scheie


"Bill Kambic" wrote in message
...

More to the point, loss of an internal Reserve hardware capability is
unlikely to EVER return. The RESFORONS have always been "poor relations"
but made do with what they had and sometimes embarassed Active Duty types
in
head to head competition. The Active Duty types have, in my personal
presence, often noted the vast "wastage" of funds on the Reserve hardware
units. (To be completely fair, a fair number have also "looked behind the
curtain" and seen the reasons why hardware units are a Very Good Thing.)

The likelyhood of facing the hords of the Red Army (or the late,
unlamented
Soviet Navy) is very small. But there are still places where you can lose
a
bunch of aircraft and people in a hurry and have to replace them the same
way (a "dust up" in North Korea comes to mind). The complexity of modern
aircraft means that the "WWII Approach" of 90 day wonder to Fleet Fighter
Pilot in a year (or so) is unlikely to EVER be seen again. This means
that
you have to have a "well" of trained people to draw on in time of crisis.
The REFORON/SRU hardware units filled that need. When they "go away" so
will a cheap solution to an expensive problem.

Bill Kambic

Formerly of VS-73 (the SRU part whose numbers escape me) and VP-93
(ditto),
NAF Detroit, 1974-1978